The decision to recall: A behavioral investigation in the medical device industry

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1016/j.jom.2018.07.003
Published date01 September 2018
AuthorRachna Shah,George P. Ball,Karen Donohue
Date01 September 2018
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Operations Management
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jom
The decision to recall: A behavioral investigation in the medical device
industry
George P. Ball
a,
, Rachna Shah
b
, Karen Donohue
b
a
Operations and Decision Technologies Department, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, 1309 East 10th Street, Bloomington, IN, 47405, United States
b
Supply Chain and Operations Department, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota, 321 Nineteenth Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN, 55455-0438,
United States
ARTICLE INFO
Accepted by: S. de Treville.
Keywords:
Product recalls
Behavioral operations
Human experiment
Cognitive reection
ABSTRACT
The decision to recall a product can signicantly aect an operations manager's career, the credibility and
nancial performance of the rm, and the safety of customers. Despite the importance of this decision, there has
been little behavioral research on what inuences judgment in this task. Leveraging insights from interviews
with regulators and professionals in the medical device industry, and supported by behavioral theory, we
identify a set of factors that may inuence the recall decision. We test the eect of these factors using a primary
experiment with 167 managers from a Fortune 500 medical device rm and a replication study with 614 subjects
from Amazon Mechanical Turk. We nd that a physician's ability to detect a defect prior to product use decreases
the likelihood to recall, while a manager's understanding of the root cause of the defect increases the likelihood
to recall. In a second study with 372 Amazon Mechanical Turk subjects, we nd that perceived patient customer
harm and perceived cost of the recall both mediate the relationship between defect detectability and recall
likelihood, but that harm is more inuential than cost. Further, the perceived cost of the recall also mediates the
relationship between root cause understanding and recall likelihood. By uncovering behavioral factors and their
mechanisms in the recall decision, this study oers important insights to both industry and regulators.
1. Introduction
The question of whether to recall a product is one of the most im-
portant, yet complex, decisions an operations manager may face in their
career. The criteria for recalling a product is highly contextual, multi-
dimensional, and necessitates balancing the rm's protability and re-
putation with customer satisfaction, customer safety, and regulatory
oversight. This is particularly salient in the medical device industry.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the federal regulator re-
sponsible for medical device recalls in the U.S., recently reported that
after controlling for market growth, the number of medical devices
recalled between 2002 and 2012 increased nearly 50%, with the ma-
jority of these recalls having customer safety implications.
1
Surpris-
ingly, the FDA does not clearly specify how a manager should integrate
the multiple, and potentially conicting, criteria inuencing whether or
not to recall a product. Consequently, managers frequently use
individual judgment in arriving at recall decisions.
Examples of recently publicized product recall incidents suggest
that managerial judgment related to recalls may benet from rigorous
academic study. On the one hand, some products are not recalled when
perhaps they should be. For instance, in 2010, Johnson & Johnson was
sanctioned by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for neglecting
to issue a product recall in a timely manner after receiving numerous
customer complaints related to multiple faulty products.
2
Conversely,
there is also evidence of products being recalled perhaps unnecessarily.
For example, between 2008 and 2010, Toyota recalled almost ten
million vehicles due to alleged unintended acceleration or sticky gas
pedals.Initially, Toyota denied that their cars had a quality problem,
but later succumbed to intense pressure from customers, regulators, and
the media, and recalled all potentially faulty units.
3
Eventually, after
numerous investigations, including those completed by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), it was determined that
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jom.2018.07.003
Received 20 July 2017; Received in revised form 15 July 2018; Accepted 23 July 2018
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: gpball@indiana.edu (G.P. Ball), shahx024@umn.edu (R. Shah), donoh008@umn.edu (K. Donohue).
1
https://www.gao.gov/assets/320/319565.pdf.
2
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/01/AR2010050103051.html.
3
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/05/who-was-really-at-fault-for-the-toyota-recalls/238076/.
Journal of Operations Management 62 (2018) 1–15
Available online 07 August 2018
0272-6963/ © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
T

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT