The Deaths of Ideas in Congress

• Published date: 01 September 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241246003
• Author: Jeremy Gelman
• Date: 01 September 2024
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Political Research Quarterly

2024, Vol. 77(3) 772–786

© The Author(s) 2024

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DOI: 10.1177/10659129241246003

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The Deaths of Ideas in Congress

Jeremy Gelman

Abstract

Research on lawmaking generally examines why lawmakers enact certain policy ideas. However, most ideas in the United

States Congress never become law. Eventually, members stop introducing them altogether. This process, where poli cies

are proposed, not acted on, and no longer advocated for is, by far, the most common legislative outcome. The literature

pays it little attention. Yet, how ideas die is important in understanding why some measures stop being realistic al-

ternatives, the importance of policy entrepreneurship, and how policy windows affect the supply of ideas. This paper

analyzes why congressional ideas die. I argue and f‌ind that the proposals designed to be enacte d, especially by legislators

with more issue expertise and agenda-setting powers, are less likely to persist across terms. I also show that ideas

disappear more often when their sponsors leave Congress, but do not f‌ind a similar patte rn for when policy windows

close and lawmaking conditions worsen.

Keywords

Congress, lawmaking, agenda-setting, text analysis

Introduction

Who or what is killing policy ideas on Capitol Hill?

Although most attention is paid to measures that fail

loudly, by f‌ilibuster, the veto, or inter-chamber dis-

agreements, most quietly disappear. They are simply not

reintroduced in the next congressional term. This process,

in which an idea is proposed, not enacted into law, and

then not proposed again is, by far, the most common life

cycle for a congressional measure. Yet, we know very

little about why legislators continue to reintroduce policy

ideas or let them disappear from the legislative agenda.

1

In one sense, this lack of scholarly attention makes

sense. Understanding how an idea is enacted, and comes

to affect people’s lives, is important. By def‌inition,

measures that are not enacted, especially those no longer

considered, are functionally irrelevant. Yet, understanding

why ideas disappear is important for two reasons. First, an

idea must f‌irst be introduced to be enacted. Although

seemingly obvious, the legislative agenda’s scope def‌ines

what is possible. Once an idea leaves it, the measure is no

longer a viable option.

Second, the reasons why ideas disappear speak to

important questions about inf‌luence and power in Con-

gress. Research on lawmaking and descriptive represen-

tation emphasizes the importance of policy entrepreneurs

bringing new ideas to Congress (Kingdon 2003;Schiller

1995). Indeed, a signif‌icant amount of research, partic-

ularly on descriptive representation, contends that

members’backgrounds shape their legislative proposals

(Griff‌in 2014). Yet, this connection between members

being the only or main champions of an idea is largely

assumed. Political scientists know very little about how

much a measure is tied to a specif‌ic legislator and even

less about its durability once their main advocate leaves

off‌ice. Studying the process by which an idea leaves the

agenda offers insight about how closely a proposal is

tethered to an individual member and the importance of

that initial entrepreneurship. Put differently, once intro-

duced, does the measure gain a life of its own?

Similarly, theories of agenda-setting and legislative

effectiveness emphasize that introduced ideas rely on

either having supporters build momentum or waiting for

the right moment (Baumgartner and Jones 2009;Kingdon

2003;Volden and Wiseman 2014). Although many case

studies show that some proposals linger in Congress for

years and eventually become law, most do not (Rawat and

University of Nevada, Reno, NV, USA

Corresponding Author:

Jeremy Gelman, Department of Political Science, University of Nevada,

1664 N. Virginia St, MS 0302, Reno, NV 89557, USA.

Email: jgelman@unr.edu