The Daubert Revolution and Lanham Act Surveys

AuthorG. Kip Edwards
Pages329-362
329
15
THE
DAUBERT
REVOLUTION AND
LANHAM ACT SURVEYS
By G. Kip Edwards*
No survey is beyond criticism, especially in the context of litigation.
Courts therefore recognize that many criticisms of surveys used in
litigation are appropriate topics of cross-examination and contrary
evidence to reduce the weight of the survey without requiring that it be
excluded. There are limits, however. The court need not and should not
respond reflexively to every criticism by saying it merely ‘goes to the
weight’ of the survey rather than to its admissibility.1
INTRODUCTION
The standardsand pretrial proceduresbywhich expert testimonyis
admitted orexcluded in federal court Lanham Acttrialswerethe subject
of anot-so-quietrevolution asaresultof the Supreme Court’s 1993
1. Simon Property Group, L.P. v.mySimon, Inc., 104F.Supp. 2d1033,1039(S.D.
Ind. 2000)(citationsomitted).
The authoracknowledgeswithappreciation the helpfulcomments of Dr.AnnaBelle
Sartoreand Dr.Gerald L. Ford, partners of FordBubala &Associates,and Dr.E.
Deborah Jay,Presidentand Chief ExecutiveOfficerof Field Research Corporation.
Section VI
330
Daubert decision.2Gone wasthe so-called Frye3test,controlling but controversial
in federal courts forover70years,underwhich expert opinion testimonywas
inadmissible unless itwasbased upon scientific techniquesthatweregenerally
acceptedin the relevantscientific community. 4The admissibility of expert testimony,
post- Daubert,isnowbased upon the Federal Rulesof Evidence, effectivein1973,that
contain detailed provisionsgoverning expert testimony,and specificallyRule 702. 5
UnderDaubert,districtcourts arerequired todischarge agatekeepingfunction
when faced withexpert testimony,almost always during pretrial proceedings.The
primary Daubert issuestoberuled upon aretwo: isthe proposed expert testimony
“relevant” tothe issuesin the case?Thisissue, summarized aswhetherthe expert’s
testimony“fits” withthe caseissues,istoberesolved byasking whetherthe expert’s
testimony,ifadmitted, speaksdirectlytoadisputed issueinthe case. If so, the district
court isthen required todetermine whetherthe proposed testimonyis“reliable,i.e.,
whetherthe expert’s proposed testimonyisbased upon principlesand methodology
based upon “scientific knowledge.6
The Daubert decision dealtwith“scientificevidence7and the Court expresslylimited
its decision to“the scientific context becausethatisthe natureofthe expertiseoffered
here.8Sixyears later,the Court held thatDaubert applied toall expert” testimony
described in Rule 702—notonlytotestimonybased upon “scientificknowledge but also
totestimonybased upon “technicaland otherspecializedknowledge.9
The Kumho decision removed anydoubtabout the applicability of Daubert to
Lanham Actsurveyevidence. Asdiscussed below,challengestothe admissibility of
surveys in Lanham ActcasesbeforeDaubert almost always resulted in adecision to
admitthe evidence;“defects” in the surveymethodology,universedefinitions,questions,
stimulus presentation, orinterpretation of results rarelyled toadecision toexclude that
evidence, but instead weresaid tobeissuesthatwenttothe weightorcredibility tobe
given tothe evidence bythe trierof fact,judge, orjury.Daubert changed all that.
2.Daubert v.Merrell DowPharmaceuticals,Inc., 509U.S. 579(1993)(hereinafterDaubert).
3.Fryev.United States,293F. 1013(D.C. Cir.1923).
4. The Frye test originated in whatthe Daubert Court called a“short and citation freedecision in
which the court stated that“while courts will go along wayin admitting expert testimonydeduced from
awell-recognized scientific principle ordiscovery,the thing from which the deduction ismade must be
sufficientlyestablished tohavegained general acceptance in the particularfield in which itbelongs.”293
F. at1014.
5. Atthe time of the Daubert decision, Rule 702 provided that:If scientific, technical, orother
specialized knowledge will assist the trierof facttounderstand the evidence ortodetermine afactin
issue, awitness qualified asan expert byknowledge,skill, experience, training, oreducation, maytestify
thereon in the formofanopinion orotherwise.Rule 702 wasamended in 2000 toreflectDaubert and
subsequentdecisions.See 333,infra.
6.Thereisathirdissue, i.e., whetherthe expert isqualified. While thisisrarelyaseriouslylitigated
issue, itdoescome upfrom time totime when aparty seekstoextendan expert’s trueexpertiseinto
areaswherethe proffered opinionslack anyfoundation. See 355–357,infra.
7.The issueinDaubert waswhetherthe plaintiffs’ children had birthdefects caused bythe mothers’
pre-birthingestion of Bendectin, aprescription anti-nausea drugmarketed byMerrell Dow.
8. Daubert, 509U.S. at590n.8.
9. Kumho TireCompany,Ltd. v.Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,147(1999) (hereinafterKumho).
The
Daubert
Revolution and Lanham Act Surveys 331
Daubert motionsseeking toexclude surveyevidence arenowroutine in Lanham
Actlitigation. Thisdoesnotmean, however,thatsuch motionsshould routinely
be filed. Asdiscussed in detail below,the caselawdealing withsurveyexperts in
Lanham Actcasesstronglysuggests thatDaubert motions,iffiled atall, should be
“surgical strikes,”ratherthan all out war.The latterrarelysucceeds.Thischapter
will hopefullyassist Lanham Actlawyers in deciding whethertomake Daubert
motionsand in determining the scope of thosemotions.
Afterareviewof the Supreme Court decisions,thischapterprovidesexamplesof
and citationstocaseswheresurveyevidence waschallenged underDaubert,withan
emphasison thosecaseswherethe evidence wasexcluded orgiven little orno weight.The
discussion isorganized bythe primary elements of surveys.The chapterthen discussesthe
caseswhereanexpert soughttotestifywithout benefitof asurvey,eitheron substantive
elements of the caseorasan expert critiquing the otherside’s surveyevidence.
THE SUPREME COURT AND EXPERT EVIDENCE
The Daubert Decision
The Daubert casewasbroughtbythe parents of children bornwithserious birth
defects allegedlycaused bythe mothers’ taking of Bendectin, an anti-nausea drug.
In responsetothe defendant’smotion forsummary judgment,plaintiffsoffered
the testimonyof eightexperts withimpressivecredentials,each of whom opined
thatBendectin could causebirthdefects.None of theseopinionswasbased on
epidemiological studies,but instead on animal-cell studies,pharmacological studies
of Bendectin’s chemical structure, and a“reanalysis” of earlierepidemiological
studies.The districtcourt granted the defendant’smotion, concluding thatthe
plaintiffs’ expert evidence wasinadmissible. Applying the Frye standard(scientific
evidence isadmissible onlyif the principle on which itisbased was“sufficiently
established tohavegeneral acceptance in the field towhich itbelongs”10), the court
concludedthatevidence notbased on epidemiological studieswasinadmissible to
establishcausation.
The NinthCircuitaffirmed. Thatcourt stated thatexpert opinion testimonybased
on ascientific techniqueisinadmissible unless thattechniqueisgenerallyaccepted as
reliable.11 Opinion testimonybased upon amethodologythatdiverges“significantly
from the proceduresaccepted byrecognized authoritiesin the field ...cannotbe
showntobegenerallyaccepted asareliable technique.’”12
10.Daubert v.Merrell DowPharmaceuticals,Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570,572 (S.D. Cal. 1989), quoting
United Statesv.Kilgus,571F.2d508, 510(9thCir.1978).
11. Daubert v.Merrell DowPharmaceuticals,Inc., 951 F.2d1128, 1129–30 (9thCir.1991).
12.Id.at1130.Othercourts of appeal had refused toadmitexpert evidence based on reanalysesof
Bendectin becausethosestudieshad notbeen published orsubjected topeerreview,contrasted withthe
massive”weightof published studiesshowing no causation thathad received full scrutiny” from the
scientific community.

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