The Cost of Doing Business: Congressional Requests, Cost, and Allocation of Presidential Resources

• DOI: 10.1177/1065912918763748
• Date: 01 December 2018
• Published date: 01 December 2018
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918763748

Political Research Quarterly

2018, Vol. 71(4) 813 –825

© 2018 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912918763748

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Article

How do presidents allocate the political resources under

their control? Broadly, the literature suggests that politi-

cal incentives structure how and when presidents deploy

executive resources, including outlays of money and

time. Rather than functioning as strictly universalistic

stewards for effective national policies, presidents target

politically valuable constituencies to reward (Kriner and

Reeves 2015a, 2), especially as presidents seek reelection

(Cohen 2006; Light [1982] 1998; Wood 2009). Allocating

resources to politically friendly territories allow presi-

dents to use their executive resources to their full advan-

tages, especially in states that are consequential for

reelection efforts (Hudak 2014; Kriner and Reeves 2012).

Presidential efforts to build political capacity are also

highlighted by allocation of resources such as disaster

declarations (Kriner and Reeves 2015b), perpetuating

military base operations (Kriner and Reeves 2015a), and

geographic locations of post offices (Rogowski 2015).

Despite the many studies exploring the president’s strate-

gic interbranch relationship with Congress, none have

looked at the informal avenue of Congressional requests

made to the White House and the White House’s granting

of these requests as part of president’s targeting of

resources to members of Congress. This article argues the

president prioritizes the requests of certain members based

upon their strategic value to the White House, contingent

upon the cost of the request, and uses a unique new data

set to examine this behavior.

Given the resource advantages, presidents may priori-

tize their choices to deliver specific items to members of

Congress—deliverable policy and political items only the

president can provide through his unique executive func-

tion. Presidents may allocate executive resources in the

form of benefits to geographic locations that elect or may

elect copartisans to Congress. For example, Covington

(1988) finds presidents reward supporters and

Congressional and party leaders in allocating presidential

perks (White House social invitations). Christenson,

Kriner, and Reeves (2017) also show that presidents allo-

cate more federal grants to states with copartisan sena-

tors, especially recently elected copartisans. Executive

agencies also play a role in the distribution of “pork,”

where cabinet agencies award more federal grants or con-

tracts to states with senators of more proximate ideolo-

gies to the president (Bertelli and Grose 2009). We

763748PRQXXX10.1177/1065912918763748Political Research QuarterlyRottinghaus and Waggoner

research-article2018

1University of Houston, TX, USA

Corresponding Author:

Philip D. Waggoner, Department of Political Science, University of

Houston, 3551 Cullen Boulevard, Room 447, Philip Guthrie Hoffman

Hall, Houston, TX 77204, USA.

Email: pdwaggoner@uh.edu

The Cost of Doing Business:

Congressional Requests, Cost, and

Allocation of Presidential Resources

Brandon Rottinghaus1 and Philip D. Waggoner1

Abstract

Executive-legislative interactions operate with cost-benefit trade-offs. Presidents possess several material options in

granting Congressional requests to leverage Congressional support but must also marshal these scarce resources. We

argue presidents should strategically grant requests from members of Congress for a range of executive actions based

upon the cost of the request and the political context. Using an original data set of nearly 4,000 internal Congressional

requests made during the Eisenhower, Ford, and H. W. Bush administrations, we find that presidents are strategic

in granting requests, where the cost of the request is an important consideration when deciding whether or not to

approve a legislator request, especially on executive appointments but not on legislative matters. Ideological proximity

to the president matters more than partisanship in granting requests. Presidents are sensitive to cost when ideology

is concerned but less so when granting requests to committee chairs. We conclude by highlighting the implications

for interbranch bargaining.

Keywords

congressional requests, presidential resources, interbranch bargaining, executive politics, legislative politics