The Contract with America and Conditional Party Government in State Legislatures

• Published date: 01 June 2009
• Date: 01 June 2009
• Author: Richard A. Clucas
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912908320667
• Subject Matter: Articles

Political Research Quarterly
Volume 62 Number 2
June 2009 317-328
© 2009 University of Utah
The Contract with America and
10.1177/1065912908320667
http://prq.sagepub.com
Conditional Party Government in
hosted at
http://online.sagepub.com
State Legislatures
Richard A. Clucas
Mark O. Hatfield School of Government, Portland State University, Oregon
This study tests two theories of legislative leadership by comparing the power of majority-party leaders in states
where the Republican Party adopted a state-level version of “The Contract with America” in 1994, with that of leaders
in states where no contract was adopted. Using a nationwide survey of legislators to rank power, the study finds that
the lower house leaders in contract states were stronger in 1995, as were those from states in which the public was
ideologically polarized along partisan lines. The results provide support for conditional party government theory
while expanding our knowledge of state legislative politics.
Keywords:
legislative leadership; state legislatures; Contract with America; state politics; conditional party government;
pivotal politics
How important of a role do party leaders play in 1991). Alternatively, some studies examine whether
legislative politics? This question is at the center
policy outcomes are determined solely by the
of debate among different positive theories of con-
members’ policy preferences or if the party leaders
gressional behavior (Cox and McCubbins 2005;
have an independent effect (Aldrich and Rohde 1997;
Shepsle and Weingast 1994; Smith 2000). Yet despite
Krehbiel 1991, 1998).
the extensive literature that has addressed this ques-
This study deviates from these past approaches by
tion over the past few decades, the importance of
examining leadership in state legislatures and by
party leaders in legislative politics is far from conclu-
using a unique political event—the adoption of the
sive. The purpose of this study is to improve our the-
Republican “Contract with the American People”—
oretical understanding of legislative leadership by
to test these theories. Rather than relying on roll-call
offering a broader approach to testing Aldrich and
votes to determine legislators’ policy preferences as
Rohde’s theory of conditional party government
is done in congressional studies, I categorized a state
(CPG; Aldrich and Rohde 1997; Rohde 1991) and
as having met the conditions of CPG depending on
Krehbiel’s theory of pivotal politics (Krehbiel 1991,
whether the Republican Party in the state adopted its
1998). The primary question this study addresses is
own version of the “Republican Contract with the
whether leaders are stronger when the preferences of
American People” in the 1994 election. In essence, I
the majority party are more homogenous and when
used the adoption of a state-level contract as an indi-
they are distinct from the preferences of the minority
cator as to whether there was intraparty homogeneity
party, as Aldrich and Rohde argue, or whether lead-
in party members’ policy preferences and interparty
ership is not significant in shaping outcomes, as
polarization. I then compared the power of the leg-
Krehbiel maintains.
islative leaders in these states in the 1995 legislative
To test these competing theories, most congres-
session with the power of leaders in states in which
sional studies have focused on the impact of legisla-
the parties did not adopt such a contract.
tors’ policy preferences on the power of party leaders
By expanding the empirical focus to state legisla-
and on policy outcomes. Frequently, these studies
tures and by using this alternative method to identify
rely on roll-call votes to identify members’ policy
the conditions of CPG, this study offers a consider-
preferences to determine whether the conditions of
ably different approach to testing these theories. The
CPG have been met. The researchers then explore
how the presence of CPG shapes the power delegated
Richard A. Clucas, Professor of Political Science, Portland State
to party leaders (Aldrich and Rohde 1997; Rohde
University; e-mail: hprc@pdx.edu.
317

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Political Research Quarterly
benefit of this approach is that the findings from
Aldrich and Rohde (1997) argue that the primary
the study should give us far greater confidence in the
conditions in which partisans are likely to expand the
accuracy and generalizability of the theories. If the
power of their leaders are when the policy prefer-
theories are correct, we would expect them to explain
ences of the majority party are more homogenous and
behavior in other legislatures beyond Congress and
when there is a clearer distinction between the major-
by using alternative forms of measurements. Of equal
ity party’s preferences and those of the minority
importance, the study allows us to improve our know-
party. When these conditions are met, the majority
ledge of state legislative politics.
party will expand the resources provided to the lead-
In the section that follows, I explain Aldrich and
ership so that the leaders are better able to help the
Rohde’s (1997) argument and compare it with the per-
party to obtain its policy preferences.
spective on leadership put forward in the pivotal poli-
Krehbiel’s (1998) work raises questions, however,
tics theory offered by Krehbiel (1991, 1998). After
as to whether we should expect increased polariza-
that, I explain the history of these state contracts and
tion to generate stronger leaders. Krehbiel argues
why they provide a good test of Aldrich and Rohde’s
that Congress is governed by majority rule and, as a
theory. In the subsequent sections, I describe the
consequence, legislative outcomes are determined
methods, data, and findings. Using a nationwide sur-
by the majority of the membership of the entire
vey of state legislators to rank the power of the major-
House and not by the majority party. Krehbiel por-
ity party leaders in the 49 state lower houses, I find
trays legislative parties and leaders as playing a mar-
that the leaders in the states that adopted their own
ginal role at best in this process. The factor that
contracts were significantly stronger in the 1995 leg-
determines the outcome of public policy is not the
islative session than the leaders in states where the
activities of the party or their leaders but the position
Republican Party did not adopt a contract. In addition,
of the median or pivotal voter within the legislature.
the leaders were stronger in states where public opin-
For us, the implication of Krehbiel’s argument is that
ion polls identified greater ideological polarization
the increased polarization between the parties would
between the state parties. These results provide strong
not be expected to produce an increase in the power
support for the theory of CPG and counterevidence
of party leaders because the principle of majority
against Krehbiel’s theory.
rule will not have changed. The parties may be more
polarized, but outcomes will still be determined by
Theory
the pivotal voter’s position. A more complete expla-
nation for why Krehbiel’s theory leads to the hypoth-
The theoretical debate on congressional leadership
esis that an increase in polarization will not produce
has spawned three primary schools of thought. One of
more powerful party leaders is provided in Aldrich
these schools has grown out of the work by Krehbiel
and Rohde (1997).
(1991, 1998), which de-emphasizes the importance of
In his review of the literature, Smith (2000) is par-
party leaders and instead emphasizes the importance of
ticularly critical of the pivotal politics thesis, writing
the median or pivotal voter in shaping policy outcomes.
that the “empirical case against parties is unconvinc-
Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) offer an alternative
ing and appears to be fading as new evidence is mar-
perspective. They maintain that parties and their leaders
shaled” (p. 203). Yet the research supporting CPG is
have always played an influential role in the House,
also incomplete. One of the problems in the theoreti-
even during periods of the mid-twentieth century when
cal debate is narrowness in scope, both in how
they are frequently identified by scholars as being less
researchers discern preferences and in the subfield’s
significant. A third school is offered by Aldrich and
nearly complete concentration on the U.S. House of
Rohde (1997) and Rohde (1991), who argue that the
Representatives. The primary method that is used to
power of congressional leaders is not constant, but that
discern preferences is through the use of roll-call
“under specifiable conditions,” congressional parties
votes. The potential problem with relying on roll-call
are more “likely to expand the power granted to party
votes, as Rohde (1994) argues, is that “roll call votes
leadership and organizations, and to increase the
are not preferences; they are decisions which are the
resources channeled to them to act on those powers”
consequence of the interaction of preferences and the
(Aldrich and Rohde 1997, 546).1 For this study, I am
alternatives that are before the legislators” (p. 346; also
interested in exploring the positive theories put forward
see Smith 2000). This is not to say that roll-call votes
by Aldrich and Rohde and by Krehbiel.
should not be used as a means to assess legislators’

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Clucas / The Contract with America
319
preference. Certainly, the use of roll-call data has
find stronger leaders in legislatures in which there is
proven quite valuable in...