The Constrained Governor
| Published date | 01 September 2016 |
| Date | 01 September 2016 |
| Author | Christopher A. Cooper,H. Gibbs Knotts,Jordan Ragusa |
| DOI | 10.1177/1065912916652504 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2016
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2016, Vol. 69(3) 482 –494
The Constrained Governor: Exploring
© 2016 University of Utah
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Gubernatorial Decision Making on Senate DOI: 10.1177/1065912916652504
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Appointments
Christopher A. Cooper1, H. Gibbs Knotts2, and Jordan Ragusa2
Abstract
In the vast majority of American states, governors have unrestricted authority to fill Senate vacancies, and in an average
decade, one-third of all Americans have been represented by an appointed senator. Despite the importance of Senate
appointments both theoretically and substantively, no published study has investigated the dynamics of gubernatorial
selection. In this paper, we compile an original data set of Senate appointees as well as the list of the candidates the
governor considered but did not select. We model the governor’s selection and discover that despite having no
formal constraints on their appointment power, governors behave as constrained actors. In particular, we find that
governors eschew the potential appointees who are closest to their policy views and instead appoint the candidate
who is closest to the ideological position of the voters in their state. This effect is particularly pronounced when the
governor is eligible for reelection within two years. These findings have both theoretical and normative implications
for understanding Senate appointments, gubernatorial decision making, and the implicit power of the electorate.
Keywords
Senate appointments, Congress, governors, gubernatorial decision making, federalism, median voter theorem
Introduction
elections to fill vacancies, giving the governor no appoint-
ment power (Neale 2013).
On November 29, 2012, U.S. Senator Jim DeMint
In an environment where formal gubernatorial powers
(Republican [R]-SC) surprised the political world by
are subject to important constraints, the ability to select a
resigning his seat.1 Speculation quickly moved from why
senator is one example where governors have unfettered
DeMint resigned to who would replace him. As reported
power over both the state and federal government. Unlike
by a variety of national and state media outlets, Republican
federal judicial nominations, which are appointed by the
Governor Nikki Haley narrowed the list of potential
president but must be approved by the Senate, a gover-
appointees to five: South Carolina Department of Health
nor’s preferred candidate does not require approval by
and Environmental Control Director Catherine Templeton,
any other institution, office, or person. Constraints on
former first lady of the state Jenny Sanford, former South
executive power, like whether the state is in a period of
Carolina attorney general Henry McMaster, U.S. divided government or whether the legislature is polar-
Representative Trey Gowdy, and U.S. Representative Tim
ized, are simply not relevant in this case. In sum, guber-
Scott (Allen 2012). All five were prominent Republicans,
natorial appointments of U.S. senators represent a rare
and four of five had held high-level political offices;
opportunity to explore executive decision making in a
Haley ultimately selected Congressman Scott.
highly salient, politically important context without for-
Although the media treated DeMint’s resignation and
mal institutional constraints. If we find that governors
Scott’s appointment as unusual events, gubernatorial
follow the will of the people in this situation, it would be
appointments of U.S. senators are fairly common, having
occurred more than 190 times between 1913 and 2014.
1
Governors have unfettered power to appoint individuals
Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, NC, USA
2College of Charleston, SC, USA
to vacant Seats in forty-one states (Neale 2013). Six of
the remaining states (Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Corresponding Author:
Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming) allow gubernatorial
Christopher A. Cooper, Department of Political Science and Public
Affairs, Western Carolina University, Stillwell 358, Cullowhee, NC
appointments with certain limits.2 Just three states 28723, USA.
(Oregon, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin) mandate special
Email: ccooper@email.wcu.edu
Cooper et al.
483
an important sign that public opinion can be heard even in
situations where politicians are not mandated to follow,
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in
or even acknowledge, their constituents’ wishes. If, on
the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue
the contrary, governors ignore the will of the people, it
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the
could provide fodder for those who argue that gubernato-
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof
rial appointments are inherently undemocratic (Clem
to make temporary appointments until the people fill the
vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. (U.S.
1966; Shedd 2011). No matter the answer, addressing this
Constitution, Amendment 17, Clause 2)
question should inform a variety of literatures that con-
sider political appointments in federal systems.
This is also politically consequential yet, as we stated
Senate appointments are worthy of study not only
above, underinvestigated.
because of their theoretical interest but also because of
This is not to say that there is no published work on
their political importance. There are many appointed sen-
U.S. Senate appointments. Indeed, a number of scholars
ators who have had long careers in the U.S. Senate, have
have investigated various aspects of the appointment
risen to chair powerful committees, and have had lasting
process, and the subsequent behavior of the appointed
impact on public policy. For example, Harry F. Byrd Jr.
senators. Work on this subject falls within two primary
was appointed to the U.S. Senate in 1965 and served
research areas. The first examines normative questions
almost twenty years. Byrd made a mark not only by his
about the nature of representation in Senate appoint-
public policies but also because his switch from Democrat
ments, whereas the second examines the electoral for-
to Independent was, as Larry Sabato noted, a “harbinger
tunes of appointed versus elected senators. Both research
of the decline of partisan identification that took place in
streams give us insights into gubernatorial decision mak-
the 1970s and 1980s all across the country” (USA Today
ing, the quality of the candidates selected, and the impli-
2013). Other prominent appointed senators include cations of these two factors for the democratic process.
Lincoln Chafee (R-RI) and Sam Ervin (D-NC), the chair
of the Senate Watergate Committee.
Although Senate appointments are theoretically The Antidemocratic Nature of Senate
important and politically consequential, we are not aware
Appointments
of any study that has modeled the dynamics of gubernato-
rial selection. Existing research has examined normative
The normative scholarship on Senate appointments tends
issues surrounding gubernatorial decision making and the
to view the Seventeenth Amendment’s call for gubernato-
fate of those senators who are appointed, but the gover-
rial appointment of senators rather circumspectly. In an
nor’s choice has, until now, been a black box. We believe
early example, Clem (1966, 53) argued that gubernatorial
this question remains unexplored because of the chal-
appointments of senators creates a “gap in popular repre-
lenges of, first, identifying the considered (but not
sentation” that must be addressed. More recently, Shedd
selected) candidates and, second, measuring the ideology
(2011) raised similar questions concerning the antidemo-
of the considered candidates on the same scale as the gov-
cratic nature of Senate appointments but expanded that
ernor, former officeholder, and appointee. We offer solu-
focus to the potential for scandal caused by gubernatorial
tions to both issues by cataloging lists of candidates who
appointments. He notes several high-profile examples,
were considered by the governor, and by employing new
including Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich’s conviction
data on the ideology of every candidate who ran for a
for conspiracy and soliciting bribes when he attempted to
state and federal office (Bonica 2014).
“sell the open Senate seat” vacated by Barack Obama
(p. 962). “Surprisingly,” he noted, “although the first
What We Know about Senate
clause of the Seventeenth Amendment—which requires
Appointments
the popular election of senators—provides for a more
democratic means of selecting senators, the second clause
Article I, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution man-
permits vacancies to be filled by a completely unchecked
dates that when a U.S. Senate seat is vacated between
and undemocratic process” (p. 963).4 In the end, Shedd
elections (generally brought upon by death or resigna-
advocates a constitutional amendment that would man-
tion), the state legislature is responsible for appointing a
date popular election in the cases of death or retirement (p.
new senator at their next meeting.3 This provision was the
985). A similar call for a Constitutional amendment was
prevailing practice until 1913 when the Seventeenth
introduced to the U.S. Senate by Russell Feingold (D-WI)
Amendment to...
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