The constitutionality of a limited convention: an originalist analysis.

• Author: Rappaport, Michael B.
• Position: I. Article V to IV. Evidence from Early Interpretations, p. 53-82

1. Article V A. The Constitution's Amendment Provisions B. The Convention Method II. The Contending Views: Limited and Unlimited Conventions III. The Limited Convention View: Text A. A Convention for Proposing Amendments 1. The Proposal Power as the Power to Offer for Adoption 2. A Convention Limited to a Specifically Worded Amendment 3. Charles Black's Arguments for the Unlimited Convention View B. The Applications of the State Legislatures for a Convention 1. State Legislative Application for a Limited Convention 2. Congress's Obligation to Call a Limited Convention C. The Obligation of the Convention to Follow the Limits Set by the States and Congress IV. Evidence From Early Interpretations A Interpretation of the Prior Version of Article V B. Interpretations from the Ratification Period V. The Limited Convention View: Purpose and Structure VI. Weaknesses of the Arguments for the Unlimited Convention View A. A Convention Is Not an Unlimited Assembly of the People 1. Text 2. History B. The Runaway Philadelphia Convention C. The Supposed Intent to Avoid Reliance on Both Congress and the State Legislatures 1. The States' Alleged Excessive Power 2. Congress's Alleged Excessive Power VII. Conclusion The United States Constitution employs two basic methods for proposing constitutional amendments. (1) Under the congressional proposal method, two thirds of each house of Congress can propose a constitutional amendment. Under the convention method, the state legislatures can apply for a national convention that would then decide whether to propose a constitutional amendment. The amendments proposed under either of these two methods are then subject to ratification by the state legislatures or state conventions, as Congress determines.

   These amendment methods were designed to operate together to ensure that no one entity could prevent the enactment of an amendment. Thus, if Congress seeks an amendment that the state legislatures oppose, Congress can propose the amendment and task state conventions with the ratification decision. Similarly, if the state legislatures seek an amendment that Congress opposes, the state legislatures can apply for a convention that could propose the amendment, which would then be subject to ratification either by the states legislatures or state conventions.

   Unfortunately, one of these two amendment methods is broken. The convention method simply does not work. Not only has it never been used to enact an amendment, but no convention has ever been called. (2) This lack of use, moreover, cannot be attributed to a lack of political interest in enacting amendments that Congress opposes. In recent years, there has been strong political support for at least three proposed amendments that would reduce congressional power--a Balanced Budget Amendment, a Line Item Veto Amendment, and a Congressional Term Limits Amendment--but unsurprisingly, Congress has refused to propose any of these. Yet, the convention method has not been employed either to enact these amendments or even to call a convention. (3) That the convention method is broken suggests that the Constitution now operates in a unbalanced way, allowing only amendments that promote congressional power, but not permitting amendments that constrain it. (4)

   The most important reason why the convention method does not work is the fear of a runaway convention. To understand this fear, imagine that two thirds of the state legislatures were to apply for a convention on a specific subject, such as restraining the federal government's power to pass unbalanced budgets, and Congress were to call for a convention on that subject. The problem, however, is that the convention might choose to ignore this subject matter limitation and propose a different amendment--perhaps an amendment to authorize a constitutional right to same sex marriage or to prayer in the public schools. And that amendment might then be ratified by the three quarters of the states. A state legislator that sought a balanced budget amendment might, then, end up instead with an amendment providing either a constitutional right to same sex marriage or to prayer in the public schools--something that he or she might strongly oppose. The fear of such a runaway convention has led many to oppose use of the convention method. (5)

   While the failure of the convention method represents a significant constitutional defect, in this Article I argue that the defect results from the failure to follow the Constitution's original meaning. I contend that the original meaning of the Constitution allows for limited conventions--conventions that are limited only to proposing amendments on specific subjects. Therefore, if the state legislatures apply for a convention limited solely to proposing an amendment that restrains the federal government's power to pass unbalanced budgets, the convention would not be permitted to propose an amendment on other subjects. The Constitution therefore forbids runaway conventions.

   To elaborate on my argument, I maintain that, once two thirds of the states apply for the same limited convention, Congress is obligated to call that limited convention. Moreover, the convention is required to conform to the limits in Congress's call. If the convention were to violate the limitations in the call--if it were to propose an amendment that was not within the scope of its authority--then that proposal would be unconstitutional. It would not represent the type of proposal that is allowed by the Constitution and could not be legally ratified by the states. I also argue that the limitations on the convention can be quite strict. The Constitution allows the state legislatures to apply not merely for a convention limited to a specific subject matter. It also allows the state legislatures to draft a specially worded amendment and then to apply for a convention limited to deciding only whether to propose that amendment.

   Readers familiar with the literature on the convention method of constitutional amendment may be surprised by my conclusions. In the past, several leading constitutional scholars have argued that the Constitution does not permit the states or Congress to impose limits on a convention. (6) And virtually no constitutional scholar has argued that a convention limited to a specifically worded amendment is constitutional. Yet, I argue that these past scholars have been mistaken. In part, the differences between my view and theirs turn on the fact that I seek to apply a rigorous original meaning analysis, whereas they have either invoked their own normative commitments or applied different or looser versions of originalism. But, in part, the differences are due to what I believe are mistaken inferences and interpretations of evidence. Finally, the differences may also be due to the fact that my analysis provides what is, to my knowledge, the first rigorous textual derivation of the right of the states to apply for a limited convention.

   Of course, showing that the Constitution's original meaning authorizes limited conventions will not solve the defect in the convention method. To eliminate the possibility of a runaway convention, it is necessary that other constitutional actors, such as the Congress, the convention, and the courts, also conclude that the Constitution authorizes limited conventions. Without such agreement, these other constitutional actors might engage in or support a runaway convention. While showing that the original meaning authorizes limited conventions is therefore insufficient to eliminating the defect in the convention method, it is a first step in that direction. It is also important for assigning responsibility for this defect. This defect is not, as some would have it, the responsibility of the constitutional enactors who decided to employ an illimitable convention. Rather, the defect is the result of both nonoriginalists and originalists who have misread or ignored the original meaning.

   The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the Constitution's two methods of proposing constitutional amendments: the congressional proposal method and the convention method. Part II then explains the two interpretations of the convention method: the limited convention view, which reads the Constitution as authorizing both limited and unlimited conventions, and the unlimited convention view, which interprets it only to allow unlimited conventions.

   Part III then undertakes the task of deriving the limited convention view from the constitutional text. It argues, based on evidence from contemporary dictionaries, from other parts of the Constitution, from conventions existing at the time, and from other evidence of word usage, that the original meaning of the Constitution's phrase a "Convention for proposing Amendments" includes both limited and unlimited conventions. It also shows that the Constitution's authorization of state legislatures to apply for a "Convention for proposing Amendments" allows them to apply for limited conventions. Part IV then explores arguments based on structure and purpose, concluding that they also support the limited convention view. Finally, Part V addresses three arguments against the limited convention view--that a convention was historically understood as illimitable, that the runaway Philadelphia Convention shows that the Framers believed that conventions were not subject to limitations, and that the debates at the Philadelphia Convention indicate that the Framers would have opposed limited conventions. This part rebuts each of these arguments, showing that none of them calls the limited convention view into question.

1. ARTICLE V

   1. THE CONSTITUTION'S AMENDMENT PROVISIONS Article V of the Constitution describes in a single paragraph the various methods for amending the Constitution. It provides:

      The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the...