The Consequences of Independence: Functions and Resources of State Legislative Fiscal Offices

• Date: 01 December 2001
• Published date: 01 December 2001
• DOI: 10.1177/0160323X0103300305
• Author: Anne Permaloff,Robert A. Bernstein,Anita Chadha
• Subject Matter: A Research Note

202 State and Local Government Review

State an d Local Government Review

Vol. 33, No. 3 (Fall 2001): 202–7

HAVI N G INDEPENDENT SOURCES of in-

formation is critical for maintain-

ing independence. In terms of

government, state Legislative Fiscal Offices

(LFOs) have been created primarily to help

maintain legislative independence from the

execut ive. They give the legislature “an inde-

pendent source of information

—

its own num-

bers derived by its own people” (Rosenthal

1990, 141).

It would seem more efficient and effective

for legislatures to establish single joint LFOs

rather than separate LFOs for each legislative

chamber. Two LFOs performing sets of simi-

lar functions within a state would be redun-

dant. Legislatures can concentrate more re-

sources on one joint LFO than on each of

two LFOs in a dual system

—

and they can still

save money. The greater concentration of re-

sources should enable joint LFOs to perform

a greater range of functions than would be per-

formed i n separate single-chamber LFOs. Ap-

parently, these considerations have proved

persuasive: joint LFOs have been established

in all but eight states (American Political Sci-

ence Association 1954; Council of State Gov-

ernments 1963; Herzberg and Unruh 1970).1

The range of functions provided by and

the resources available to LFOs vary substan-

tially from state to state (Chadha, Permaloff,

The Consequences of Independence:

Functions and Resources of State Legislative

Fiscal Offices

Anita Chadha, Anne Permaloff, and Robert A. Bernstein

and Gentle 2000). If the logic maintained by

previous researchers is correct, some of that

vari atio n wil l be ex plained as a consequence

of whethe r states main tain joint or dual LFOs:

(1) joint LFOs will tend to perform a greater

range of budgetary functions than will dual

LFOs, and (2) joint LFOs will tend to have

greater resources than will dual LFOs.

However, there is good reason to think

that once a dual system is established in a

state, it is competition between chambers or

agencies rather than efficiency or effective-

ness that primarily influences the range of

functions and distribution of resources.2 As

Madison (1788 [1992]) observed in The Fed-

eralist Papers 51, in establishing agencies with

overlapp ing functions, “ambition [is] made

to counteract ambition.” The agencies de-

velop “opposite and rival interests” that pro-

mote the independence of each agency but

undermine the efficiency of the entire enter-

prise. In states with dual LFOs, the Madiso-

nian view suggests that legislative chambers

and their offices will seek to maintain inde-

pendence from not only the executive but also

one another. Each LFO seeks the resources

to do its own fiscal research and make its

own projections. Each has an incentive to

perform a range of functions and to have re-

sources not only as great as those of the ex-

A RESEARCH NOTE