The Congressional Committees On Small Business: Pattern of Legislative Committee-Executive Agency Relations

• Published date: 01 September 1968
• Date: 01 September 1968
• DOI: 10.1177/106591296802100303
• Subject Matter: Articles

391

THE

CONGRESSIONAL

COMMITTEES

ON

SMALL

BUSINESS:

PATTERN

OF

LEGISLATIVE

COMMITTEE-EXECUTIVE

AGENCY

RELATIONS

DALE

VINYARD

Wayne

State

University

CHOLARS

seem

agreed

that

legislative

oversight

is

an

important

subject

and

~~~

an

increasing

part

of

the

legislative

work

load.

But

despite

this

unanimity

S

of

opinion

there

is

a

dearth

of

studies

which

discuss

how

this

function

is

performed

and

the

extent

to

which

it

is

actually

carried

on.’

The

few

available

studies

suggest

a

number

of

different

patterns

for

oversight.

One

would

be

a

pat-

tern

of

passivity,

where

the

committee

in

fact

does

not

perform

this

function.

Another

pattern

would

be

one

of

hostility

toward

the

agency,

with

the

committee

acting

as

critic

and

censor.

Another

pattern,

as

illustrated

here

by

the

Small

Busi-

ness

Committees

in

regard

to

the

Small

Business

Administration,

is

committee-

agency

mutual

cooperation

and

assistance.

Further

studies

might

suggest

either

modifications

of

or

combinations

of

these

patterns

for

other

committees.

The

congressional

committees

on

small

business

differ

in

one

respect

from

most

congressional

committees.2

They

are

non-legislative

or

select

committees -

unable

to

report

bills

to

the

floor

-

for

a

variety

of

historical,

jurisdictional

and

political

reasons.

But

although

created

as

select

committees,

they

have

become

permanent

features

of

the

legislative

scene;

or

what

George

Galloway

calls

&dquo;stand-

ing

committee

in

all

but

name.&dquo;

3 While

they

perform

a

number

of

functions,

one

of

them

is

that

of

legislative

oversight.

In

performing

this

function,

they

are

probably

very

similar

to

other

clientele

committees

in

their

method

of

approach.

The

Committees

have

claimed

a

rather

wide

jurisdiction

for

oversight.

As

one

House

member

told

the

author:

&dquo;Our

function

is

to

assess

the

fairness

with

which

governmental

agencies

deal

with

small

business.&dquo;

This

jurisdiction

is

supported

by

House

Resolution

13

re-creating

the

House

Committee

at

the

beginning

of

the

88th

Congress

charging

the

Committee

to

see

whether

governmental

agencies

adequately

serve

and

give

due

consideration

to

the

interests

of

small

business.

But

in

actual

practice

the

two

committees

have

limited

their

scope.

A

special

object

of

their

attention

has

been

the

Small

Business

Administration

(SBA).

They

have

also

devoted

some

attention

to

the

procurement

agencies,

especially

military,

and

several

of

the

federal

regulatory

agencies.

1

For

happy

exceptions

see

Seymour

Scher,

"Congressional

Committee

Members

as

Inde-

pendent

Agency

Overseers:

A

Case

Study,"

American

Political

Science

Review,

54

(December

1960),

911-20;

also

his

"Conditions

for

Legislative

Control,"

Journal

of

Politics,

25

(August

1963),

526-51;

John

F.

Bibby,

"The

Senate

Banking

and

Currency

Committee:

A

Study

in

Conditions

Dysfunctional

for

Performance

of

Legislative

Over-

sight,"

Midwest

Journal

of

Political

Science,

10

(February

1966),

78-98;

also

J.

Leiper

Freeman,

The

Political

Process:

Executive

Bureau

— Legislative

Committee

Relations

(New

York:

Random

House,

1955).

2

See

the

author’s

"Congressional

Committees

on

Small

Business,"

Midwest

Journal

of

Politi-

cal

Science,

August

1966,

pp.

364-77.

3

History

of

the

House

of

Representatives

(New

York:

Crowell,

1961),

p.

58.