The Conflict Between State and Federal Regulation of Railroads

• Author: Walker D. Hines
• Published date: 01 January 1916
• Date: 01 January 1916
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/000271621606300117
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE
CONFLICT BETWEEN
STATE AND
FEDERAL
REGU-
LATION OF RAILROADS
BY WALKER D. HINES,
New York City.
The Interstate Commerce Act declares (section 3) that it shall
be unlawful for any common carrier engaged in interstate commerce
to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage
to any particular person, locality or description of traffic in any
respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, locality or
description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.
If a common carrier on its own initiative should establish an
intrastate rate which would work an unreasonable preference or
prejudice to any shipping interest concerned with an interstate
rate of the common carrier, such action would be a violation of this
provision. For example, if a common carrier should establish an
intrastate rate between St. Louis and Kansas City so low in com-
parison with the interstate rates established by it between Chicago
and Kansas City as to subject those interested in traffic between
Chicago and Kansas City to an undue prejudice or disadvantage,
such action of the common carrier would be a violation of the Inter-
state Commerce Act.
If the intrastate rate which works the undue prejudice to the
interest concerned in the interstate rate is established by state
statute or by order of a state commission, such statute or order
necessarily becomes void when such prejudicial effect is ascertained
in the manner prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Act. To
follow the illustration just used, if the legislature of Missouri should
pass a statute or the commission of Missouri should make an order
prescribing a rate between St. Louis and Kansas City which would
work an undue prejudice to those interested in traffic between
Chicago and Kansas City, such statute or order would be void when
the fact of the undue prejudice had been duly established in a pro-
ceeding before the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The invalidity of the state statute or order under the circum-
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stances supposed is the natural result of our form of government.
Commerce among the states is committed to the care of Congress
by the federal constitution. Direct burdens cannot be imposed
upon that commerce by state legislation or under state authority.
It would be difficult to conceive a more direct burden upon com-
merce among the states than an intrastate rate adjustment which
works a prejudice to those concerned in interstate commerce so
unreasonable that it would be in violation of an act of Congress if
done by the common carrier on its own initiative. The federal
constitution wisely provides that the laws of the United States
made in pursuance thereof shall be the supreme law of the land
&dquo;anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding. &dquo; The necessity for such a paramount national
authority in matters of national concern is self-evident. This
necessity is particularly striking with reference to the interstate
rates of common carriers.
It would be unthinkable under our
scheme of government that the state of MissoL ’i should decide the
commercial fate of the city of Chicago even with ference to traffic
from or to Kansas City. There is only one poB
&dquo; which has a
horizon broad enough to decide what ought to be dont- nd only one
power extensive enough to reach all the parties concern ’
and that
power is the government of the United States.
Even if the Interstate Commerce Act applied only to specific
interstate shipments, the act would control an interstate rate ad-
justment which unreasonably prejudiced such specific interstate
shipments. But the...