The Collapse of the Democratic Majority: Economics and Vote Choice Since 1952

• Author: David G. Lawrence
• Published date: 01 December 1991
• Date: 01 December 1991
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/106591299104400403
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE

COLLAPSE

OF

THE

DEMOCRATIC

MAJORITY:

ECONOMICS

AND

VOTE

CHOICE

SINCE

1952

DAVID

G.

LAWRENCE

Fordham

University

CBS

News/New

York

Times

survey

in

October

1986

reported

a

fascinating

picture

of

public

opinion

of

the

political

parties’

abilities

to

manage

the

economy

(CBS/NYT

1986).

By

52

to

26

percent

the

public

felt

that

the

Democrats

were

more

likely

to

care

about

the

needs

and

problems

of

people

like

themselves;

at

the

same

time,

they

believed

by

a

45

to

35

margin

that the

Republicans

were

better

able

to

maintain

prosperity.

The

findings

are

interesting

for

two

reasons.

First,

they

indicate

a

complexity

of

public

opinion

on

economics

that

in

itself

merits

further

investigation.

The

notion

that

Democrats

care

more

about

people’s

problems

but

are

less

able

to

produce

&dquo;good

times&dquo;

is

a

paradox

of

some

inherent

interest.

Second,

and

more

importantly,

the

data

sug-

gest

changes

since

1976

in

long-standing

public

images

for

the

parties

which

are

at

least

partially

responsible

for

the

Democrats’

record

in

recent

presidential

elections.

Economics

has

long

been

identified

as

the

key

issue

underlying

Democratic

dominance

of

the

New

Deal

System.

A

public

that

held

an

incumbent

Republican

administration

responsible

for

the

Depression

and

credited

the

Democrats

with

both

economic

recovery

and

creation

of

the

welfare

state

made

the

Democrats

the

majority

party

from

1932

on

(Campbell

et

al.

1960:

45;

Sundquist

1983;

Kelley

1988).

Scam-

mon

and

Wattenberg

(1971)

saw

economics

as

the

issue

that

people

cared

most

about

and

which

they

believed

Democrats

could

handle

better

than

Republicans.

Received:

June

8,

1990

Revision

Received:

December

5,

1990

Accepted

for

Publication:

December

10,

1990

Note:

The

data

analyzed

in

this

paper

were

collected

by

the

Center

for

Political

Studies

and

made

available

through

the

Inter-university

Consortium

for

Political

and

Social

Research,

neither

of

which

bears

any

responsibility

for

the

use

I

have

made

of

them.

Richard

Fleisher,

Paul

Kantor

and

several

anonymous

referees

provided

useful

criticism

of

earlier

drafts

of

this

paper.

798

It

is

debatable

whether

the

Democrats

have

remained

the

majority

party

since

1968

or

even

whether

the

notion

of

&dquo;majority

party&dquo;

has

the

same

significance

that

it

did

in

1932-68.

Elements

that

most

the-

orists

believed

hung

together

to

create

a

coherent

party

system

no

longer

do

so:

the

Democrats

have

lost

five

of

the

last

six

presidential

elections,

averaging

only

43

percent

of

the

popular

vote,

but

they

retain

their

majority

status

in

Congress,

sub-federal

offices,

and

par-

tisan

loyalties

of

ordinary

citizens.

Traditional

realignment

theory

sug-

gests

that

this

combination

could

not

be

sustained

over

time,

yet

it

has

persisted

for

some

twenty

years

(but

see

New

York

Times

1990).

On

the

other

hand,

consistency

of

Republican

dominance

at

the

presidential

level

hardly

fits

the

dominant

competing

hypothesis

of

de alignment

(Ladd

1982;

Ladd

and

Hadley

1978).

Dealignment

theory

predicts

an

inconsistent

pattern

of

election

outcomes,

with

temporary

candidate-

centered

electoral

coalitions

forming

every

eight

years;

the

actual

pat-

tern

of

outcomes

is

a

stability

of

Republican

presidential

dominance

consistent

with

Burnham’s

(1970)

initial

notion

of

realignment

(Law-

rence

and

Fleisher

1987).

This

paper

investigates

changed

public

perceptions

of

the

parties’

abilities

to

handle

economic

issues

and

their

impact

on

recent

presi-

dential

election

results.

Scammon

and

Wattenberg

(1971)

believed

that

the

end

of

Democratic

dominance

was

signaled

by

two

interrelated

factors:

decline

in

salience

of

economic

concerns

in

the

late

1960s,

and

rise

in

public

concern

with

questions

of

social

order

on

which

Repub-

licans

were

thought

more

in

tune

with

mass

opinion.

Miller

and

Levitin

(1976),

Ladd

and

Hadley

(1978),

Nie,

Verba,

and

Petrocik

(1979:

99),

and

Petrocik

(1981:

98)

have

all

argued

that

economic

concern

decreased

in

importance

in

the

1960s

and

1970s

as

the

social

welfare

program

of

the

New

Deal

was

accepted

by

both

major

parties

and

newer

cross-cutting

issue

concerns

emerged.

As

both

Scammon

and

Wattenberg

(1971:

40)

and

Sundquist

(1983:

441)

observe,

however,

economics

is

an

issue

of

intrinsic

importance,

possibly

secondary

in

citizens’

minds

when

times

are

good

but

always

capable

of

being

activated

when

conditions

worsen.

Conditions

of

the

late

1970s

would

seem

capable

of

returning

economics

to

the

center

of

the

electoral

agenda.

Many

have

argued

that

economics

made

a

major

contribution

to

Ronald

Reagan’s

two

presidential

victories.

Pomper

(1981:

88)

wrote

that

&dquo;economic

grievances

were

at

the

heart

of

the

[first]

Reagan

vote&dquo;

(see

also

Hibbs

1982)

while

Quirk

(1985:

170)

wrote

that

citizen

belief

&dquo;that

his

economic

program

had

been

an

out-