The Civic Role of the Military: Some Critical Hypotheses

• Published date: 01 March 1966
• DOI: 10.1177/106591296601900109
• Date: 01 March 1966
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE CIVIC ROLE OF THE MILITARY:
SOME CRITICAL HYPOTHESES
DAVIS B. BOBROW
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee
HE
CIVIC ROLE of the military has become a principal American instru-
~ ment to cope with communist revolution, political instability, and economic
JL backwardness. Expressed in the doctrine of civic action, the civic role refers
to &dquo;the use of military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels
in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, com-
munications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social de-
velopment, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces
with the population.&dquo;’
This article attempts to stimulate systematic work on the civic sector of military
behavior in order to understand it as a social process and to evaluate it as an instru-
ment of American foreign policy. Against the background of the problems which
have produced the civic role concept, the article presents two sets of hypotheses.
The first set hypothesizes that particular factors which tend to operate in predictable
ways determine the acceptance, conduct and consequences of civic action. Based on
these statements, the second set hypothesizes the value of the civic role concept to
U.S. foreign policy in different situations.
We
make the assumption that, in the absence of validated statements about the
civic action process, fruitful hypotheses can be derived from knowledge of other
social processes and actors. This assumption applies to the selection of determinants
and to inferences about their operation. As an example of the latter, we hypothesize
that, ceteribus paribus, a greedy general manifests behavior similar to that of a greedy
mayor or bureaucrat. Unless our assumption is accepted, social scientists cannot at
this time clarify the value of the civic role activities emphasized in our military
assistance program.
THE BACKGROUND
What we can call a &dquo;passive&dquo; civic role, i.e., respect for the sensibilities of friend-
ly and neutral civilians, has long been part of official U.S. military doctrine. However,
the &dquo;active&dquo; civic role concept defined in the first paragraph has emerged recently in
response to a number of foreign policy frustrations. The advocates of civic action
assume that these actions will ameliorate problems in counterinsurgency, in the do-
mestic economic and political policies of underdeveloped states, and in their regional
and cold-war foreign policies by modifying the behavior of communist insurgents, in-
digenous armies and indigenous governments.
NoTE : The author is a member of the Director’s Division of the Oak Ridge National Labora-
tory, which is supported by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. The views expressed in
this paper are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of ORNL or the
USAEC.
1
Major Robert L. Burke, "Military Civic Action," Military Review, 44 (October 1964), 63.
101

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102
We
can
begin this summary of the assumptions which the advocates make about
the civic action process with the effects on communist insurgents. If friendly coun-
terinsurgent armies play an active civic role, they will reap the same benefits as the
insurgents have from similar activities. Accordingly, the rebels will first lose their
popular base and, with the flow of men, supplies, and information diminished, ex-
perience military defeat.2 This rationale has been most fully developed by the French
theorists of psychological warf are.3
3
For indigenous armies, the advocates assume that an extensive civic role will
diminish three patterns of behavior which are disadvantageous for the United States.
First, civic action involvement will motivate the military to assist rather than veto
political and economic reform. Accordingly, if South American armies are given
extensive civic roles, they will expedite reform programs rather than staging coups
d’etat against their authors. Second, civic action involvement will motivate the
military to give priority to domestic development rather than to external ventures.
Accordingly, if the Egyptian and Indonesian military become heavily involved in,
for example, village-level development tasks, the probabilities of regional military
conflict will decline. Third, civic action involvement will motivate the military to
acquire economic and managerial skills and multiply their commitment to mass
modernization. Accordingly, if the Pakistani army emphasizes its civic role, the
Ayub Khan regime will be both more competent in and more dedicated to modern-
ization.
The advocates also assume that military civic action will improve the domestic
and foreign policies of indigenous governments. These effects are based on assump-
tions about the characteristics of a military establishment with an extensive civic
role. If a government is hostile to political and economic development, inefficient,
unskilled, or corrupt, it will either accommodate itself to or be replaced by military
leaders who, by definition, will be partisans of development, efficient, skilled, and
honest. If a government pursues policies of regional aggrandizement or communist-
inclined nonalignment, the military will, at least, not support these policies and, at
best, oppose them. The reasoning here is that extensive military civic duties reduce
military demands for regional adventures and communist hardware and improve the
government’s domestic popularity, therefore reducing the need for political diversion
in the form of a foreign &dquo;victory.&dquo; Some, but not all, advocates also reason that the
officer corps is more firmly nationalistic and anticommunist than civilian politicians.
Accordingly, since civic action will increase military leverage on the politicians, it
will minimize civilian tendencies to cooperate with and be absorbed into communist
spheres of influence.
Obviously, these assumptions all produce the conclusion that civic action is
thoroughly in the American interest. To explore the validity of that conclusion, we
must explore the validity of the assumptions on which it rests. These assumptions are
really one half of a number of function statements. The other side of these state-
’ Lt. Col. Harry F. Walterhouse, "Civic Action — A Counter and Cure for Insurgency," Mili-
tary Review, 42 (August 1962), 47-54.
3

Perhaps the most informative analysis of the French experience is that of Peter Paret, French
Revolutionary Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1964).

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103
ments contain four factors and their relationships: the aspirations of the indigenous
population; the strategy and capability of the local communist movement; the in-
digenous military; and the indigenous government. The acceptance and conduct of
civic action primarily depend on the two institutions responsible for internal order
and popular satisfaction: the local military and the local government. The con-
sequences of a military civic role depend primarily on the extent to which it satisfies
popular demands and copes with communist maneuvers. For the preliminary pur-
poses of this article, we can treat popular demands and communist maneuvers as
...