The Challenge of Foreign Fighter Returnees

• Date: 01 August 2017
• Author: R. Kim Cragin
• Published date: 01 August 2017
• DOI: 10.1177/1043986217697872
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986217697872

Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice

2017, Vol. 33(3) 292 –312

© The Author(s) 2017

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DOI: 10.1177/1043986217697872

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Article

The Challenge of Foreign

Fighter Returnees

R. Kim Cragin1

Abstract

This article explores the security challenges posed by foreign fighter returnees.

It argues that—contrary to popular belief—most foreign fighters do not die on

battlefields or travel from conflict to conflict. They return home. This means that law

enforcement, intelligence, and other security officials should expect unprecedented

numbers of returnees from Syria and Iraq should a ceasefire hold. The challenge

posed by returnees is threefold: Recidivism rates are uncertain, law enforcement

cannot manage the numbers of prospective returnees alone, and returnees from non-

Western countries also pose a threat to the United States. Findings suggest that a

global architecture should be put in place to mitigate the threats from foreign fighter

returnees.

Keywords

Foreign fighters, ISIS, Indonesia, Algeria

On November 13, 2015, terrorists associated with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

(ISIS) attacked the Stade de France, Bataclan Concert Hall, as well as restaurants and

bars in Paris’s 11th District. One hundred twenty-nine people died (Higgins, 2015).

The assailants included seven individuals from France and Belgium, who had fought

previously in the Levant, and two Iraqis sent by ISIS to Europe for the attack (“Kill

Them All Wherever You Find Them,” 2016). Further investigations revealed that an

additional 21 individuals provided logistical support for the attacks, seven of whom

also were foreign fighter returnees (“Suspect Salah Abdeslam,” 2016).

The Paris attacks exemplify the security challenge posed by foreign fighters:

defined as individuals who travel abroad to fight against so-called “corrupt” Muslim

regimes or to expel foreign occupying forces. Some are recruited by terrorist groups

1National Defense University, Washington, DC, USA

Corresponding Author:

R. Kim Cragin, National Defense University, Washington, DC 20319, USA.

Email: kim.cragin.civ@ndu.edu

697872CCJXXX10.1177/1043986217697872Journal of Contemporary Criminal JusticeCragin

research-article2017

Cragin 293

based on relationships, knowledge, or experience. Others come to believe in the neces-

sity of political violence without ties to a recruiter. They act on these beliefs by travel-

ing to another country to fight. Some foreign fighters subsequently return home to

conduct attacks. But, beyond this immediate threat, still others become recruiters or

inspire local residents to become terrorists.

This article explores the nature and extent of the challenge posed by foreign fighter

returnees. It argues that—contrary to popular belief—most foreign fighters do not die

on battlefields or travel from conflict to conflict. Past experience instead indicates that

they return home. This means that security officials should expect unprecedented

numbers of foreign fighter returnees from Syria and Iraq should a ceasefire hold. The

policy challenge posed by foreign fighter returnees is threefold: First, recidivism rates

are uncertain; second, the sheer numbers of foreign fighters today—31,500 total and

20% from the West—suggest that law enforcement cannot manage the threat alone;

and third, returnees from non-Western countries also pose a threat to the U.S. home-

land (Pizzi, 2015; Zengerle, 2015). The article concludes that a global architecture

should be put in place to mitigate the threats from foreign fighter returnees.

Data Sources and Methods

The general consensus among commentators is that foreign fighters do not represent a

significant threat to the United States (Byman & Shapiro, 2014). A number of studies

have reinforced this consensus, arguing that foreign fighters relocate to other conflicts.

For example, Hegghammer (2010, 2010-2011) has found that foreign fighters often

travel from conflict to conflict, bringing a pan-Islamic worldview with them. But just

because foreign fighters affect local religious beliefs when they relocate to a conflict

zone, does not mean that a majority of them do so. Indeed, Hegghammer (2010) refer-

ences Saudi officials who claim that most if not all of the Saudi fighters returned home

after they left Afghanistan in early 1990s. Abdel Bari Atwan (2012) similarly notes

that a majority of Saudis and Yemenis received a heroes’ welcome upon their return

from Afghanistan.

In addition, a number of studies suggest that, upon returning home, foreign fighters

do not immediately engage in violence. Hegghammer (2010) makes this observation

in the context of Saudi returnees. Conboy (2006) argues that Indonesian officials did

not consider foreign fighter returnees from Afghanistan a threat, because they did not

reengage in violence locally. And, more recently, studies of Western foreign fighters

have noted that many are not ideologically driven or committed to pan-Islamism and,

thus, unlikely to conduct attacks upon their return home. These more recent studies

generally place the threats posed by individuals inspired by ISIS (and al-Qaeda) above

the threat of Western returnees. They include ISIS in the West released by the New

America Foundation (Bergen, Schuster, & Sterman, 2015) and ISIS in America from

George Washington University’s Program on Extremism (Vidino & Hughes, 2015).

But just because returnees do not reengage in violence right away, does not mean that

they do not pose a security risk. In the case of Saudi Arabia, for example, returnees

from Afghanistan did not immediately turn to violence, but their families represented