The Case for CASR: Applying Lessons from Strategic Airlift and Sealift Contracts to Build a Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve Program for the Space Force

• Pages: 189-230
• Date: 01 July 2025
• Published date: 01 July 2025
• Author: Hank D. Nguyen
• Subject Matter: Derecho Civil

The Case for CASR: Applying Lessons from

Strategic Airlift and Sealift Contracts to Build a

Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve Program

for the Space Force

Hank D. Nguyen*

Look again at that dot. That’s here. That’s home. That’s us. . . . The Earth is a

very small stage in a vast cosmic arena. Think of the rivers of blood spilled by

all those generals and emperors so that, in glory and triumph, they could

become the momentary masters of a fraction of a dot.

1

CARL SAGAN, PALE BLUE DOT: A VISION OF THE HUMAN FUTURE IN SPACE 8-9 (1994). See also

Carl Sagan, Carl Sagan - Pale Blue Dot, 0:09–0:17, 1:12–1:36, YOUTUBE (Mar 24, 2009), https://perma.

cc/HW6M-89EV; Carl Sagan, The Pale Blue Dot: Short Recording, at 1:26–1:32, 2:26–2:48, held by the

Library of Congress, https://perma.cc/T3VJ-ZEQM.

INTRODUCTION

Satellites and the space-based services they provide are integral to daily life.

Civil society depends upon every day services like weather, television, credit card

processing, maps, and the Global Positioning System (GPS).

2

The U.S. military is

even more reliant on space-based capabilities.

3

Charles Pope, 30 Years Later, Desert Storm Remains a Powerful Inf‌luence on Air, Space Forces,

AIR FORCE, (Feb. 23, 2021), https://perma.cc/LCQ5-MNHZ (statement of General Jay Raymond) (“We

are more reliant on space today than ever before. And unlike at the time of Desert Storm, today, access

to space is not a given, and we need to maintain superiority in the domain to protect our nation’s security

and our way of life.. .”).

However, space assets are gravely

vulnerable to attack. Several world powers have demonstrated anti-satellite weap-

ons capable of targeting and destroying satellites.

4

A capable adversary can easily

take out swaths of satellites via a variety of means, whether kinetic, electronic, or

through cyberspace.

5

For instance, on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,

hackers launched cyberattacks to disable satellite internet service across Ukraine.

6

* Major Hank Nguyen is a Judge Advocate in the United States Air Force and currently serves as the

Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, 354th Fighter Wing, Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska. Major Nguyen

previously earned an LL.M. in Military Law with concentration in Contract & Fiscal Law from The

Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, a J.D. from University of California Davis School

of Law, and a B.A. from the University of California Davis. The views expressed in this article are those

of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Department of Defense,

United States Air Force, or any other government agency. I would like to thank Allen Coe, Robert

Borich, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Schoeni, and Major Catherine Godfrey for their expert advice that

helped shape this article. © 2025, Hank Nguyen.

1.

2. See infra Part III.A.

3.

4. See infra Part I.

5. See infra Parts I, II.

6. See infra Part II.

189

This raises an important question: in a crisis, if the government’s satellites

become inoperable or insuff‌icient, how would the military obtain more space

capabilities? The answer is the private sector. Commercial space companies in

the United States own eleven times as many satellites as the U.S. government.

7

USC Satellite Database, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (May 1, 2023), https://perma.cc/

L4ND-TEMD (4,741 U.S. commercial satellites compared to 167 U.S. government and 246 U.S.

military).

Worldwide, commercial expenditure on space activities outpaces government

expenditures nearly four-to-one.

8

Space Found. Ed. Team, Space Foundation Announces $570B Space Economy in 2023, Driven by

Steady Private and Public Sector Growth, SPACE FOUND. (Jul. 18, 2024), https://perma.cc/DRY9-BZ23

[hereinafter Space Report 2024 Q2] ($125 billion in world governments’ spending on space compared to

$445 billion commercial spending, together totaling as a $570 billion space economy).

This article will detail the potential for the United States Space Force (USSF)

to implement a Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve (CASR) by assessing

the policy justif‌ications, analyzing the statutory and regulatory considerations,

and drawing lessons from other commercial reserve programs. The goal of CASR

is to “ensure that the USSF can leverage the capabilities of the commercial sector

to enhance the resilience, capacity, and effectiveness of its national security space

architecture.”

9

U.S. S PACE FORCE, COMMERCIAL SPACE STRATEGY 14 (Apr. 8, 2024), https://perma.cc/4AFV-

UPW4.

In other words, CASR would incentivize private companies to

stay ready to replenish, replace, or supplement the military’s space launches and

space services. In 2023, the USSF proposed a draft CASR framework modeled

after the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).

10

The CRAF is part of the national air-

lift mobility system which bolsters the domestic airline industry that, in turn, sup-

ports military operations in a crisis.

11

11. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 4-01, DEF. TRANSP. SYS., at III-4 to III-7 (2017), https://

perma.cc/S9RA-XRCZ [hereinafter JOINT PUB. 4-01].

Similarly, the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift

Agreement (VISA) is part of the U.S. Merchant which bolsters the sea cargo ship-

ping industry.

12

Despite discussions of a commercial space reserve since at least

2022,

13

Courtney Albon, US Has Planes, Boats on Call for Emergencies, Why Not Satellites?, C4ISRNET

(Apr. 11, 2023), https://perma.cc/8QA9-DBK8.

the threat of Russian aggression already realized,

14

and risk of war with

China looming within the next half decade,

15

U.S. Four-Star General Warns of War with China in 2025, REUTERS (Jan. 29, 2023), https://

perma.cc/QB7B-H3PD. See Sam Lagrone, Milley: China Wants Capability to Take Taiwan by 2027,

Sees No Near-Term Intent to Invade, U.S. NAVAL INST.: USNI NEWS (Jun. 23, 2021), https://perma.

cc/6ACU-76WT; Naveed Jamali, Alex Rouhandeh & Tom O’Connor, Marine Commandant Warns

U.S. Lacking in Key Capability for War with China, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 30, 2023), https://perma.cc/

RW7J-Z95N.

the U.S. military has not yet exe-

cuted such a program for the space industry. The U.S. military intends to award

contracts for CASR starting in 2025.

16

Courtney Albon, Space Force Plans to Award 20 Contracts for Commercial Reserve by 2026,

DEFENSE NEWS (Nov. 22, 2024), https://perma.cc/2JVV-M69V.

7.

8.

9.

10. See discussion infra Part IV.

12. Id.

13.

14. See infra Part II.

15.

16.

190 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 15:189

The CASR Framework is an effective solution to bolster the U.S. military’s

space capabilities during a contingency, but its implementation will be far more

complicated than its predecessor airlift and sealift programs. These previous com-

mercial reserve programs were mired in problems that took decades to solve or

are still untested; for example, during the Gulf War, the U.S. government strug-

gled with obtaining adequate manning of reserve ships and the negative impact

an activation would impose on the prof‌itable summer travel season.

17

Achieving

success for CASR may require signif‌icant regulation and planning to succeed.

However, the U.S. government has broad discretion and f‌lexibility in how the

Department of Defense (DoD) and other federal agencies impose obligations and

incentives for commercial space vendors.

In assessing how to implement CASR, this article will take a systematic view.

Part I of the article will discuss the role of the space domain in military opera-

tions. Part II of the article will address the need for the surge capacity in the space

domain, through a case study of Ukraine’s reliance on Starlink satellite communi-

cations in the Russo-Ukrainian war. Part III will orient the reader to the broad

array of current space activities and space-based services. Following that, the arti-

cle will take a close look at some impressive data illustrating how the commercial

space industry is rapidly outpacing government space activities. Part IV will dis-

sect the proposed draft framework for CASR, which the U.S. Space Force pub-

lished for industry comment. Part V will f‌irst discuss existing authorities, namely

the Defense Production Act (DPA), and assess recent presidential actions that

bode favorably for broad federal powers to inf‌luence the industrial base. That will

segue into an analysis of the history, statutes, and regulations of the other U.S.

military commercial reserve programs, CRAF and VISA. The article will then

contrast the commercial reserve programs against government-owned reserve

f‌leets that have seen only limited success. Finally, Part VI of the article will ana-

lyze the new authorities and f‌lexible incentives needed to implement a commer-

cial space reserve.

I. SPACE AS A MILITARY DOMAIN

Space, the f‌inal frontier, is booming with activity. While large states such as the

United States, India, and China are major players in space,

18

See Edouard Mathieu & Max Roser, Data Page: Cumulative Number of Objects Launched into

Space, OUR WORLD IN DATA: SPACE EXPLORATION AND SATELLITES (2024), https://perma.cc/S32F-

YWRC (processing data from United Nations Off‌ice for Outer Space Affairs).

even states as small

as Monaco now own satellites in orbit.

19

Monaco Sets Its Sights on Space, MONACO NOW, https://perma.cc/D6Q8-EL4J.

Fifty-four nations are now invested in

space technology.

20

The private space industry is even more prolif‌ic, with SpaceX

leading as the industry’s dominant player. Nearly half of all launches in 2023 were

17. See infra Parts V.C. & VI.A.

18.

19.

20. Space Report 2024 Q2, supra note 8.

2025] THE CASE FOR CASR 191