The By-Election System of the Fifth French Republic

• Author: William G. Andrews
• DOI: 10.1177/106591296401700407
• Date: 01 December 1964
• Published date: 01 December 1964
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE BY-ELECTION SYSTEM OF THE
FIFTH FRENCH REPUBLIC
WILLIAM G. ANDREWS
Tufts University
MONG
THE PRINCIPLES of Western democracy are that government rests
/~ on popular support and that elections measure that support. Government is
~L
continuous. Elections are periodic. When an election indicates a shift in
popular political opinion, it is assumed that the orientation of the government will
undergo a similar change.
General elections are seldom held at intervals bf less than four or five years.
Vacancies -
because of deaths, resignations, and invalidations -
are likely to occur
frequently between general elections. By-elections to fill the vacancies make random
samplings of electoral opinion during the interval. They are closely followed by
political and governmental leaders and observers for indications of shifts in opinion.
For instance, after Prime Minister Macmillan drastically reshuffled his cabinet in
the summer of 1962 it was widely reported that his decision had been taken largely
because he believed that a series of by-elections had indicated widespread popular
dissatisfaction with the government. In the Fourth French Republic after 1951
by-elections were followed with similar interest. The strength of the government
parties in the by-elections relative to their strength in the previous general election
was regarded as an indication of the popular support for the government.
The present article is an attempt to assess the value of the by-election system of
the Fifth French Republic for the measurement of such opinion. It describes the
system and compares the trends indicated by it with the shift which occurred in
electoral comportment between the general elections of 1958 and 1962. In this way,
it is thought some indication may be found of the extent to which by-elections now
reflect popular opinion.
Although by-elections and general elections are basically similar institutions,
certain important differences should not be overlooked. Among these differences are:
1. By-elections are held in the absence of the type of national political cam-
paign that accompanies general elections. The local voter, therefore, may be less
subject to the influence of national political appeals.
2. Control of the legislature is not ordinarily at stake in a by-election whereas
it virtually always is in a general election. Usually, changes in the control of two or
three seats will not determine the balance of parliamentary forces. This may mean
that by-election voters need not take this factor into consideration in deciding how to
vote.
3. The occasion for the election is different. By-elections are usually held to
replace deputies who have died, resigned, or had their general election victory in-
validated. Most general elections are held to replace a parliament whose mandate
has expired or has been terminated by the government. The differences in circum-
stances may influence voter motivation and, therefore, electoral comportment di-
rectly. They may also have an indirect influence through their effect on the lineup
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of candidates. For instance, incumbents are usually candidates in general elections
but often are not in by-elections.
4. By-elections and general elections are necessarily held at different times.
Electoral opinion changes over time, both because voters change their minds and
because the composition of the electorate changes. Significant changes in electoral
opinion may occur between the date of a by-election and the date of the succeeding
general election. Thus, even though by-elections may faithfully represent the com-
portment of the general election electorate at any given moment, it may not be possi-
ble to confirm that accuracy when the next general elections are held.
Despite these differences, however, voters in the two types of elections are en-
gaged in basically the same activity. It would be dangerous to assume, without sup-
porting empirical data, that the differences are necessarily more influential than the
similarities or vice versa. The following observations of Fifth Republic experience
are intended to contribute data toward the illumination of this question.
THE BY-ELECTION SYSTEM OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC
In addition to the limitations inherent in any by-election, there are certain
peculiarities of Fifth Republic by-elections that result from the special characteristics
of the electoral system. Contrary to the practice in the Fourth Republic after 1951,
in Great Britain, and in a number of other countries, most vacancies in the National
Assembly are not filled through by-elections. The process by which by-elections were
largely eliminated is an interesting example of the combination of doctrine and
pragmatism in the elaboration of the 1958 constitution.’
M. Debr6 and his team of experts began with no clear intention to reduce the
number of by-elections. In fact, M. Debr6 had criticized the absence of by-elections
in the early Fourth Republic and did not later alter his views.2 On the other hand,
he and the team he directed were convinced that among the causes of the instability
in the Third and Fourth Republic were the ambitions of most deputies &dquo;to become
ministers, even if for only six months.&dquo; Many deputies helped overturn a cabinet
partly in hopes they might be invited to join its successor. These hopes were fortified
by the realization that ministers retained their National Assembly seats and could
resume exercise of their parliamentary prerogatives after leaving the government.
This belief led the framers to base the 1958 Constitution on a doctrine of separa-
tion of powers between government and parliament.3 One of the means by which
1
Most of the information and opinion in the following paragraphs was obtained through inter-
view, March 13, 1963, in Paris, with M. Debré, Keeper of the Seals in the 1958 De Gaulle
government and head of the team of experts that drafted the constitution. For an excel-
lent description of the process through which the constitution emerged see Nicholas Wahl,
"The French Constitution of 1958: The Initial Draft and Its Origins," American Political
Science Review, 53 (June 1959), 358-82.
2
"What purpose is served by the resignation of the dissatisfied deputy? There will be no by-
election ! It must be admitted: the sovereignty of the people has been stolen." La mort
de l’état republicain (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), p. 205.
3
See M. Debré’s exposition of this point in "La nouvelle constitution," Revue française de
science politique, March 1959, pp. 7-29. See also the explanation of M. Janot, govern-
ment commissar, in Travaux preparatoires de la constitution: avis et débats du comité
consultatif, La documentation française, Paris, 1960, pp. 45 and 89-91.

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this principle was to be implemented was by requiring deputies or senators who
accept ministerial appointments to resign from their seats.
The question then arose as to what should be done about the parliamentary
vacancies thus created. The first suggestion, according to M. Debr6, was that the
seats be left vacant. M. Debr6 felt that this would be &dquo;impossible&dquo; for two reasons.
First, a constituency would be left without representation, a situation that would
not conform to democratic theory or practice. Second, if the seat were left vacant, it
would be logical that the elected deputy return to his seat upon leaving the govern-
ment, precisely the situation that the framers of the constitution wished to prevent.
A second suggestion was that the vacancies be filled by by-elections. M. Debr6
also objected to that solution. In the first place, perhaps a dozen or fifteen by-elec-
tions would take place during the first few months after the formation of a govern-
ment. He
regarded this as an &dquo;abnormal&dquo; situation that would involve the new gov-
ernment too heavily in electoral activities. Also, a deputy or senator might be reluc-
tant to accept a ministerial appointment for fear that his seat might fall to a rival
party in the by-election.
According to M. Debr6, he then proposed a system of suppliants (replace-
ments), whereby a potential replacement would be elected as the running-mate of
each deputy and senator and would succeed to the seat if the deputy or senator were
to join the government. This proposal was adopted. Then, it was suggested that the
supplgants be used to fill all parliamentary vacancies.
This general extension of the use of suppliants was objected to on the grounds
that it would open the way to certain &dquo;abuses.&dquo; For one thing, a &dquo;grand old man&dquo;
with high prestige in a constituency might run for and win a parliamentary seat,
without intending to serve, in order to resign and cede his seat to a prot6g6, his
suppliant. Or two political groups might make a deal in an Assembly election
whereby one...