The Boundary Problem in Workplace Democracy: Who Constitutes the Corporate Demos?

• Published date: 01 June 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00905917221131821
• Author: Philipp Stehr
• Date: 01 June 2023

https://doi.org/10.1177/00905917221131821

Political Theory

2023, Vol. 51(3) 507 –529

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/00905917221131821

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Article

The Boundary

Problem in Workplace

Democracy: Who

Constitutes the

Corporate Demos?

Philipp Stehr1

Abstract

This article brings to bear findings from the debate on the boundary

problem in democratic theory on discussions of workplace democracy to

argue that workplace democrats’ focus on workers is unjustified and that

more constituencies will have to be included in any prospective scheme of

workplace democracy. It thereby provides a valuable and underdiscussed

perspective on workplace democracy that goes beyond the debate’s usual

focus on the clarification and justification of workplace democrats’ core

claim. It also goes beyond approaches like stakeholder theory in law and

economics that determine decision-making rights without taking into

account genuinely democratic considerations. My discussion proceeds by

considering three principles for inclusion from democratic theory for the

specific case of the corporation. I submit that two of them, the all-coerced

and the all-subjected principle, are not appropriate for this specific case,

because they cannot capture the distinguishing features of the corporation.

The all-affected principle however is appropriate but has a very wide range.

I further argue that this is not as big of a problem as it first might seem and

that this principle is still the most appropriate for defining the demos of the

democratic corporation. The article closes by pointing out the consequences

1Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

Corresponding Author:

Philipp Stehr, Utrecht University, Janskerkhof 13, Utrecht, 3512 BL, The Netherlands.

Email: p.h.stehr@uu.nl

1131821PTXXXX10.1177/00905917221131821Political TheoryStehr

research-article2022

508Political Theory 51(3)

of this result for the workplace democracy debate and for the legitimacy of

the market as a coordination mechanism.

Keywords

workplace democracy, boundary problem, business corporation, democratic

theory, markets

Introduction

Business corporations are some of the most powerful institutions in the world

today, in some cases arguably outclassing states. They play an important role

in organizing production and distribution, and increasingly also public debate

and social relations. At the same time, the vast majority of corporations is

internally profoundly undemocratic. The theoretical debate around work-

place democracy has long recognized this fact (Frega, Herzog, and Neuhäuser

2019). Elizabeth Anderson has summarized it in the four features of private

government (Anderson 2017): superiors can rule arbitrarily and are unac-

countable to their subordinates. Employees have no right to appeal decisions

nor do they have any right to be heard. To rectify what is thus taken by many

to be a dictatorial status quo, scholars have proposed the introduction of dem-

ocratic mechanisms in the workplace. Although the details of the proposals

vary, they share the idea that, as in national democracies, workers should be

given control over who rules them under what conditions via some election

mechanism. After all, a widespread conviction is that for a form of rule to be

democratic, the governed have to have a say in government.

Although the attention that workplace democracy has received among

political philosophers is considerable, the debate focuses on two main

aspects: the clarification of the claim of workplace democrats and the justifi-

cation for that claim. What has been fairly absent from the debate however is

any further concern with the subjects of workplace democracy: who should

get a say in a democratic workplace? Authors usually quietly assume the

subjects to be the workers or employees as opposed to the current holders of

decision-making power, management and shareholders. Some authors grant

that there might be other constituencies that have legitimate claims to partici-

pation (e.g., Ferreras 2017, 142). The only exception to this rule is Robin

Archer, who explicitly tests his argument for workplace democracy for

whether it applies to other constituencies besides workers (Archer 1994). The

otherwise widespread neglect of this question represents a serious omission

in the literature, not least because popular justifications for workplace