The Bank Merger Act a Decade After: Reply to Reid

DOI10.1177/0003603X7401900208
Published date01 June 1974
Date01 June 1974
AuthorBernard Shull,Paul M. Horvitz
Subject MatterArticle
THE BANK MERGER ACT A DECADE
AFTER:
REPLY
TO
REID
by
PAUL
M.
HORVITZ·
and
BERNARD
SHULL··
Reid has expressed the belief
that
the bank regulatory
agencies, as a group, have undermined Congressional
intent
and fostered monopoly in banking. This blanket
and
largely
unsupported indictment seems to be the principal basis
for
his criticism of
our
contrary
findings
that
Congressional
purpose in passing the Bank Merger Act was largely effected
in the 1960's. We will discuss first Reid's views
regarding
the regulatory authorities and then some of the specific
criticisms of the
data
we have presented.'
Reid's view is
that
"a
complete prohibition on bank mer-
gers would be the
appropriate
legislative mandate." Reid
is entitled to his view on this
matter
(though we think
it
is
one totally without
merit),
but
this is not the legislative man-
date
that
exists,"
His
view is
irrelevant
to
our
objective of
Director of Research,
Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Washington, D. C.
UProfessor,
Department
of Economics,
Hunter
College of the
City University of New York.
1B. Shull
and
P. M. Horvitz, "The Bank Merger Act of 1960:
A Decade After," The
Antitrust
Bulletin, Vol.
XVI,
No.4,
Winter
1971, pp. 859-889. S. R. Reid,
"'The
Bank
Merger Act of 1960: A
Decade
After':
Comment," The Antit1'ust Bulletin, Vol.
XVIII,
No.
3,
Fall
1973, pp. 449-462.
2Donald
Turner
has pointed out
that
economic welfare is signifi-
cantly served by limiting prohibitions of mergers
and
maintaining
relatively free markets for capital assets. Cf. "Conglomerate Mergers
and
Section 7 of the Clayton Act," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 78,
No.7,
May 1965, p. 1313.
321

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