The Autocrat’s Advisors: Opening the Black Box of Ruling Coalitions in Tunisia’s Authoritarian Regime

• Date: 01 June 2018
• Author: Matt Buehler,Mehdi Ayari
• Published date: 01 June 2018
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912917735400
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912917735400

Political Research Quarterly

2018, Vol. 71(2) 330 –346

© 2017 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912917735400

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Article

Understanding the relationship between autocrats and the

elites that constitute their ruling coalitions has crucial con-

sequences for research on authoritarian regimes. Because

autocrats cannot rule by force alone, they build a coalition

of elites who support their regimes voluntarily (Brownlee

2007; Moore 1966; Riker 1962; Yom 2011, 2016).

Autocrats’ ruling coalitions have been analyzed in former

authoritarian regimes that have democratized, like those

of Latin America and Eastern Europe, and also in standing

autocracies, like those of Sub-Saharan Africa and the

Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Such coalitions,

as Sean Yom’s pioneering study explains, fortify regimes

because they “not only reduce the audience for potential

resistance but also moderate emergent opposition.” Elites

retained in coalitions, he continues, “complain not if but

how” autocrats should reign (Yom, 2016, 5). Others con-

cur that coalitions of elites stabilize regimes and help to

“upgrade” authoritarian rule (Albrecht 2013, 19–21;

Brownlee 2007, 8–11; Camau and Massardier 2009, 25–

28; Cavatorta 2010, 219; Gandhi 2008, 34; Heydemann

2007a, 21–26; Stacher 2012, 18–27, 25–28).1

While the actors2 that constitute an autocrat’s ruling

coalition vary by country, and often include generals of

the military, captains of industry, and bosses of dominant

parties, this article examines one core component of such

coalitions—an autocrat’s cabinet and his closest elite

advisors within it, his ministers. Puzzling variation exists

in how long autocrats retain such elites within their ruling

coalitions. Of all the elites who served as ministers in

Tunisia’s authoritarian regime, 14 percent were retained

for over a decade, 41 percent for over five years, and 19

percent for less than one year. Some elites (like minister

Lassaad Ben Osman) were retained for over 20 years as

core coalition members, whereas others (like Mohamed

Snoussi and Noureddine Hached) were dismissed in less

than one year as tertiary coalition members. Further

examining the data reveals significant variation between

the duration of elites retained during the reigns of

Tunisia’s two different autocrats, Habib Bourguiba (r.

1956–1987) and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (r. 1987–2011).

Hence, this article inquires: Why do autocrats retain some

elites as core, long-term members of their ruling

735400PRQXXX10.1177/1065912917735400Political Research QuarterlyBuehler and Ayari

research-article2017

1The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, USA

Corresponding Author:

Matt Buehler, The University of Tennessee, 1001 McClung Tower,

Knoxville, TN 37996-0410, USA.

Email: mbuehle2@utk.edu

The Autocrat’s Advisors: Opening

the Black Box of Ruling Coalitions in

Tunisia’s Authoritarian Regime

Matt Buehler1 and Mehdi Ayari1

Abstract

Why do autocrats retain some elites as core, long-term members of their ruling coalitions for years, while others are

dismissed in months? How and why might the type of elites retained within coalitions vary across time and different

autocrats? Although what constitutes an authoritarian regime’s ruling coalition varies across countries, often including

the military and dominant parties, this article focuses on one critical subcomponent of it—an autocrat’s cabinet and

his elite advisors within it, his ministers. Because coalitions function opaquely to prevent coups, scholars consider

their inner-workings a black box. We shed light through an original, exhaustive dataset from the Middle East of all 212

ministers who advised Tunisian autocrats from independence until regime collapse (1956–2011). Extracting data from

Arabic sources in Tunisian national archives, we track variation in minister retention to identify which elites autocrats

made core, long-term advisors within ruling coalitions. Whereas Tunisia’s first autocrat retained elites as ministers due

to biographical similarities, capacity to represent influential social groups, and competence, its second autocrat did not.

He became more likely to dismiss types of elites retained under the first autocrat, purging his coalition of ministers

perceived to be potential insider-threats due to their favored status under his predecessor.

Keywords

authoritarianism, dictators, autocratic coalitions, Middle East Politics, Tunisia

Buehler and Ayari 331

coalitions for years, while dismiss others as tertiary,

short-term members in months? How and why do the

types of elites retained vary across time and different

rulers?

Addressing these questions, this article leverages an

original quantitative dataset from Tunisia, one of the

MENA’s most firmly entrenched autocracies before its

2011 collapse.3 This article’s exhaustive dataset examines

the duration of ministerial careers of all 212 elites who

served as ministers under Tunisian autocrats from decolo-

nization to authoritarianism’s end (1956-2011). Modeling

the novel approach of Poczter and Pepinsky (2016), we

built statistics from biographical data of elites extracted

from each minister’s curriculum vita and other primary

sources from original, Arabic-based research conducted

in Tunisia’s national archives.4 We show variation over

time in the backgrounds of elites autocrats retained as

core, long-term ministers within their cabinets. This arti-

cle examines autocrats’ retention of ministers because

these were powerful elites, not simple sycophants.5 Since

ministers held real power, it mattered which ones auto-

crats decided to retain as core, long-term coalition mem-

bers. Tunisia’s regime’s 2011 collapse has also increased

access to minister-level personnel files in national

archives, furnishing a discrete, exhaustive sample that

could be realistically obtained and analyzed. While it is

likely that examining autocrats’ retention decisions

related to non-minister elites could usefully address our

research questions, challenges emerge related to data

inaccessibility and coding subjectivity when tracking

non-minister elites.

Because autocrats fear for their political and personal

survival given the threat of coups, assassinations, and

revolts, maintaining power lies at the heart of their deci-

sions whether or not to retain elites as core, long-term

ministers. Autocrats retain elites as key advisors when

they become valued assets to helping them maintain

power. Three traditional theories postulate how an elite as

minister becomes a valued asset, thereby motivating

autocrats’ retention decision-making. Theory 1 centers on

personal loyalty to the autocrat, and on an elite’s bio-

graphical traits that enhance expectations thereof. Theory

2 emphasizes authoritarian institutional design, specifi-

cally autocrats’ need to retain elites from influential social

groups. Theory 3 stresses an elite’s functional compe-

tency. Each theory posits reasons why retaining an elite

as minister reinforces the autocrat’s rule. To control for

external crises, which also shape autocrats’ decisions

whether or not to retain elites, “critical events” in foreign

policy and the economy are also tested (Camerlo and

Pérez-Liñán 2015, 608–10).

In testing these traditional theories, we show that they

do not fully explain variation in trends in minister reten-

tion in Tunisia. Thus, we conclude by contributing a new

theory hypothesizing that autocrats’ retention and dis-

missal decisions from ruling coalitions often hinge on

desires to purge potential insider-threats. Because this

theory emerges inductively from evidence collected in

Tunisia, it is preliminary and needs broader testing. Yet it

indicates that Tunisia provides a useful starting-point, as a

theory-generating case. This theory posits that where

more than one autocrat has ruled the same regime (as in

Tunisia), the successor autocrat may become more likely

to dismiss elites as ministers from his ruling coalition who

had the characteristics, attributes, and affiliations that

would have made them core, long-term ministers under

the former autocrat’s reign. Given that the predecessor

autocrat had retained these types of elites, the new, succes-

sor autocrat likely judges them to be potential insider-

threats. The autocrat’s perceptions of an elite’s posing an

insider-threat—given his favored status under the ousted

autocrat—motivated a higher likelihood of dismissal.

Such trends in Tunisia’s ruling coalition can be

observed. Data over the lifespan of Tunisia’s regime

(1956–2011) indicate that elites with biographical simi-

larities with the autocrats and with portfolio responsibili-

ties in security and economics were more likely to be

retained. They were the ruling coalition’s core, long-term

members. However in breaking down these data sepa-

rately for each autocrat’s reign, clear variation is identi-

fied between the rulers. Whereas Tunisia’s first autocrat

relied on a broad, diverse cadre of core, long-term minis-

ters, its second autocrat relied on a much narrower and

personalist ruling coalition. The trends demonstrate that

Tunisia’s first autocrat built a coalition based on retaining

elites who had similar biographical traits as his own,

intermediated for influential social groups, and held eco-

nomic portfolio responsibilities. By contrast, Tunisia’s

second autocrat became more likely to dismiss elites with

attributes and affiliations indicating that they would have

been retained as core, long-term ministers during the first

autocrat’s reign. After his 1987 bloodless coup against

Tunisia’s first autocrat, its second autocrat moved to reor-

der the regime’s intra-coalitional politics to purge likely

sympathizers of his predecessor from his pool of advi-

sors. These varying patterns in minister retention and dis-

missal found between Tunisia’s two autocrats underline

the need for a new theory, which could be subsequently

refined and tested in other autocracies.

This article carries important implications for political

science research on authoritarian regimes for three reasons.

First, while numerous scholars of authoritarian politics

stress the import of ruling coalitions to how autocracies

function, they often encounter obstacles observing their

inner-workings. The reason why is that autocrats shroud

intra-coalitional politics in secrecy. They have good rea-

son. Autocrats keep their coalitions’ inner-workings

opaque to “coup-proof” their regimes from plots exploiting