The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 and the Cold War

• Author: Robert L. Ferring
• DOI: 10.1177/106591296802100408
• Published date: 01 December 1968
• Date: 01 December 1968
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY OF 1955
AND THE COLD WAR
ROBERT L. FERRING
Loras College
N
MAY
15, 1955, the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain,
~
~ France, and the Soviet Union announced to a cheering crowd gathered
0
outside the baroque Belvedere Palace in Vienna that they had put their
signatures to a State Treaty for Austria.’-
For Austrians, the significance of the treaty was that seventeen years of occu-
pation by foreign troops would soon end. Austrians could look forward to complete
sovereignty for the first time since mid-March of 1938 when Nazi Germany’s war
machine lumbered across the Austrian border. For the rest of the world, the signifi-
cance of the treaty lies elsewhere.
In Austria, as in other regions of central Europe, the Soviet Union and the
United States and its allies came into conflict following the second world war. On
its face the Austrian conflict concerned a basic disagreement over the terms accord-
ing to which Austria would be given her independence. The disagreement led to
protracted negotiations, and was settled at last through the agreement of the United
States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union - as well as Austria -
to the
terms of a treaty. Thus the situation was a conflict which led to protracted negotia-
tions of eight years and approximately four hundred four-power meetings at various
levels,2 and finally to a peaceful accommodation of the conflict. Such a course of
events is not unusual in the world of diplomacy. What is interesting and significant
about the Austrian treaty, however, is that negotiations themselves, concerning the
specific points at issue, had only slight relevance to the final agreement.
Because of her small geographical size, her relatively small population of
seven million, and her limited resources, Austria was not a prize over which the
powers would be inclined to fight. Consequently, the four powers could be expected
to deal with Austria not within the narrow confines of the Austrian question itself,
but in terms of the Austrian question as a part of the whole range of questions
dividing the Soviet Union from the three Western powers; that is, in terms of what
is called &dquo;the cold war&dquo; in Europe.
The conflict over Austria is not the only East-West dispute which his been
settled peacefully since the cold war began, but it is the only one, between the
conclusion of the treaties of peace with the former Axis powers in 1947 and 1959,
which resulted in a treaty observed by both the United States and its Western allies
and the Soviet Union. Thus, this particular dispute provides a unique study in the
peaceful settlement of a cold-war issue. As such, it ought to be studied more care-
fully to see if the dispute and its resolution provide information helpful to the
1
Provisions of the treaty are explained in detail in Felix Ermacora’s Dokumente Osterreichs
Staatsvertrag und Neutralitat (Berlin, 1957).
2
See statement by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on June 10, 1955, quoted in Paul E. Zinner, Documents on American For-
eign Relations (New York, 1956), p. 158.
651

---

652
understanding of Soviet policy objectives and techniques. For example, broadly
speaking, study of the dispute again raises the question whether Soviet policy gets
its direction and motivation from the realities of world politics perhaps more than
from communist theory.
This study undertakes to present a brief historical background account of the
conflict over the Austrian treaty question and to analyze the significance of that
conflict as it was related to over-all East-West conflicts and world politics generally.3
3
HISTORY:
I
POSTWAR CONTROL OF AUSTRIA
The origins of the Austrian conflict lie in the Anschluss -
Austria’s annexation
in 1938 by Germany - and the subsequent participation by Austrians as soldiers in
Nazi Germany’s armies during the second world war.~
4
Austria occupied a unique position among the victims of Nazi aggression. She
was the only nation which was formally annexed in its entirety by Germany. For
this reason, from the point of view of the Allies, Austria was a question mark: was
Austria during the war an unwilling captive of the Axis, terrified under the circum-
stances into cooperating with Germany, or was Austria an enthusiastic partner in
Hitler’s war? Or, perhaps a little of both? The Allies did not know. This postwar
indecision had its history.
In April 1938, the United States recognized the annexation of Austria as an
accomplished fact to be dealt with only as a fact and not as a cause for action to
remedy the injustice done by the annexation. The annexation was regarded as too
slight a provocation for war. Only when the United States entered the war in 1941
did her policy begin to shift from one of informal protest to one of action which
could result in restoration of Austrian independence. The shift toward a more
active policy began in August of 1941 with the Atlantic Charter. President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill concluded their
meeting in the Atlantic with a joint declaration that their nations sought no
aggrandizement, territorial or otherwise, and that they wished to see no territorial
changes which did not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples con-
cerned. They then declared that they &dquo;respect the right of all peoples to choose
the form of government under which they will live&dquo; and that they &dquo;wish to see the
sovereign right and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly
deprived of them.&dquo; 5
That Austrians were later correct in interpreting this charter statement to
include them is clear from President Roosevelt’s radio message of December 9,
1941.6 When explaining the necessity for the United States to enter the war, Roose-
velt listed Hitler’s aggressions, among them, Austria, as justification for United
States entry.’
3
Lengthy amplification of details is not necessary here since excellent detailed studies are
available; see, for example, William Lloyd Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occu-
pation of Austria (Bonn, 1961).
4
Hans Kohn, The Future of Austria (New York, 1955).
5
United States Department of State, Press Releases, 18 (April 6, 1938), 624.
6

Red-White-Red Book, Justice for Austria, First Part (Vienna, 1947), p. 23.
7
Department of State Bulletin, 5, No. 129 (Washington, 1941), 477.

---

653
The United States went only two steps further in clarifying its policy toward
Austria during the period prior to early 1945, when it was clear that the war was
almost won. The first was a promise in early 1943 to restore seized property, and
the second was a joint promise, entered into in the fall of 1943 by the four major
Allies, to li.berate Austria.
By October 1943, the need for coordinated planning by the major allies for the
postwar period had become pressing as the Soviet army was about to liberate Kiev,
and the forces of the Western Allies were pushing up the Italian peninsula. The
foreign ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain met in
Moscow late in the month, and, at one of the first sessions, Anthony Eden, Cordell
Hull, and V. M. Molotov agreed on a declaration on Austria. The declaration did
not attempt to determine the future physical form of Austria. It was essentially a
compromise. Austria was referred to in the declaration as &dquo;the first free country
to fall a victim of Hitlerite aggression.&dquo; 8 The three governments promised to liber-
ate Austria from German domination; the annexation of Austria was declared null
and void; and the Allies stated that they considered themselves in no way bound
by any changes effected since the date of the Anschluss. The three declared that
they wished to see re-established a free and independent Austria. In addition, they
indicated it would be necessary to help Austria and her neighboring states regain
political and economic security.
In order that joint planning of some sort could begin, provision was made at
the Moscow Conference for the establishment of the European Advisory Commis-
sion. With headquarters in London, the E.A.C. was to undertake the study of
European political problems in the postwar world and to make recommendations
to the three major Allies.9
9
The Commission began its planning in January 1944 on the basis of Austria’s
boundaries as they existed prior to the Anschluss, for want of any other agreement
on Austria Agreement was not reached on occupation controls and zones until
July 1945, three months after Austria had fallen to the Allies. The United States
obtained a northwest sector, the Soviet Union a northeast sector, France the south-
eastern tip, and Great Britain a southwest sector. Soviet amendments gave the
Soviet Union that part of Upper Austria north of the Danube and the Styrian
section of the province of Burgenland.’-1 The amendments isolated Czechoslovakia
from the West and gave the Soviet Union control of the whole course of the
Danube River through Austria and thus from the German border to the Black Sea.
The United States entered into the occupation of Austria late in April with
one serious disadvantage. The other three occupation powers were vitally inter-
ested, because of their proximity to Germany, in Germany’s future, which included
Austria’s future. Additionally, they were willing to take vigorous action to preserve
that vital interest. The United States, on the other hand, obviously viewed its
8
...