The Appellate Corner, 0314 ALBJ, 75 The Alabama Lawyer 124 (2014)
| Author | Wilson F. Green, J., Marc A. Starrett, J. |
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0By Wilson F. Green
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Wilson F. Green is a partner in Fleenor & Green LLP in Tuscaloosa. He is a summa cum laude graduate of the University of Alabama School of Law and a former law clerk to the Hon. Robert B. Propst, United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. From 2000-09, Green served as adjunct professor at the law school, where he taught courses in class actions and complex litigation. He represents consumers and businesses in consumer and commercial litigation.
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0By Marc A. Starrett
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Marc A. Starrett is an assistant attorney general for the State of Alabama and represents the state in criminal appeals and habeas corpus in all state and federal courts. He is a graduate of the University of Alabama School of Law. Starrett served as staff attorney to Justice Kenneth Ingram and Justice Mark Kennedy on the Alabama Supreme Court, and was engaged in civil and criminal practice in Montgomery before appointment to the Office of the Attorney General. Among other cases for the office, Starrett successfully prosecuted Bobby Frank Cherry on appeal from his murder convictions for the 1963 bombing of Birmingham's Sixteenth Street Baptist Church.
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0RECENT CIVIL DECISIONS
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0From the Alabama Supreme Court
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Guardianships
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Sears v. Hampton, No. 1120578 (Ala. Nov. 22, 2013]
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Under Ala. Code § 26-2B-302(b), an in-state transferee court of an extraterritorial guardianship can only accept the transfer and enter a conditional order. Justice Bolin's opinion traces the contours of the guardianship and conservatorship laws.
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Door-Closing Statute
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Wausau Development Corporation v. Natural Gas S Oil, Inc., No. 1120614 (Ala. Nov. 22, 2013]
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Held: (1) interstate commerce is not an affirmative defense to operation of the door-closing statute, but, instead, is an exception to the affirmative defense of lack of capacity, and failure to comply with the door-closing statute is properly characterized as a defense of lack of capacity; and (2) since lack of capacity had not been raised, the trial court erred by adjudicating the case based on an affirmative defense not properly pleaded.
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Personal Jurisdiction; Collateral Attack of Foreign Judgment
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Afassco, Inc. v. Sanders, No. 1120801 (Ala. Nov. 22, 2013]
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0In a domestication of judgment proceeding, a potential judgment defendant claiming lack of personal jurisdiction in the primary action may either ignore the proceedings and attack the judgment collaterally in an enforcement or domestication proceeding, or may appear in the primary action and challenge jurisdiction directly. Since defendant litigated the personal jurisdiction question in the prior primary action, he could not re-litigate the question in Alabama, even if the foreign court decided the personal jurisdiction question on procedural rather than substantive grounds.
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Inverse Condemnation
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Ex parte Alabama Department of Transportation, No. 1101439 (Ala. Dec. 6, 2013]
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Complaint sufficiently alleged a physical intrusion onto plaintiff's property, thus satisfying the standard of Willis v. University of North Alabama, 826 So. 2d 118 (Ala. 2002). Justices Bolin, Shaw and Bryan concurred specially, noting their view that Willis should be overruled in that it wrongly requires a physical invasion of property, whereas injuries to property through governmental action should be compensable as takings.
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Lost Profits; Mental Anguish; Punitive Damages
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Pensacola Motor Sales, Inc., d/b/a Bob Tyler Toyota v. Daphne Automotive, LLC d/b/a Eastern Shore Toyota, No. 1110840 (Ala. Dec. 6, 2013]
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0EST is owned by Shawn Esfahani, an Iranian by birth but a U.S. citizen. EST and BTT are Toyota dealers and competitors. EST and Esfahani sued BTT and Keener (a BTT employee) for slander, based on statements made by BTT's employees calling EST "Taliban Toyota" and "Middle Eastern Shore Toyota." At trial, witnesses who were customers testified that BTT's employees told customers that EST was Iraqi and was funneling money to terrorists. EST offered lost-profits expert who testified that EST had lost $7.1 million in profits from these defamatory statements. Jury returned a verdict for Esfahani on slander per se for $1.25 million compensatory and $2 million punitive damages, and for EST for $1.25 million compensatory and $3 million punitive damages. The supreme court unanimously affirmed, holding: [1] BTT failed to properly preserve for appeal the trial court's exclusion of evidence concerning parties' prior cybersquatting litigation in federal court; (2) alleged hearsay evidence, even if inadmissible, was harmless because it was cumulative as to similar admissible evidence of...
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