The Appellate Corner, 0115 ALBJ, 76 The Alabama Lawyer 60 (2015)
| Author | Wilson F. Green, J. Marc A. Starrett, J. |
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\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0By Wilson F. Green
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Wilson F. Green is a partner in Fleenor & Green LLP in Tuscaloosa. He is a summa cum laude graduate of the University of Alabama School of Law and a former law clerk to the Hon. Robert B. Propst, United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. From 2000-09, Green served as adjunct professor at the law school, where he taught courses in class actions and complex litigation. He represents consumers and businesses in consumer and commercial litigation.
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0By Marc A. Starrett
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Marc A. Starrett is an assistant attorney general for the State of Alabama and represents the state in criminal appeals and habeas corpus in all state and federal courts. He is a graduate of the University of Alabama School of Law. Starrett served as staff attorney to justice Kenneth Ingram and justice Mark Kennedy on the Alabama Supreme Court, and was engaged in civil and criminal practice in Montgomery before appointment to the Office of the Attorney General. Among other cases for the office, Starrett successfully prosecuted Bobby Frank Cherry on appeal from his murder convictions for the 1963 bombing of Birmingham's Sixteenth Street Baptist Church.
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0RECENT CIVIL DECISIONS
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0From the Alabama Supreme Court
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Limited Partnerships
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Cadence Bank, N.A. v. Goodall-Brown Associates, L.P., No. 1111422 et al. (Ala. Sept. 19, 2014)
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0One of the five appeals in this case concerned whether an Alabama limited partnership lacked standing to pursue claims once it had dissolved; the supreme court answered that question in the negative, noting that (1) standing is determined as of commencement of the action, and the act triggering dissolution had not occurred at time of commencement and (2) in any event, under Ala. Code § 10A-9-8.03, a limited partnership continues after dissolution for wind-up affairs, and litigation is one wind-up activity.
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Decedent's Estates; Spousal Elective Shares
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Ferguson v. Critopolous, No. 1130486 (Ala. Sept. 19, 2014)
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Under Ala. Code § 43-8-90(a), "[i]f a testator fails to provide by will for his surviving spouse who married the testator after the execution of the will, the omitted spouse shall receive the same share of the estate he would have received if the decedent left no will unless it appears from the will that the omission was intentional or the testator provided for the spouse by transfer outside the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision be reasonably proven. The issue in the case is how courts should evaluate the second exception enumerated in the statute-that the testator provided for the spouse outside the will with the intent that the transfers be in lieu of a testamentary provision. Ultimately, the court announced an eight-factor test to be used in determining the intent of the testator.
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Door-Closing Statute
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0CAG MLG, L.L.C. v. Smelley, No. 1130659 (Ala. Sept. 19, 2014)
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Failure to qualify to do business in Alabama is a challenge to capacity, not standing; capacity need not be affirmatively pleaded, but rather is a waivable affirmative defense.
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Slayer's Statute
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Williangham v. Matthews, No. 1130890 (Ala. Sept. 19, 2014)
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Based on the plain language of the Slayer's Statute, Ala. Code § 43-8- 253(a), the statute applies only to the estate of the murdered decedent, not the estate of the party who feloniously and intentionally killed the decedent.
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0AEA; "Political Activities" and Payroll Deductions of Dues (Part Three)
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0White v. John, No. 1111554 (Ala. Sept. 26, 2014)
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0The court reversed the trial court's grant of preliminary injunction, which barred the state comptroller from implementing regulations prohibiting payroll deduction of AEA and ASEA dues on grounds that the regulations were not promulgated properly using notice and comment as required by the state APA. The court reasoned that, under the plain language of various statutes governing such matters, payroll deductions were prohibited for organizations engaged in "political activities," in which the plaintiffs were undisputedly engaged, and, therefore, the same prohibition would be effective with or without the injunction.
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Tax Sale Redemptions; Excess Proceeds
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Ex parte First United Security Bank, No. 1120302 (Ala. Sept. 26, 2014)
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0In First Union National Bank of Florida v. Lee County Commission, 75 So.3d 105 (Ala. 2011), the court held that "owner" in Ala. Code § 40-10-28 meant "the person against whom taxes on the property were assessed," 75 So.3d at 117, and that the term "owner" does not include a mortgagee who has not foreclosed on its mortgage. The issue in this case was whether "owner" includes a mortgagee who has foreclosed before the demand for excess funds is made. The court answered in the affirmative.
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Peace Officers; Damage Caps
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation v. Allen, No. 1121006 (Ala. Sept. 26, 2014)
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Issue: whether the $100,000 cap of § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975 applies when a peace officer, acting outside his employment, is sued in the officer's individual capacity. Held: The cap does not apply to individual capacity suits.
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Abatement; Third-Party Actions
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Ex parte Sundy, No. 1121140 (Ala. Sept. 26, 2014)
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Abatement statute did not bar assertion of third-party claims in separate actions by identical defendant against identical third party, because actions were brought by different plaintiffs
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Arbitration; Waiver and Non-Signatory Law
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Anderton v. The Practice-Monroeville, P.C., No. 1121417 (Ala. Sept. 26, 2014)
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Party seeking to compel arbitration did not waive right due to prior district court action, because movant was not a party to the prior district court action. Movants were entitled to compel arbitration of the claims as non-signatories, under the "equitable estoppel" method of allowing non-signatory enforcement. The court reasoned that non-signatory enforcement is a question of "substantive arbitrability," which is typically a question for the court, but since the parties adopted AAA rules, which reserves such questions to the arbitrator. Three justices dissented.
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Warranty
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0Barko Hydraulics, LLC v. Shepherd, No. 1121479 (Ala. Sept. 26, 2014)
\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0\xA0In a plurality per curiam decision, the court concluded: (1) identification of an existing defect is not essential to recovery upon an express warranty claim; rather, it is sufficient if, either directly or by permissible inference, that the product was defective in its performance or function or that it otherwise failed to conform to the warranty, (2) whether product had not been...
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