The anatomy of American "isolationism" and expansionism. Part I
| Author | Bernard Fensterwald |
| Published date | 01 June 1958 |
| Date | 01 June 1958 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002200275800200201 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The
anatomy
of
American
"isolationism"
and
expansionism.
Part
I
BERNARD
FENSTERWALD,
JR.
1
Washington,
D.C.
In
1920,
in
a
solemn
referendum,
the
American
people
rejected
Wilson’s
League
of
Nations
in
favor
of
something
popularly
known
as
&dquo;isolationism.&dquo;
By
adhering
to
the
policy
for
the
next
twenty
years,
they
brought
themselves
literally
to
the
brink
of
disaster.
As
late
as
the
summer
of
1941,
the
House
of
Representatives
passed
the
Draft
Extension
Act
by
a
single
vote.
The
British
fought
on
alone
in
what
seemed
a
losing
battle.
If
the
British
had
given
up
the
fight,
the
oceans
would
have
been
in
complete
control
of
a
combination
of
our
enemies.
We
would
actually
have
been
isolated.
Today,
less
than
twenty
years
hence
and
after
a
resounding
victory
in
World
War
II,
we
again
stand
in
peril.
There
is
no
inter-
national
organization
designed
to
maintain
the
peace
and
security
of
the
world.
Our
defenses
are
inadequate.
Our
alliances
are
falling
apart
at
the
seams.
Anti-Americanism
is
rampant
in
all
parts
of
the
globe.
There
is
no
doubt
that
American
&dquo;isola-
tionism,&dquo;
per
se,
is
dead.
&dquo;Isolationist&dquo;
has
- -.. -... -... - - -- - - - -- ------- --------- - - - - - - ---- - - - - - - - -- - - -... - -...
become
an
insulting
epithet.
Yet
the
herit-
ages
of
&dquo;isolationism&dquo;
and
the
factors
which
underlay
it
are
very
much
alive,
and
these
have
an
intense
effect
upon
both
our
current
foreign
policies
and
the
attitudes
of
our
peo-
ple
toward
them.
This
study
is
an
attempt
to
analyze
the
history,
causes,
and
heritages
of
both
American
&dquo;isolationism&dquo;
and
its
na-
tionalistic
counterpart,
&dquo;expansionism.&dquo;
Many
of
the
causes
and
heritages
can
be
found
in
what
might
best
be
described
as
the
sociological
or
environmental
factors,
particularly
history,
geography,
economics,
politics,
national
and
ethnic
origins,
religion,
and
education.
These
will
be
analyzed
in
Part
I
of
the
study.
The
psychological
fac-
tors
will
be
discussed
in
Part
II
(to
be
pub-
lished
in
a
subsequent
issue
of
this
Joicrnal ) .
I.
Introduction
It
must
be
kept
clearly
in
mind
that
the
United
States,
even
in
the
heyday
of
&dquo;isola-
tionism&dquo;
in
the
1930’s,
never
practiced
iso-
lationism
in
its
pure
form.
At
their
best-
or
at
their
worst-our
policies
have
never
amounted
to
anything
more
than
pseudo-
isolationism.
America
never
attempted
the
type
of
geographical,
political,
or
economic
isolationism
which
was
put
into
effect
by
Japan
in
the
seventeenth
and
eighteenth
centuries,
by
Tibet
until
very
recently,
or
by
Yemen
even
today.
We
never
tried
to
pro-
mote
the
type
of
cultural
isolationism
prac-
ticed
by
the
U.S.S.R.
and
Communist
China.
1
The
author
of
this
study
is
currently
adminis-
trative
assistant
to
a
United
States
Senator.
How-
ever,
the
research
was
begun
in
1954
at
Cam-
bridge
University,
where
he
was
studying
on
leave
of
absence
from
the
Department
of
State.
At
that
time,
he
was
an
assistant
to
the
depart-
ment’s
legal
adviser.
It
must
be
stressed
that
the
views
expressed
herein
are
entirely
his
own.
He
is
a
graduate
of
Harvard
College,
Harvard
Law
School,
and
the
School
of
Advanced
Interna-
tional
Studies
of
Johns
Hopkins
University.
112
What
we
have
practiced
has
been
unbridled
nationalism,
especially
in
the
political
and
economic
spheres
and
particularly
before
World
War
II.
From
its
inception,
the
United
States
was
politically
and
militarily
involved
in
every-
one’s
affairs
on
the
North
American
conti-
nent,
later
in
the
whole
of
the
Western
Hemisphere,
and
finally
throughout
the
Pa-
cific.
Our
only
tendency
toward
&dquo;isolation-
ism&dquo;
has
been
aloofness
from
the
&dquo;internal
political
and
military
affairs&dquo;
of
Europe,
and
even
there
our
record
has
been
spotty.
For
example,
during
the
Napoleonic
Wars,
we
intervened
twice,
once
on
each
side.
Al-
though
our
aloofness
was
symbolized
by
the
motto
&dquo;entangling
alliances
with
none,&dquo;
we
depended
for
security
on an
unwritten
alli-
ance
with
Great
Britain
from
1823
through
the
dawn
of
the
twentieth
century.
At
least
three
times
in
our
history
we
were
in
des-
perate
need
of
allies,
and
each
time,
despite
our
mottoes
and
in
good
part
through
luck,
we
found
allies
in
the
nick
of
time:
1823,
1917,
and
1941.
The
complex
nature
of
&dquo;isolationism&dquo;
is
well
illustrated
by
the
checkered
career
of
the
term
&dquo;isolationist&dquo;
and
the
individuals
and
groups
to
which
it
has
been
applied.
It
was
originally
used
in
the
middle
of
the
nineteenth
century
(when
aloofness
from
the
internal
problems
of
Europe
presented
no
serious
problem)
to
designate
non-ex-
pansionists.
Around
the
turn
of
the
century,
it
was
applied
to
Bryan
Democrats
who
were
opposed
to
overseas
expansion.
In
1917
it
was
applied
to
those
who
opposed
entry
into
World
War
I
and
in
the
c,irly
1920’s
to
those
who
opposed
our
participa-
tion
in
the
Leagne
of
Nations
and
other
international
endeavors.
Although,
during
the
1930’s,
the
most
vocal
&dquo;isolationists&dquo;
were
Republicans,
the
term
was
freely
ap-
plied
to
many
New
Deal
Democrats
who
had
forsworn
their
earlier
internationalism.
In
recent
years
the
term
&dquo;isolationism&dquo;
has
become
such
a
term
of
opprobrium
that
it
is
often
overlooked
that
the
desire
for
aloofness
from
other
countries’
political
and
military
affairs
is
very
natural.
As
one
Brit-
ish
commentator
put
it,
&dquo;But
that
America
should
want
isolation
is
a
matter
neither
for
surprise
or
for
reproach.&dquo;2
Furthermore,
&dquo;isolationism&dquo;
was
a
marked
success
during
the
nineteenth
and
early
twentieth
centuries;
by
adhering
to
this
policy,
we
expanded
across
the
continent
and
became
the
strong-
est
single
power
in
the
world.
When
we
de-
parted
from
it
(1798-1812),
we
got
our
fingers
burned.
The
success
of
the
policy
over
a
long
period
of
time
was
its
most
dangerous
element;
America
was
led
into
the
delusion
that
its
success
depended
not
on
political
circumstances
but
on
geography
and
natural
law-and
that
the
policy
could
be
successfully
followed
forever.
The
other
salient
point
is
that
the
raison
d’etre
of
nineteenth-century
aloofness
to-
ward
Europe
was
the
desire
to
expand
in
other
directions.
At
first,
the
expansion
was
purely
continental,
but
eventually
it
was
di-
rected
toward
Latin
America
and
the
Far
East.
Historically,
those
Americans
who
have
been
the
staunchest
advocates
of
aloof-
ness
toward
European
affairs
have
usually
been
the
most
ardent
devotees
of
American
intervention
elsewhere.
As
to
continental
expansion,
these
are
perfectly
logical
and
consistent
attitudes.
The
North
American
continent
presented
a
land
of
opportunity,
only
sparsely
occupied
and
lightly
held.
Aloofness
from
Europe
could
be
justified
on
the
sole
ground
that
it
gave
the
fledgling
United
States
a
free
hand
to
explore,
expand,
and
exploit
the
continent
from
coast
to
coast.
Our
&dquo;attentions&dquo;
to
Latin
America
can
be
partially
explained
on
.... - --............... ------... -- --... -- -----... ----- ---... --... ----... --- -- - - - - --.
2
Robert
Waithman,
Report
on
America
(London:
F.
Muller,
Ltd.,
1940),
p.
232.
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