The "American Creed" and American Identity: the Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States

• Published date: 01 June 1988
• Date: 01 June 1988
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/106591298804100202
• Subject Matter: Articles

THE

"AMERICAN

CREED"

AND

AMERICAN

IDENTITY:

THE

LIMITS

OF

LIBERAL

CITIZENSHIP

IN

THE

UNITED

STATES

ROGERS

M.

SMITH

Yale

University

N

1915,

President

Woodrow

Wilson

told

a

group

of

newly

natural-

ized

citizens

that

they

had

just

sworn

allegiance

&dquo;to

no

one,&dquo;

only

to &dquo;a

great

ideal,

to

a

great

body

of

principles,

to

a

great

hope

of

the

human

race&dquo;

(Harrington

1980:

678).

The

view

of

American

citizenship

Wilson

thus

expressed

has

a

distinguished

historic

lineage,

recently

reaffirmed

by

Samuel

P.

Huntington.

In

American

Politics:

T’he

Promise

of Disharmony,

he

maintains

that

for

most

nations,

&dquo;national

identity

is

the

product

of

a

long

process

of

historical

evolution

involving

com-

mon

ancestors,

common

experiences,

common

ethnic

background,

com-

mon

language,

common

culture,

and

usually

common

religion. &dquo;

But

citing

an

impressive

list

of

authorities,

Huntington

argues

that

the

United

States

is

different.

American

civic

identity

has

been

based

on

&dquo;political

ideas,&dquo;

on

shared

allegiance

to

the

&dquo;American

Creed&dquo;

of

liberal

democracy

(Huntington

1981:

23).

Huntington,

like

most

of

his

authorities,

also

implies

that

this

is

more

or

less

the

way

it

should

be .2

He

believes

that

whenever

the

United

States

becomes

severely

divided,

the

nation’s

liberal

democratic

ideals

serve

to

restore

unity

more

inclusively

than

a

focus

on

common

ancestors,

lan-

guage,

or

religion

would

permit

(1981:

230-31).

Many

past

and

present

critics

of

liberalism

agree

with

Huntington

that

American

political

cul-

ture

is

overwhelmingly

liberal,

but

they

dispute

his

normative

judgment.

They

contend

that

a

public

philosophy

and

public

law

which

strive

to

rest

national

political

identity

simply

on

acceptance

of

liberal

principles

reflect

a

thin,

one-sided

conception

of

the

human

personality.

Liberal

pol-

Received :

April

1,

1987

First

Revision

Received:

July

31,

1987

Accepted

for

Publication:

August

12,

1987

1

The

original

"old

nations" of

Europe,

such

as

England,

France,

and

Spain,

evolved

slowly

as

Huntington

suggests,

accompanying

the

rise

of

centralized

monarchical

states.

But

the

literature

on

nationalism

indicates

that

in

fact

most

contemporary

nationalities

have

been

self-consciously

fostered

since

the

late

eighteenth

century

by

elites

leading

revolu-

tionary

movements

or

building

new

nation-states

(Seton-Watson

1977:

6-9;

Anderson

1983:

48, 65,

70-73,

102-04;

Gellner

1983:

18,

34,

49,

55-57).

The

present

essay

may

properly

be

seen

as

a

study

of

the

partly

conflicting

conceptions

of

American

identity

that

diverse

elites

have

struggled

to

promote

historically

through

the

laws

of

citizen-

ship

of

the

"first

new

nation."

2

Huntington

notes

that

from

"Crevecoeur

to

Tocqueville

to

Bryce

to

Brogan

to

Myrdal,

foreign

as

well

as

domestic

observers

have

singled

out

this

striking

phenomenon"

(1981:

24).

Other

advocates

of

this

view

include

Kohn

1957:

8-9;

Schaar

1957:

184;

Gleason

1980:

58-60;

Harrington

1980:

678;

Lane

1985:

25.

226

ities

like

the

United

States

therefore

fail

in

practice

to

meet

needs

for

a

strong,

realistic,

and

satisfying

sense

of

political

community

and

com-

mon

identity

(Maclntyre

1981:

202-05,

233,

236;

Sandel

1982:

147-54;

1984:

90-91;

Sullivan

1982:

14-15;

Bellah

et

al.

1985:

154-55).

These

critics

have

a

point,

though

not

quite

the

one

they

conceive.

While

in

comparative

perspective

the

United

States

is

a

predominantly

liberal

society,

its

political

system

has

never

been

as

fully

liberal

as

the

critics,

like

Huntington,

presume -

in

large

part

because

American

law-

makers

have

often

decided

that

liberal

ideals

did

not

respond

adequately

to

the

problems

of

community

identity

their

society

faced.

Huntington’s

s

assertion

that

American

identity

involves

only

adherence

to

the

&dquo;Ameri-

can

Creed,&dquo;

either

as

a

matter

of

law

or

of

social

psychology,

is

at

best

a

half-truth.

If

it

were

so,

this

conception

of

American

nationality

should

be

clearly

embodied

in

the

nation’s

laws

governing

citizenship.

We

would

expect

the

United

States

to

require

from

prospective

citizens

only

the

profession

of

allegiance

to

liberal

democratic

doctrines

Wilson

referred

to,

as

well

as,

perhaps,

a

showing

that

they

will

not

burden

the

commu-

nity

unduly.

Instead,

a

cursory

review

of

the

nation’s

historic

laws

of

citizenship

indicates

that

many

qualities

Huntington

holds

not

to

be

definitive

of

American

nationality

have

often

been

requirements

to

become

a

full

American

citizen.

Place

of

birth,

ethnicity,

gender,

special

skills,

and

will-

ingness

to

subscribe

to

political

propositions

much

more

exacting

than

those

of

the

&dquo;American

Creed&dquo; -

all

have

figured

prominently

in

America’s

immigration

and

naturalization

laws.

Wilson

himself,

for

ex-

ample,

supported

harsh

policies

of ‘ ‘ 100 %

Americanism&dquo;

and

continued

exclusion

of

Asiatics

from

citizenship

in

the

latter

years

of

World

War

I

(Higham

1966:

210, 230;

Cronon

1965:

232).

Over

time,

the

more

extreme

violations

of

liberal

ideals

in

America’s

s

civic

laws

have

been

altered.

But

this

movement

in

liberal

directions

has

hardly

been

steady

or

unbroken.

Indeed,

in

some

periods

liberalism

has

seemed

obsolete;

and

its

great

successes

since

World

War

II

have

not

been

complete

nor

wholly

immune

to

reversals.

The

historic

pattern

of

recur-

ring

restrictions

and

exclusions

raises

two

questions.

First,

why

has

com-

mitment

to

the

&dquo;American

Creed&dquo;

so

frequently

not

been

enough

to

define

eligibility

for

full

membership

in

the

American

political

commu-

nity ?

Second,

how

have

the

other,

often

anti-creedal

requirements

for

citizenship

been

defended

historically?

Huntington’s

answer

presumably

would

be

that

these

legal

require-

ments

are

examples

of the

&dquo;Ideals

v.

Institutions&dquo;

gap.

Due

to

the

un-

realizable

nature

of

American

values,

he

maintains,

there

is

always

a

gulf

between

these

principles

and

the

practices

of

American

institutions

(1~81:

39-42).

Huntington

would

reject

any

notion

that

Americans

might

view

such

practices

as

genuinely

legitimate

according

to

non-creedal

political

beliefs,

for

he

denies

that

clashes

of

&dquo;idea

versus

idea&dquo;

ever

play

much

role

in

American

politics

(1981:

32).

This

essay

challenges

that

response

by

exploring

how

America’s

gover-

nors

actually

defended

these

laws

of

citizenship.

It

argues

that,

at

least