The Agenda-Setting Power of the Prime Minister Party in Coalition Governments
| Author | Florence So,Christoffer Green-Pedersen,Peter B. Mortensen |
| Published date | 01 December 2018 |
| Date | 01 December 2018 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918761007 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2018
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2018, Vol. 71(4) 743 –756
The Agenda-Setting Power of the Prime
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Minister Party in Coalition Governments
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918761007
DOI: 10.1177/1065912918761007
journals.sagepub.com/home/prq
Christoffer Green-Pedersen1, Peter B. Mortensen1, and Florence So1
Abstract
Despite coalition governments being the most widespread form of government, many aspects of coalition politics are
still poorly understood. This is especially true for questions relating to the role of the prime minister party within the
coalition. Being the prime minister party seems to imply considerable influence, but little evidence actually exists as
to the factors shaping the influence of the prime minister. This paper offers a new approach to studying the factors
conditioning the influence of the prime minister party in a coalition. The approach is focused on the extent of issue
overlap between the party manifesto of the prime minister party and the first government speech after the election.
This approach makes it possible to actually analyze the factors shaping the influence of the prime minister party. The
results show that the PM party is constrained by the issue emphasis of its coalition partners but less so when it holds
dissolution power and more, also when it has many coalition partners when controlling for the seat share of the PM
party. The paper, thus, both offers a new approach to study the coalition compromise and new evidence on the factors
shaping the influence coming from holding the PM position.
Keywords
coalition politics, government speeches, party manifestos, dissolution power
The functioning of coalition or multiparty governments has
This paper contributes to this by investigating what
long been a central concern for political science (e.g., Müller
constraints the party of the prime minister in setting the
and Strøm 2000).1 While the literature has traditionally
policy agenda of the government. Does the influence of
focused on coalition formation, questions about coalition
the party holding the prime minister position vary with
politics, or the actual functioning of coalition governments,
the number of coalition partners, the number of seats held
have gained increased attention. In a recent piece, Martin
by the party of the prime minister, and/or the formal pow-
and Vanberg (2014) summarize this discussion by arguing
ers of the prime minister, such as the right to dissolution?
that coalition politics is best understood as a coalition com-
Investigating such questions empirically is important to
promise. It is not simply the party holding a given ministe-
advance our understanding of a certain party gaining the
rial portfolio that determines coalition policies, nor is it the
PM position. It is further important for advancing the
median legislative party. Instead, these policies reflect com-
coalition literature from recognizing that coalition poli-
promises between the parties forming a coalition.
tics leads to a compromise toward an understanding of
The emphasis on the coalition compromise raises new
the politics and functioning of coalition governments.
and important questions. In particular, in this paper, we
One reason why the literature on government coali-
focus on the role of the prime minister and his or her
tions has been relatively slow in addressing questions
party. Anyone following coalition formation will notice
about coalition compromising is the difficulties of
that the position as prime minister seems especially
investigating this empirically. Ideally, a study of the
important to the parties. Recent studies have shown that
nature of coalition compromise needs data on both the
this is for good reasons. For instance, Fortunato and
emphasis of the coalition partners and on a common
Adams (2015) show that voters tend to identify the posi-
output from the coalition, which needs to be measured
tion of the government with that of the Prime Minister,
on a common scale. To meet this requirement, we use
and a recent study by Thomson et al. (2017) indicates that
gaining the position as Prime Minister provides a party
1Aarhus University, Denmark
better possibilities of fulfilling its electoral pledges.
However, empirical research into the influence within a
Corresponding Author:
Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Department of Political Science, Aarhus
coalition of the party holding the PM position is still
University, Bartholins Allé 7, 8000 Arhus C, Denmark.
rather limited.
Email: cgp@ps.au.dk
744
Political Research Quarterly 71(4)
the content of the annual speech delivered by the
implications of these findings are discussed in the con-
prime minister at the opening of each parliamentary
cluding section of the paper.
session.2 These speeches represent both an important
opportunity for the government to communicate its
Coalition Politics
issue emphasis to the public and a highly visible com-
mitment to certain legislation in the coming parlia-
Coalition politics has been at the core of political science
mentary year. Furthermore, the speech is a joint output
for a long time focusing on coalition formation (Martin
from the coalition in which the prime minister speaks
and Stevensson 2001) and portfolio allocation (Laver and
on behalf of the entire government. This implies that
Shepsle 1996). However, research on coalition politics
it should only contain issues that coalition partners
has increasingly moved into broader questions about the
can (minimally) agree on because the prime minister
functioning and internal dynamics of coalitions. One cen-
is unlikely to convey disagreement among coalition
tral aspect of this development has been a growing inter-
partners. This paper examines how the consistency
est in the instruments of coalition governance (e.g.,
between the issues that the party of the prime minister
Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2008; Timmermans and
has advocated for during the election and the issue pri-
Moury 2006). However, the actual analysis of coalition
orities in the following speech is influenced by coali-
politics has been rather limited. For instance, most of the
tion characteristics.
studies of coalition agreements have focused on the exis-
Our approach builds on a policy agenda-setting perspec-
tence of the instrument itself rather than on the content of
tive (Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 2014; Timmermans
these agreements (Müller and Strøm 2008).
and Breeman 2015). The agenda-setting perspective focuses
In recent years, scholars such as Martin and Vanberg
primarily on the priority of different issues, such as the
(2011, 2014) have begun to investigate coalition politics
economy, defense, and education, rather than on the policy
empirically. They (Martin and Vanberg 2011) test three
positions of the issues or the broader left–right dimension.
competing models based on a study of the number of
This focus on issue agendas is consistent with the idea of
changes made to bills in Germany, the Netherlands, and
issue competition in which political parties compete by
Denmark. The first model implies that the party holding
emphasizing the issues they would prefer to see dominate
the legislative median determines which changes are
politics (Budge and Farlie 1983). In this perspective, the
made to bills before passing. The second model stipu-
central question is: “To what extent is the issue agenda
lates that changes in the bills will reflect the preferences
of the prime minister’s party reflected in the agenda rep-
of the party holding the relevant ministerial portfolio
resenting the coalition government and, not least, how is
(Laver and Shepsle 1996). The third model, which is the
this relationship moderated by certain characteristics of
one receiving the most empirical support, is the idea of
the coalition?”
a “coalition compromise” in which policies reflect a
Our data cover observations over time from Germany,
compromise across the policy preferences of the coali-
Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands. These countries
tion partners. Relatedly, Sagarzazu and Klüver (2017)
vary in terms of the formal powers of the prime minister,
investigate how German parties balance the electoral
the typical number of coalition partners, and the type of
imperative (the need for each party to gain votes) and
coalition, which makes it possible to shed light on the
the coalition imperative (the need to govern together)
moderating effects of such factors. The paper draws on
over time, using press releases to extract parties’ policy
data on the issue priorities of the individual coalition part-
issue emphasis. The findings reveal that German parties
ners as well as data on a common issue agenda presented
differentiate themselves right after and just before elec-
by the coalition, that is, the executive speeches. These
tions (for related studies, see Schermann and Ennser-
data have features that are attractive from the perspective
Jedenastik 2014; Timmermans and Breeman 2015;
of the coalition literature.
Zubek and Klüver 2015).
The empirical analysis shows that the extent to which
Despite these recent contributions, our understanding
a prime minister’s party is constrained by its coalition
of...
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