The Administrative Presidency and Federal Service

• Author: Robert N. Roberts
• Published date: 01 August 2021
• Date: 01 August 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0275074021993849
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074021993849

American Review of Public Administration

2021, Vol. 51(6) 411 –421

© The Author(s) 2021

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DOI: 10.1177/0275074021993849

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Article

Introduction

The article explores the question of whether the growth of the

administrative presidency prevents a serious threat to the

long-term survival of the federal civil service system. With

the rise of the modern administrative state, the federal service

underwent a profound transformation. Through the first half

of the 20th century, many federal employees continued to per-

form routine ministerial tasks. For instance, hundreds of thou-

sands of postal service employees delivered the mail. By the

2016 presidential election, the number of federal employees

with policy making and policy advocating responsibilities

had exploded. Federal agencies employ tens of thousands of

some of the best policy experts in the world. Efforts to limit

their independence present a direct threat to the capacity of

federal agencies and departments to solve the most serious

problems facing the United States and the world.

The federal response to the COVID-19 pandemic pro-

vided vivid demonstration of the level of discretion federal

agencies have in responding to crisis situations that threat-

ens the lives and health of large numbers of Americans

and what happens when political leadership refuses to listen

to federal employees with combined decades of expertise.

Career federal employees of the Centers for Disease Control

and Prevention (CDC) and other federal agencies with

public health responsibilities, for example, constantly found

themselves at odds with the Trump White House regarding

what information to provide the American people on how to

safeguard themselves from COVID-19 (Abutaleb et al.,

2020). Federal agencies rely upon an army of experts to

develop and implement policy initiatives involving a vast

spectrum of issues.

For understandable reasons, a White House might want to

exert tight control over the policy making apparatus of the

administrative state. To do so presents a direct threat to the

ability of federal administrative agencies to provide political

leadership timely and accurate policy assessments. A President

might believe the world that a new virus is no worth than the

yearly flu. A President might want to convince the American

people they have nothing to fear from a new virus. Without the

cooperation of federal public health experts, a President might

find such an undertaking impossible to accomplish. The fact

993849ARPXXX10.1177/0275074021993849The American Review of Public AdministrationRoberts

research-article2021

1Department of Political Science, James Madison University, Harrisonburg,

VA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Robert N. Roberts, Department of Political Science, James Madison

University, Miller Hall, MSC 7705, 91 E. Grace, Harrisonburg, Virginia

2280, USA.

Email: robertrn@jmu.edu

The Administrative Presidency

and Federal Service

Robert N. Roberts1

Abstract

Through the 20th and early 21st century, the United States has seen the growth of the administrative presidency. As political

polarization has made it much more difficult for a presidential administration to push public policy initiatives through Congress,

presidential administrations have become much more dependent on executive orders, policy statements, federal rulemaking,

and nonenforcement policies to implement their agenda. Presidential administrations have also attempted to exert much

greater control over the actions of federal employees with policymaking and policy implementation responsibilities. The

article argues that the modern administrative presidency has become a serious threat to the nation’s democratic values and

institutions. The article also argues that in the wrong hands, the administrative state may do great harm. Finally, the article

argues that the discipline of public administration must end its love affair with the administrative presidency. The danger of

misuse of the administrative state has just become too serious to permit presidential administrations to coerce career civil

servants to put the ideological interests of a President over the public interest. To help control this serious problem, the

article argues that the discipline of public administration should help to empower federal employees to serve as guardians

of constitutional values by providing them the tools necessary to uncover and make known instances of abuse of power by

presidential administrations intent upon ignoring the constitutional foundations of the administrative state.

Keywords

administrative presidency, separation of powers, administrative evil, federal service