The 2017 Manchester Bombing and the British-Libyan Jihadi Nexus.

• Author: Benedek, Eran

On May 22, 2017, Salman Abedi, a 22-year-old of Libyan descent born in the city of Manchester, detonated a large improvised explosive device in the foyer of the Manchester Arena as an Ariana Grande pop concert was drawing to a close. The resulting explosion was so powerful that it killed 22, physically injured 237, and traumatized hundreds more. The Manchester Arena attack came as a local and national shock. The ferocity of the bomb and the targeting of concert-goers, mainly teenagers and youngsters, horrified the country. What paths led brothers Salman and Hashem Abedi to commit an atrocity in their home city? Haras Rafiq, the chief executive of the Quilliam Foundation, has suggested that Salman Abedi's radicalization was the result of the salafi ideology and theology that he had absorbed in Manchester from a young age. (1) The two brothers were also influenced by their interactions with peer networks within Manchester's Libyan community and in Libya itself, although no evidence has come to light suggesting that anyone else is implicated in their attack. Yet, rather than the Islamic State radicalizing Salman, Rafiq contends, the group "cherrypicked" him. (2) If this is true, then it is possible that Hashem was influenced or mobilized in a similar way.

During Hashem Abedi's trial, the prosecution described the two brothers as follows:

In the years leading up to the bombing, the brothers had begun to display to [sic] some signs of radicalisation: Salman more so than Hashem. They changed in appearance, becoming more religious and devout. They talked about Libya, the conflict there and expressed support for ISIS. (3) In 2018, moreover, the report by the U.K. Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) into the 2017 terrorist attacks in Britain included sections about the Manchester bombing and the Abedi family. While the report is heavily redacted throughout due to national security concerns, it quoted an excerpt of oral evidence from the U.K. Security Service (MI5) that stated:

So we cannot even now look at the Abedi case and say it is obvious because of the father's activities over the years that two or three of the sons would become extremists, but it is relevant to the story, clearly. (4) In the paragraph immediately after, however, the ISC provided its own view on the nature of extremism within the family:

Nevertheless, post-attack it appears highly likely that SALMAN and HASHEM's extremist views were influenced by their father RAMADAN Abedi and fostered by other members of their immediate family. (5) Drawing on the text of the prosecution's opening arguments in the trial of Hashem Abedi, along with relevant official U.K. documents and investigative reports, this article explores the connectivity of Salman and Hashem to networks in Manchester and Libya. The article first describes some of the operational aspects of the bombing, Hashem's extradition to the United Kingdom from Libya and his subsequent trial and conviction. The article then places the brothers in the context of longstanding extremism within the milieu of the United Kingdom's Libyan Islamist diaspora, looking at family and community connections over at least two decades. While the article briefly discusses some of Salman and Hashem's links in Germany, the final sections concentrate on their jihadi connections in Libya and the nexus of their peer networks in Manchester to Libya and Syria.

Unfortunately, the potential threat posed by the Manchester-Libya extremist nexus may not have been sufficiently appreciated, as Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu, the United Kingdom's Senior National Coordinator for Counterterrorism Policing, described in a CTC Sentinel interview:

Libya is very close to home for Europe and our allies, but for a long time, it was not the focus for our attention. For us in the U.K., what happened in Manchester was a big wake-up call to the fact that there were people who had traveled back and forth to Libya doing much the same thing we were preventing people from doing in Iraq and Syria and who had a similar hatred for this country. (6) Pre-Attack Reconnaissance, the Attack, and the Trial

At 10:31 PM on May 22, 2017, Salman Abedi detonated his large improvised explosive device (IED) hidden in the 65-liter backpack he was carrying. He was standing among the crowds departing the Ariana Grande concert in the Manchester Arena, one of the largest indoor venues in Europe. The explosion killed 22 and physically injured 237 others, 91 of whom were classed as being either "very seriously" or "seriously" injured. Of the fatalities, the youngest was an eight-year-old girl, and nine were teenagers. (7)

Abedi arrived via Metrolink at Victoria Station at 8:30 PM. He spent his final two hours wandering around the station and the shared spaced adjacent to the Arena, including the City Room that is often described as the Arena's foyer. According to the official account, Abedi appeared to be "awaiting the conclusion of the performance and the then expected departure of concert goers from the building." (8) His device was packed with TATP explosive and a large quantity of shrapnel of screws, nuts, and cross dowels. Police later recovered from the blast scene shrapnel and metal fragments weighing over 30 kilos, including 3,000 nuts. (9) With the explosion forcing the shrapnel in all directions, it caused most of the injuries and fatalities. (10) Weighing around 36 kilos, the IED was heavy and powerful. (11) So powerful, in fact, that the explosion dismembered Salman Abedi, (12) propelling his head and upper torso to Victoria Station's ticket hall, which is about 160-200 feet away from the blast scene. (13)

At the time of the attack, Salman was not under investigation, though he had twice been an MI5 "Subject of Interest" (SOI) whose cases were closed. (14) His prior criminal record related to theft, receiving stolen goods, and assaulting a female at college for wearing a short skirt. (15) Crime scene evidence, however, implicated Salman within hours. He had carried out at least three pre-attack hostile reconnaissance visits to the Arena. (16) Salman's first visit--four days before the attack--was in the early evening of May 18; his return flight to Manchester from Libya (via Dusseldorf) landed earlier the same morning. (17) Salman visited the Manchester Arena and the City Room, the precise location of his imminent attack. (18) CCTV footage showed Salman scouting the area during a Take That concert, while observing the crowds before the concert and the long lines at the box office. (19) Salman visited the venue again on May 21, the day before the attack, and a third and final time earlier in the evening on May 22 itself. (20)

The day after the bombing, Salman's elder brother, Ismail, was arrested in Manchester on suspicion of involvement but was released without charge. (21) On May 24, 2017, Libya's Special Deterrence Force (RADA), a militia acting as the police force of the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA), arrested Salman's younger brother, Hashem, and their father, Ramadan, at the family home in Tripoli. (22) Ramadan was released shortly after without charge. He categorically condemned the attack: "We don't believe in killing innocents. This is not us... We aren't the ones who blow up ourselves among innocents. We go to mosques. We recite Quran, but not that." (23)

Meanwhile, RADA claimed that Hashem had confessed to knowing all the details of the Manchester Arena bombing and also confessed that both he and Salman belonged to the Islamic State. (24) RADA also claimed that Hashem was a "significant player" in a jihadi cell that had been plotting to attack the United Nations' special envoy to Libya during a visit to Tripoli earlier that year. (25)

Hashem had left the United Kingdom for Libya on April 15, 2017, around a month before the attack. (26) After a two-year extradition process, he was returned to the United Kingdom in July 2019 and was formally arrested and charged. His trial commenced in February 2020, and he pleaded not guilty to all charges. But while the trial was slated to last two months, it concluded several weeks early in a dramatic turn of events after Hashem dismissed his counsel and decided against mounting a defense. On March 17, after deliberating for four and a half hours, the jury found him guilty of 22 counts of murder, one count of attempted murder, and one count of conspiracy to cause an explosion likely to endanger life in connection to his brother's attack. (27a)

Hashem's trial revealed important details on how he and his brother plotted the attack. (28) Together with Salman, Hashem had persuaded individuals (who were unaware of the two brothers' intentions) to purchase chemicals on their behalf; (b) they obtained metal containers and experimented with prototypes; (29) and they bought a car in April 2017 that was used to store their bomb-making equipment. (30) Hashem's fingerprints and a matching DNA profile, along with traces of TATP, were found in an apartment the brothers used in Blackley, north Manchester. (31) Hashem's fingerprints were also found on the pieces of cans that were modified for use as detonator casings, (32) as well as on the nails and screws that, in the words of the prosecution, the two brothers bought "with a view to deployment in a lethal explosion." (33)

The prosecution's case against Hashem focused on the evidence demonstrating his joint culpability, detailing how the two brothers prepared for their attack. The prosecution stated that they "expressed support for ISIS" and noted Salman's friendship with a convicted terrorist from Manchester; (34) however, the trial did not reveal the extent of guidance or direction, if any, the Islamic State may have provided for the Manchester attack. During the trial, the jury was shown footage of a jihadi bomb-making video, which the brothers may have watched and which provided instructions on how to produce an explosive...