The 1963 Italian Elections
| Author | Robert McLellan,David S. McLellan |
| DOI | 10.1177/106591296401700406 |
| Date | 01 December 1964 |
| Published date | 01 December 1964 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
671
THE
1963
ITALIAN
ELECTIONS
DAVID
S.
McLELLAN
University
of
California,
Riverside
AND
ROBERT
McLELLAN
INTRODUCTION
N
THE
EARLY
MONTHS
of
1962
a
leftward
looking
government,
dubbed
in
~
Italy
the
centro-sinistra,
was
established
in
Rome.
It
was
composed
of
the
large
center
Christian
Democratic
party
(CD)
which
has
dominated
Italian
political
life
since
1947,
the
small
Italian
Social
Democratic
party
(PSDI)
and
the
miniscule
Italian
Republican
party
(PRI).
Together
these
controlled
slightly
more
than
half
(301)
of
the
596
seats
in
the
Chamber
of
Deputies.
The
novelty
of
the
new
govern-
ment
was,
however,
that
it
relied
for
added
support
in
the
Chamber
upon
the
Italian
Socialist
party
(PSI)
which
until
the
Hungarian
revolution
was
bound
to
the
Italian
Communist
party
(PCI)
in
a
unity-of-action
pact.
The
objective
of
the
new
government
was
to
insure
the
country
a
stable
and
pro-
gressive
regime,
while
concurrently
drawing
the
still
Marxist-oriented
PSI
into
the
democratic
arena.
The PCI
was
to
be
isolated
by
a
process
of
loosening
relations
with
the
PSI,
and
simultaneously
rendered
superfluous
by
the
enactment
of
necessary
social
reform
legislation.
Italy’s
&dquo;economic
miracle&dquo;
was
to
be
brought
more
under
public
control
and
its
fruits
made
more
accessible
to
the
common
man
in
the
belief
that
democratic
government
would
then
command
a
broader
and
more
stable
foun-
dation.
The
attitude
of
the
Vatican,
critically
important
to
the
success
of
any
politi-
cal
venture
in
Italy,
was,
under
Pope
John
XXIII,
indulgent
toward
the
experiment
despite
the
misgivings
of
the
more
conservative
members
of
the
Church
hierarchy.
The
major
area
of
weakness
in
the
new
arrangement
stemmed
from
the
mutual
suspicions
harbored
by
the
right
wing
of
the
CD
opposed
to
collaboration
with
a
Marxist
party
and
the
left
wing
of
the
PSI
opposed
to
any
disassociation
from
the
PCI.
The
success
of
the
new
government
was
to
be
determined
by
the
general
politi-
cal
elections
held
in
late
April
1963
-
the
first
since
1958.
On
the
eve
of
the
elections
-
characterized
principally
by
the
dominance
of
television
over
the
piazza
(town
square)
as
the
center
of
political
polemic,
and
a
rela-
tively
calm
if
not
apathetic
response
by
the
electorate
-
it
was
widely
agreed
that
the
elections
would
produce
changes
in
the
strength
of
the
parties.
These
changes
were,
however,
expected
to
be
moderate
and
to
affect
for
the
most
part
the
small
parties
to
the
immediate
left
and
right
of
the
CD
party.
On
the
left,
the
moderate
PSDI
was
expected
to
gain
strength
as
a
result
of
the
government
shift
to
the
left
and
the
key
role
played
by
party
leader
Saragat
in
achieving
this.
On
the
right,
the
Italian
Liberal
party
(PLI),
led
by
Giovanni
Malagodi,
anticipated
substantial,
pos-
sibly
spectacular,
gains
by
drawing
votes
from
both
the
disintegrating
Monarchist
party
(PDIUM)
to
its
right
and
from
former
CD
voters
disillusioned
with
the
gov-
ernment’s
concessions
to
the
PSI.
The
CD
was
expected
to
suffer
modest
losses -
losing
votes
both
on
the
right
to
the
PLI
and
on
the
left
to
the
PSDI
and
PSI.
A
672
1
per
cent
figure
was
most
frequently
quoted.
The
PSI
was
expected
to
win
some
new
votes
from
the
parties
to
its
right
and
lose
votes
to
the
PCI,
but
on
the
whole
to
make
a
modest
advance.
The
PCI,
on
the
other
hand,
was
expected
to
remain
sta-
tionary
or
decline
somewhat
in
strength.
Alleged
intra-party
conflicts,
principally
between
the
center
faction
headed
by
Party
Secretary
Togliatti
and
the
younger
revisionists
led
by
Giorgio
Amendola,
together
with
the
accomplishments
and
future
program
of
the
center-left,
were
seen
as
ruling
out
any
further
Communist
advance
and
most
probably
causing
a
loss
of
voting
power.
PCI
losses
during
the
1962
muni-
cipal
elections
-
held
mostly
in
the
South
-
and
the
alleged
decline
in
Communist
party
membership
were
facts
frequently
cited
to
support
this
prediction.
1963
ELECTION
RESULTS
In
a
certain
measure
these
predictions
were
fulfilled.
The
PSDI
and
the
PLI
gained
as
expected,
while
the
PSI
remained
stationary
as
most
observers
had
antici-
pated.
The
main
interest
lies
in
the
changes
that
were
not
predicted,
or
wrongly
pre-
dicted.
The
Christian
Democratic
party
lost
over
4
per
cent
of
its
votes
rather
than
the
1
per
cent
estimated,
failing
for
the
first
time
to
secure
40
per
cent
of
the
popular
vote.
By
contrast,
the
Italian
Communist
party
registered
gains
in
practically
all
electoral
districts.
The
voting
trends,
region
by
region,
appear
to
conform
to
the
national
pattern
with
but
minor
variations.
Tables
I
and
II
demonstrate
the
consistency
with
which
the
Liberal,
Communist
and
Social
Democratic
parties
gained
in
all
three
regions;
and
conversely,
the
consistency
with
which
the
Christian
Democrats
and
Monarchists
lost
in
all
three
regions.
The
Christian
Democratic
vote
fell
sharply
in
the
North
(4.8
per
cent)
and
the
Center
(4.5
per
cent)
and
somewhat
less
in
the
South
(2.6
per
cent)
where
the
CD
undoubtedly
captured
some
of
the
600,000
votes
lost
by
the
Monarchists
(PDIUM).
The
beneficiaries
of
the
political
changes
denoted
by
the
election
were
the
Com-
munists,
Liberals,
and
Social
Democrats.
The
Communists
increased
their
share
of
the
vote
most
heavily
in
Central
Italy
but
added
votes
also
in
the
North
and
South.
Communist
gains
were
greatest
in
the
large
industrial
centers
into
which
thousands
of
migrants
pour
each
year
from
the
surrounding
countryside
as
well
as
from
the
south
of
Italy.
That
the
Communists
are
the
immediate
beneficiaries
of
this
influx
should
come
as
no
surprise.
The
migrants
enter
a
working
class
environment
which
is
dominated
by
the
Communist
party
and
by
the
CGIL
( the
Communist-dominated
trade
union ) .
There
they
are
met
by
the
agencies
of
the
Communist
party
which
serve
a
function
not
unlike
that
of
Tammany
Hall
in
the
1880’s
and
1890’s.
Under
such
circum-
stances
the usual
class
differential
in
voting
turnout
is
either
&dquo;entirely
eliminated
or
reversed.&dquo; ~
The
working-class
districts
turn
out
en
masse
to
vote.
And
the
immi-
grant’s
propensity
to
vote
his
traditional
party
affiliation
is
submerged
by
the
strength
of
his
new
occupation
and
associational life.
In
support
of
the
hypothesis
that
the
Communists
and
not
the
Christian
Demo-
crats
benefit
initially
from
this
increasing
industrialization,
the
former
increased
their
1
S.
M.
Lipset,
Political
Man
(New
York:
Doubleday
Anchor
Book,
1963),
p.
204.
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