Terror and the Fifth Republic.

• Author: Debat, Alexis

FOUR HUNDRED years of coping with revolution, subversion, occupation and decolonization have turned France into one of the most policed states in the world, with approximately 394 public personnel per 100,000 inhabitants, and one of America's most respected partners in the War on Terror. While highly centralized under the Interior Ministry, the government's counter-terrorism function is not placed under a particular department. It is spread among a half-dozen police, intelligence and administrative agencies, each entrusted with a specific piece of the mission. The French success in rolling up a number of terrorist networks (arresting more than 230 people since 2002) can be attributed to this complex combination of centralization and flexibility, proactive and reactive policing, and the aggressive targeting of logistical networks.

The French Experience

BECAUSE OF its support for the Algerian military junta, which in 1992 cancelled the second round of elections when the first round had shown an extraordinary push from an Islamic coalition, France became the target of a loose confederation of neo-salafi terrorist networks built around a small group of former Algerian volunteers to the Afghan jihad in the 1980s and united in an organization named Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA). Beginning in 1993, the GIA started to assassinate French expatriates (including Christian religious figures) in Algeria, 42 in all between 1993 and 1996. The French government, which closely monitored Algerian Islamists in exile on its territory, quickly responded by unleashing an all-out war against these networks and their logistical infrastructure. In one year, from November 1993 to November 1994, 180 suspects were arrested, and a significant portion were tried. Then, in a chilling prelude to the September 11, 2001, attacks, a GIA commando hijacked an Air France flight in Algiers in late December 1994 with plans to crash it into the Eiffel Tower. Although foiled, this plot was a turning point in how the government perceived the Algerian terrorist threat.

Starting in 1994, French security services began sharing information on the international connections of French and Algerian GIA militants, including with the neo-salafi underground in London, and noticed the departure of many militants to Bosnia, Afghanistan and Chechnya for military training. But because this information-sharing strategy still relied on the old model of counter-terrorism built in the 1980s on a system with limited judicial powers and plagued by interservice rivalries, it only skimmed the surface of GIA's French networks and failed to uncover their stealthiest and most violent elements. As a result, France was once again the target of the GIA in 1995 and 1996: Ten bombs targeted public squares and the transportation system. But French counter-terrorism services were able to roll up these cells in under four months. They traced the money trail back to prominent Algerian exiles in London, such as Rachid Ramda (alias Abu Doha), as well as criminal gangs, such as the Gang de Roubaix, which provided financing to some GIA networks by robbing banks. French intelligence analysts also started linking GIA's international networks to Al-Qaeda through Abu Doha and Rachid Ramda in London. The investigation into GIA's international connections in 1997 and 1998 quickly uncovered an international support network stretching across Canada, France, Belgium, Italy and South Asia that provided volunteers for the global jihad and false passports to recruits. This worldwide intelligence operation is credited with the arrest on December 14, 1999, of Ahmed Ressam at the U.S.-Canadian border in Washington state with a truck full of 120 pounds of explosives and four detonators, which he planned to use in a terrorist attack against the Los Angeles airport.

In spite of its relatively short span (less than ten years) the struggle against GIA networks gave French intelligence and law enforcement agencies an early and unique insight into the ideology, organization and modus operandi of modern jihadi networks--some of which still form the backbone of Al-Qaeda. This was accomplished by a vast and complex intelligence and law enforcement apparatus, drawing on forces throughout the government, whose structure, powers and organization are deeply rooted in France's political culture.

A Flexible Apparatus

THE THREE main services responsible for monitoring and investigating the terrorist threat in France are the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), the Direction Centrale des Renseignements Generaux (DCRG) and the Division Nationale Anti-terroriste (DNAT).

Formally created in 1944 as the main civilian unit responsible for counter-intelligence, the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) is the latest institution in a very long and very successful French tradition of counter-intelligence that started with Joseph Fouch4 in the late 18th century under Napoleon. Placed under the responsibility of the Interior Ministry, the DST has seen its mandate broadened in the past ten years and is now the de facto central security agency in France, with responsibility over any traditional (espionage)...