Technical Support or Symbolic Threat? French Military Technicians Versus Private Providers

• Author: Hadrien Clouet
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X20958682
• Published date: 01 April 2022
• Date: 01 April 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X20958682

Armed Forces & Society

2022, Vol. 48(2) 364 –384

© The Author(s) 2020

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X20958682

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Article

Technical Support or

Symbolic Threat? French

Military Technicians

Versus Private Providers

Hadrien Clouet

1,2

Abstract

Since the mid-2000s, French military telecommunications have been partially out-

sourced to private companies. This was justified by an intent for budgetary savings

and efficiency. However, an interview survey conducted among military technicians

shows that this transfer weighs upon their work and expectations. Outsourcing

damages the profession’s appeal, deprives staff of strategic resources, and places

their time under the control of private providers. This represents a symbolic cost for

the personnel committed to the institution but also grants symbolic benefits to

officers who are hostile to the process. Although they were not designed for this

purpose, market procedures closely regulate the activity of frontline military

technicians.

Keywords

civil military relations, sociology, military organization, recruitment/retention,

outsourcing, privatization

Resorting to the private sector curr ently plays an increasing role in the ma inte-

nance and logistics of the French armed for ces. Since the abolition of the draft in

1996 and reduction in military strength of the 2000s (Bonnardot, 1998), in the

1

Centre de Sociologie des Organisations (CNRS and Sciences Po), Paris, France

2

Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire pour la Sociologie ´

Economique (CNRS and CNAM), Paris, France

Corresponding Author:

Hadrien Clouet, Centre de Sociologie des Organisations (CNRS and Sciences Po), 84 rue de Grenelle,

75007 Paris, France.

Email: h.clouet@cso.cnrs.fr

Clouet 365

wake of an international decline of co nscription and military sizes (Bu rk, 1992;

Segal & Korb, 2013), some internally pe rformed tasks were handed over to privat e

companies. Outsourcing has bec ome a consensual strategy within Fr ench armed

forces. A few years after the United States and United Kingdom adopted it

(Ku

¨mmel, 2004; Mandel, 2001), in 200 3, a ministerial instruction de fined and

formalized military outsourcin g in France (Sill, 2010). Curren t institutional doc-

uments insist on its objectives: e liminating redundancies, incre asing productivity,

absorbing load peaks, refocusing on core competencies, transforming “good

practices,” and maintaining activity despite budget cuts (Blaire, 2015; UNSA

D´efense, 2018). Outsourcing beg an with catering and clothing, f ollowed by infra-

structures and software (Miga ud, 2017)—only affecting the so -called removable

tasks (Boe¨ ne, 2003, p. 678). So far, Fran ce is less concerned with issues face d by

the United States or the United K ingdom, such as privatizing arme d personnel on

the battlefield (Minow, 2005) or negotiating over the scope of the State (Magnon-

pujo, 2011).

Accordingly, French military outsourcing is particularly concentrated in infor-

mation and communication departments. Indeed, French public telecommunications

experienced a drastic decline since 1982 (Musso, 2008), depriving the military of a

potential source of support. In 1991, the French administration of postal services and

telecommunications was divided into two autonomous companies, one of which—

France Telecom—was privatized in 2004. Only 23,000 agents still work in public

telecommunications (Schoen & Bigot, 2015). The Defense Ministry’s telecommu-

nications sector is therefore a pioneer in military outsourcing; the data flow transport

market, telephone communications (by terrestrial cable or satellite), and information

infrastructures are now entrusted to private companies.

Whereas the existing literature on the French case has intensively addressed the

rapidly evolving legal framework (Boulot, 2009; Frot, 2012) or the great controver-

sies surrounding the marketization of sovereign activities (Joana & M´erand, 2013;

Larrieu, 2017; Sill, 2010), this article rather emphasizes the consequences of

established marketization for labor in the public military sector. Indeed, the

public–private division of labor does not have a solely budgetary or optimizational

dimension. The literature rather suggests that outsourcing may produce discontent,

as it shapes power relations between civilians and soldiers ( Avant, 2002; Burk,

2002). It also alters the basic professional identity of the latter (Avant, 2005) and

erodes the military knowledge (Dandeker, 1994). Moreover, it generates unforeseen

costs while preventing democratic control (Avant & Sigelman, 2010) and verifica-

tion of claimed savings (Camacho, 2015). Officers thus still regard outsourcing with

a certain amount of skepticism (Heinecken, 2009), although the focus on budget

analysis in the surrounding debate dramatically weakens their argument (Deavel,

1998). Deprived of trade union organizations and of ordinary labor rights (though

allowed to form or join professional associations in 2015)

1

and constrained by

confidentiality agreements, and subject to a reserve duty requirement upon comple-

tion of their active duty contract, soldiers are therefore prevented from dissenting

2Armed Forces & Society XX(X)