Tech Tips, 0417 WYBJ, Vol. 40 No. 2. 50

AuthorBlake A. Klinkner Crowley Fleck, PLLP Cheyenne, Wyoming

Tech Tips

Vol. 40 No. 2 Pg. 50

Wyoming Bar Journal

April, 2017

Do You Have a First Amendment Right to Social Media?

Blake A. Klinkner Crowley Fleck, PLLP Cheyenne, Wyoming

In February 2017, the United States Supreme Court heard arguments in State v. Packingham, a case originating from North Carolina that will have important implications on the ability of governments to restrict social media among certain individuals. In particular, Packingham presents the question of whether states can prohibit convicted sex offenders from accessing social networking websites. A number of states have enacted such laws, claiming that social media websites allow sex offenders to obtain information about minors and also enable sex offenders to contact and groom minor victims.

The defendant in State v. Packingham, Lester Packingham, was convicted of taking indecent liberties with a child in 2002, which required that he subsequently register as a sex offender.[1] In 2010, the Durham, North Carolina, Police Department began searching through Facebook and other social media websites to identify sex offenders using these websites in violation of a state law, North Carolina General Statute § 14-202.5, that prohibited sex offenders from using social networking websites.[2] A police officer recognized Packingham’s profile picture on a Facebook page belonging to a user named “J.R. Gerard,” and upon further investigation, the officer determined that this Facebook account really belonged to Packingham (who was using an alias to mask his ac-count).[3] In 2012, Packingham was convicted of accessing a social networking website in violation of North Carolina General Statute § 14-202.5.[4]

On appeal to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, the court found that the statute violated constitutional rights to free speech, expression, association, assembly, and the press, and the court further found that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad, vague, and not narrowly tailored to achieve a legitimate governmental interest.[5] The court summarized its concerns with the statute by explaining: We assume that persons of ordinary intelligence would likely interpret the statute as prohibiting access to mainstream social networking sites such as Facebook.com and Myspace.com. H o w -ever, the ban is much more expansive. For example, while Food-network.com contains recipes and restaurant suggestions, it is also a...

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