The impact of taxation on unemployment in OECD countries.
| Jurisdiction | United States |
| Date | 22 September 2002 |
| Author | Heitger, Bernhard |
There have been numerous studies of the impact of labor market rigidities on unemployment rates. The general conclusion for both OECD as well as other countries is that rigidities explain a significant part of the observed international variation in unemployment rates (Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 1991).
The primary interest of the present paper is the impact of taxation on unemployment in OECD countries. The relation between unemployment and taxation has recently attracted special attention. For example, Nickell (1997) has found that taxation is a significant factor in explaining differences in unemployment rates across countries (see also Scarpetta 1996; Nickell and Layard 1997; Heitger 1998; and Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta 1998). Since high unemployment rates may lead to higher government expenditures and taxes, the question is whether the impact of the tax burden on unemployment has been estimated correctly--that is, whether the estimates are consistent and unbiased.
To evaluate the "true" impact of taxation on unemployment, Hausman specification tests can be carried out (Hausman 1978). With the help of these tests it is possible to investigate whether the impact of the tax burden on unemployment is exogenous. If the outcome is that the null hypothesis (that taxes are exogenous) has to be rejected, a two-stage least squares estimation procedure can provide unbiased and consistent estimates of the tax burden's impact on unemployment and thus correct for the simultaneity bias.
The empirical investigation will focus on total unemployment but also examine long-term and short-term unemployment. The reason is that an increase in long-term unemployment will eventually create a larger effect on government expenditures (and taxes) than will an increase in short-term unemployment. Since the tax burden is assumed to be only one of the structural features of the labor market in OECD countries, the impact of the other determinants also has to be estimated. The investigations are based on Nickell's (1997) data set, which contains the relevant data for two periods, namely 1983-88 and 1989-94.
Unemployment Experience in OECD Countries
Unemployment rates in OECD countries differ widely (Table 1). The rate of total unemployment in 1983-88 in Spain was 19.6 percent while the rate in Switzerland was only 0.8 percent. In 1989-94 these two countries again reported the highest (18.9 percent) and the lowest (2.3 percent) unemployment rate. The OECD average rate of total unemployment increased only slightly from 7.8 percent in 1983-88 to 8.0 percent in 1989-94. Total unemployment in Europe was higher than in non-European countries in both periods. At the same time the variation of total unemployment rates increased.
Short-term unemployment (i.e., a duration of unemployment less than one year) also varied widely in OECD countries. Again in Switzerland in both periods the short-term unemployment rate was lowest. In contrast, Canada in 1983-89 and Spain in 1989-94 reported the highest rate (about 9 percent). The mean rate of short-term unemployment in OECD countries accounted for more than half of the rate of total unemployment--with the non-European countries showing a much higher share. The variation in short-term unemployment in Europe and non-Europe increased in the course of time, but in both periods the rate was higher in the European countries.
Long-term unemployment in non-European countries seems to have been a problem of only minor importance--l.0 percent and 1.4 percent in 1983-88 and 1989-94, respectively--compared with Europe where this type of unemployment accounted for 4.2 percent and 3.7 percent.
Characteristics of OECD Labor Markets
The theoretical framework to explain unemployment rates in OECD countries is given by the familiar model of Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991). The model is characterized by an upward sloping wage-setting schedule which follows from the assumption that real wages are the result of a bargaining process between employers and employees--and a downward sloping labor demand schedule. Product market conditions and a number of wage-push factors influence the labor demand schedule and the wage-setting schedule, respectively. The intersection of the labor demand schedule and the wage-setting schedule determine the equilibrium of the structural unemployment rate and of real wages. Structural unemployment is thus a function of wage-push factors, price-push factors, and the elasticities of real wages and price markups to unemployment (Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta 1998: 212-13).
The determinants of unemployment may be classified with respect to four categories: direct labor market rigidities, the treatment of the unemployed, the structure of wage determination, and taxes (Nickell 1997). The database for the 1989-94 period is given in Appendix Table 1. Some descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.
Direct labor market rigidities are present if employment legislation is stringent and labor market standards are strict. Employment legislation may be measured by the employment protection index. This index was constructed by the OECD and is based on the legal regulations with respect to hiring and firing. Countries are ranked from 0 to 20, with 20 indicating the most stringent restrictions. Southern European countries like Italy, Spain, and Portugal are the most strictly regulated whereas the United States, New Zealand, and Canada have the weakest laws. The labor standard index, also introduced by the OECD, measures the strictness of regulations with respect to several aspects of the labor market. The index is based on five characteristics: working time, fixed-term contracts, employment protection, minimum wages and employees representation rights (on work councils, company boards, etc.). Each feature is being scored from 0 (no legislation) to 2 (strict legislation), and the scores are added up. Thus, the index ranges from 0 to 10. The emerging picture is very much the same as in the case of the employment protection index (e.g., Italy and Spain rank very high whereas the United States and Canada rank lowest).
The treatment of the unemployed by social security systems is another labor market feature that appears to help explain why unemployment rates in OECD countries differ. The replacement rate--the share of income replaced by unemployment benefits--ranges from about 20 percent for Italy to about 80 percent for Sweden. Benefit duration also varies widely. Whereas the benefits in the United States, Japan, and Italy are strictly time-limited (only six months), the benefit duration in several European countries like Belgium, Germany, Ireland, and England, as well as in Australia and New Zealand, is up to four years. Active labor market policy, which aims at reintegrating the unemployed into regular work (e.g., labor market training, assistance with job search, subsidized employment, and measures for the disabled) also varies widely among OECD countries. If labor market policy is measured by the amount of active labor market spending per unemployed (as a percentage of GDP per person of the labor force), Sweden's figure of about 60 percent ranks highest. Germany comes next with expenditures of nearly 26 percent. The United States with only 3 percent spent the least.
Characteristics of the wage bargaining system also appear to be important determinants of the variation in unemployment rates (see Calmfors 1993). Union density figures give the percentage share of union members in relation to total wage and salary earners. According to this measure, Sweden and other Northern European countries rank highest. However, these numbers may be misleading because in some countries, even those with small shares like France and Spain, union wage negotiations determine the wages of large parts of the workforce. To account for this circumstance, a union coverage index has been calculated that shows the percentage share of workers actually covered by union wage bargaining (with 3 indicating more than 70 percent covered, 2 indicating 25-70 percent, and 1 less than 25 percent covered). In all European countries except Switzerland and the United Kingdom more than 70 percent of the workforce are covered by union wage bargaining.
The next two rows indicate the degree of union and employer coordination in wage bargaining. For both measures the degree of coordination is ranked from 1 (low) to 3 (high). The coordination of the unions is highest in Northern Europe and Austria. In contrast, the non-European countries as well as Switzerland and the United Kingdom rank lowest. The ranking of employer coordination looks very much the same.
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