TAX REGULATIONS IN A LOPER BRIGHT LIGHT. (Moore, Loper Bright, Corner Post and the Future of the Federal Tax System)

AuthorSaito, Blaine G.
Published date22 March 2025
INTRODUCTION 532
                I. LOPER BRIGHT AND THE END OF CHEVRON 534
                 A. Chevron's Development 534
                 B. Loper Bright's Affirmative Reasoning 537
                 C. Animating Concerns 539
                II. THE STANDARD FOR TAX REGULATIONS? 540
                 A. What Is the Standard? 540
                 B. Tax and Grants of Authority 542
                 C. Everything Old Is New Again 544
                 1. The Death of National Muffler 544
                 2. Why the Redux? 546
                 3. Fitting in Skidmore 549
                 4. Specific Grants and Greater Leeway 549
                III. THE CHAOS GOING FORWARD 551
                 A. Admin Law for Whom 551
                 B. Specific Grant Problems 554
                 C. Forum Choices 557
                 D. Preamble Scramble 559
                 E. Putting It Together 560
                IV. A PROVISIONAL EXAMPLE 561
                 A. Statutory Section and Regulatory Authority 561
                 B. Regulations and Standards 564
                 C. Is Transfer Pricing Toast? 569
                 D. Arm's-Length Prison 571
                V. CONCLUSION 575
                

INTRODUCTION

In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the Court overturned Chevron deference and loosed chaos into the world of administrative law. (1) Since the opinions were issued, commentators and courts have struggled with figuring out the path forward, as the majority opinion is not a model of clarity. (2) I include myself in that group. When it comes to tax regulations, there will be chaos, but it may be more muted than we expect. More regulations will get overturned, but probably not a lot more.

The reason stems from two ideas in Loper Bright. First, while not perfectly clear about what the proper standard of review is for substantive challenges to regulations, the Court noted that there may be more room for agencies to act regulatorily if a statute grants power to issue regulations. (3) Second, Loper Bright seems to put a thumb on the scale of contemporaneously issued regulations and long-standing regulations. (4) The phenomenon of shifting regulations or regulations that overruled a court's interpretation of a statute was a major reason for overturning Chevron. (5)

Tax is interesting and likely more stable because both of these observations apply. First, all of the Code falls under a general grant of power in section 7805(a) to issue regulations. And in interpreting that section prior to the decision in Chevron, the courts applied the factors set out in National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, which prized contemporaneously issued or long-standing regulations as well. (6) Additionally, the concept of Skidmore weight, where the agency's well-reasoned position can have the power to persuade based on its expertise, can slot in well. (7) All of these move the analysis of tax regulations away from a de novo review that slightly tilts the balance in favor of Treasury. There may not be strong deference in tax anymore, but instead a good sense of giving the agency's position greater weight.

Furthermore, some parts of the Code have specific grants of authority. These should provide more weight to Treasury's position, potentially even allowing it to change its previous position and break free of the old regulation emphasis of National Muffler--Skidmore framings. The real issue is identifying these specific grants and determining their scope.

These matters all point toward some level of stability in the midst of chaos for tax regulations. Additionally, some other points are worth noting and most point toward stability rather than overturning regulations. The lower courts are likely to still want to find ways to move tax regulatory challenges along. That may preserve deference to Treasury's views. More of the focuses will fall too on the actual scope of specific grants, since there is more room for Treasury to maneuver and exercise wider judgment. The forum can also take a greater importance, with the Tax Court providing the best chances for overturning regulations, because those judges are likely to have greater expertise and desire to comb through the substantive matter of whether tax regulations comport with statutory meanings. District courts, on the other hand, given the wide variety of cases they have, busy dockets and their lack of expertise, may still be willing to defer more to Treasury except on hot-button political matters. Finally, preambles may swell in size, especially at the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking stage. But even with these, most of these factors still push in having a thumb on the scale for Treasury.

To explain some of these outcomes, this Article looks at the development and future of transfer pricing regulations. This part of tax law is mostly regulatory. Congress occasionally intervenes, but rarely. It seems that key details, such as how exactly a method works or even something like what constitutes a best method, would likely be left alone. But moves to remove problematic ideas like the arm's-length standard itself and the goal of shifting to formulary apportionment or eliminating cost sharing arrangements likely cannot happen without congressional action.

In the end, there is chaos in the near term. But perhaps what is said here may point to ways forward to a new equilibrium on the validity of tax regulations. That said, the next few years may still be unsettled as we figure out exactly how to apply the proposed framework and grapple with the various realities mentioned below.

This Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I discusses Chevron's rise and takes a close reading of Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in Loper Bright. Part II explains a potential framework for thinking about Loper Bright's effect on tax regulations. It suggests that the general grant of regulatory authority will create a standard that sounds similar to the old National Muffler test and a Skidmore overlay. It also points out that specific grants should provide greater leeway to Treasury. Part III addresses some practical concerns that will arise. Part IV then uses transfer pricing as an example through which to view these matters.

I. LOPER BRIGHT AND THE END OF CHEVRON

To understand the significance of Loper Bright, it is necessary to understand Chevron and its development. It is also important to get a sense of what seems to be driving the opinion itself. This Part examines key points on the development of Chevron and then turns to what the Court said in Loper Bright.

A. Chevron's Development

Beginning shortly after it was decided, Chevron became the test as to whether an agency's regulations survived a substantive ultra vires challenge. A bit of history is worth mentioning, because it puts in context the Court's move in Loper Bright.

Prior to Chevron, the state of these types of challenges was a mess. (8) Courts were all over the map as to whether they would uphold or strike an agency's regulations. In particular, the D.C. Circuit seemed overwhelmed. These cases were complex, involving technical nonlegal issues and often difficult statutes as well.

The Supreme Court decided Chevron in 1984. The case involved an agency's regulations defining the term "stationary source" for purposes of the Clean Air Act. (9) The question was whether a stationary source to which pollution controls applied was a smokestack in a plant or the entire plant. (10) The Court upheld the regulation that applied the plant definition. (11) Justice Stevens reasoned that a two-step analysis applied to determine the validity of the regulation. First, the Court determined whether the statute was clear on the precise point in question. If so, it would end its analysis there. (12) Second, if it was not clear, the question was whether the agency's interpretation was reasonable. (13) If so, the court was to defer to the agency's interpretation. If not, the court was to interpret the statute itself. In Chevron itself, the Court held the statute was not clear and the agency's views were reasonable. (14) The Court accordingly deferred to the EPA.

Chevron was never meant to be revolutionary. (15) Indeed, Justice Stevens later tried to walk it back a bit. (16) The Supreme Court initially did not really cite the case. But lower courts in general, and the D.C. Circuit in particular, adopted Chevron relatively quickly. (17) Chevron became Chevron because of the lower courts. And lower courts may have adopted it partly because of both the promise of simplicity and the urging of the Department of Justice. (18) The promise of simplicity and moving cases along can indeed be powerful. Chevron as a doctrine eventually migrated to the Supreme Court from the D.C. Circuit as a decisional rule, partly because Justice Scalia came up and pushed it further. (19)

Over time, the Supreme Court did try to pare back Chevron. In Mead, the Court determined that not all agency actions received Chevron deference, rather only those where there are certain procedures, usually notice-and-comment rulemaking. (20) Other agency actions then would not receive Chevron deference but rather the more limited deference provided under Skidmore. (21) This change raised questions as to what exactly the scope of Chevron deference was. It also revivified Skidmore.

But Chevron also expanded. Under Brand X, if a court interpreted an ambiguous statute, an agency could override the court's reading, so long as the override was reasonable. (22) Indeed, so long as agencies followed notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures and provided reasoned explanations to comments, regulations would survive even if they changed the agency's position on the meaning of an ambiguous statute.

Overall, Chevron, because it aided courts in their analyses and moved cases along, became one of the most cited Supreme Court cases. But over the last few years, the Supreme Court raised concerns about Chevron as allowing agencies in the administrative state to grow. Even Justice Scalia, who while on the D.C. Circuit and later the Supreme Court, was an advocate of Chevron, began to backtrack. (23) In particular, the Court tried to pare back Chevron through the major questions doctrine. In certain situations of great political or economic issues, the Court ruled that Congress did not ever intend to leave such power to...

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