Expensive tastes: how the military has spent years gold-plating itself out of a cheap and effective unmanned aircraft - that could save lives.

• Author: Piore, Adam
• Position: Unmanned aerial vehicle

In the midst of the Persian Gulf War, a group of bedraggled Iraqi soldiers were shown on CNN, desperately waving what appeared to be white shirts at a passing US. airplane. But the plane seemed unimpressed by their attempts at surrender, continuing placidly on its way. That was to be expected: There was no pilot on board.

The Iraqis were attempting to surrender to what's known as an "unmanned aerial vehicle" (UAV), a pilot-less "drone" aircraft that some say is the military surveillance tool of the future. This particular drone, called a "Pioneer," was essentially a souped-up remote control airplane with a camera. Its mission during the Gulf War was to cruise the desert looking for signs of the enemy. Though limited in both quantity and quality, Pioneers performed a valuable service during the war -- beaming back images of Iraqi troop movements, and transmitting targeting information to American gunners on offshore battleships.

But the United States' relatively successful deployment of UAVs in the war was one of the few bright spots in the American military's otherwise troubled history with the aircraft. The Pioneers used in the Gulf were Israeli-made. They were purchased in 1985 as a "temporary" solution while the U.S. military developed an American version. But despite having spent more than $2 billion since 1979, the U.S. has yet to produce and fully deploy its own UAV system. Meanwhile our Israeli-made Pioneers have become antiquated, which hampered their performance in the Gulf. To top it all off, by allowing spare-parts contractors to charge grossly inflated prices, as well as wasting millions trying to adapt the land-based Pioneers for use at sea, the U.S. has managed to turn an originally inexpensive plane into yet another boondoggle.

UAVs ought to be a commander's dream. They provide a wealth of essential intelligence, while taking human pilots and on-the-ground observers out of the fine of fire. And the technology to build simple drone planes has been around for years. Why can't the U.S. military get it's act together? The fault lies not with the engineers, but with the perverse culture of their bosses. Leaders at the Pentagon tend to favor big-ticket items because these help justify large budgets -- which can then be padded with pay raises and promotions. And however useful they may be in combat, as weapons in the budget battle, drones have a major drawback: they are cheap to produce. So the top brass has loaded on a host of expensive, and increasingly complicated additional requirements. "They want this thing to do everything except shave you and pat you on the fanny in the morning," said Piers Wood, a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel, now chief of staff at the Center for Defense Information. The result: the models developed often literally can't fly straight. "We've essentially goldplated ourselves out of a good UAV," complains Wood. "And don't kid yourself, we really need one."

Turf Wars

The potential of unmanned aircraft was first demonstrated in 1982, when they were used by Israel to win a stunning victory over Syria in the Bekka Valley. The Israelis sent a front-line force of propeller-driven drones over the Syrians. The unmanned planes, equipped with cameras, drew radar-guided missile fire from the Syrians, allowing Israelis to identify their position and launch radar-seeking missiles. Meanwhile, the planes sent back real-time video...