Taming polysemous signals: The role of marketing intensity on the relationship between financial leverage and firm performance

AuthorHannah Oh,John Bae,Sang‐Joon Kim
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1016/j.rfe.2016.12.002
Published date01 April 2017
Date01 April 2017
Taming polysemous signals: The role of marketing intensity on the
relationship between financial leverage and firm performance
John Bae
a,
,Sang-JoonKim
b
, Hannah Oh
c
a
Financeat Elon University, NC27244, United States
b
Managementat Ewha School of Business,Ewha Womans University,South Korea
c
Marketingat the College of BusinessAdministration, Universityof Nebraska Omaha,NE 68182, United States
abstractarticle info
Articlehistory:
Received23 February 2016
Receivedin revised form 9 December2016
Accepted18 December 2016
Availableonline 23 December 2016
This studyattempts to reconcile the two strandsof research on the impactsof nancial leverage on rm valua-
tion. The prior literaturehas shown that nancial leveragehas a polysemous effect. In other words,it provides
two opposingsignals of rm performance (i.e., nancialdistress vs. a driver of positive changein a rm's pros -
pects). Given that the effects of nancial leverage are contradictory,we specify how these divergentsignals ap-
pear and propose that there is a non-monotonic effect of nancial leverage on rm valuation. The study also
shows that marketingactivities can be strategicallyimplemented to tame thesepolysemous signals. Marketing
activities are costly actions for a rm, especially one in an adverse environment with high le verage, and are
rewardedin terms of rm valuation.Therefore, marketingactivities can help reinforcethe driver signaland alle-
viatethe distress signal of nancialleverage, thus increasingrm valuation.This study nds a U-shapedrelation-
ship between nancial leverage and Tobin's q and a positive moderating effect of marketing intensity on the
curvilinearrelationship.
© 2016 ElsevierInc. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Firm nancialleverage
Marketingintensity
Firm valuation
Signaling
1. Introduction
Since the seminal work on debt by Modigliani and Miller (1958),
debt, as a means to nance, has been studiedin terms of how it can af-
fect the capital structureof a rm (Myers, 1984; Kraus & Litzenberger,
1973;Frank & Goyal, 2003). Basically, Modigliani and Miller (1958) the-
orized that capitalstructure does not affect the marketvalue of a rm.
However, since the conception of corporate income tax was added to
the capital-structure-irrelevancethesis, the role of debt has been exten-
sively exploredand its monetarybenets and costs have been specied
(Myers, 1984; Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; Frank & Goyal, 2005;
Graham, 2003). For example, Kraus and Litzenberger (197 3) argued
that debt is benecial in that it can shield earnings from corporatein-
come taxes, butthat it can also lead rms to the dangerof bankruptcy.
That is, as the level of debt increases, the marginalbenet of debt de-
clines, while the marginal cost increases. A rm that is optimizing its
overall value will focus on this tra de-off when choosing how much
debt and equity to use for nancing (Frank & Goyal, 2005). Thus, the
conictbetween benetand cost of debt can yielda curvilinearrelation-
ship betweendebt and performance(specically,an inverted U-shaped
relationship).
While thetrade-off theory has providedtheoretical contributions to
our understanding of capitalstructure, its empiricalrelevance has often
beenquestioned. In addition,our knowledgeof the impact of debt,char-
acterizedby multiple meaningswithin a rm, on rm performance,has
not been fully specied. The empirical ndings reported have been in-
conclusive. Some scholars havefound a positive relationship between
debt and rm performance (Jensen, 1986; McConnell & Servaes,
1990), while others have found a negative relationship (Goddard,
Tavakoli & Wilson, 2005; Myers, 1977; Mar garitis & Psillaki, 2010;
Yazdanfar & Ohman, 2015). Stulz (1990) found both a positive and a
negative effect of debt based on Myers (197 7) and Jensen (1986).
Scholars have not reached an agree ment about the relationship be-
tween nancial distress and corporate performance (Opler & Titman,
1994) and the empiricalevidence based on the agencycosts hypothesis
is mixed (Campello, 2006a, b; Mesquita & La ra, 2003; Titman, 2000;
Myers, 2001;Harris & Raviv, 1991; Weill,2008). See Table 1 for a sum-
mary of previousliterature.
Variousconclusions exist in the literature regardingthe relationship
between nancialleverage and rm performance.Consideringpotential
causes for these inconsistentresults, such as different sample periods,
sample regions, model specications, and hypothesized relationships
between various researches, we attem pt to reconcile these ndings
through the use of a very comprehensive data set that covers a time
span of 30 years under a non-linear model specicationthat properly
accounts for other rm and industry effects. Furthermore, we provide
Reviewof Financial Economics 33 (2017)2940
Correspondingauthor.
E-mailaddresses: jbae@elon.edu(J. Bae), s.kim@ewha.ac.kr (S.-J.Kim),
hoh@unomaha.edu(H. Oh).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rfe.2016.12.002
1058-3300/©2016 Elsevier Inc. All rightsreserved.
Contents listsavailable at ScienceDirect
Review of Financial Economics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/rfe

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