Taking on the boss: Informative contests in prosecutor elections

• Date: 01 October 2018
• Author: Bryan C. McCannon,Joylynn Pruitt
• Published date: 01 October 2018
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12291

657

Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2018;20:657–671. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jpet © 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Received: 3 July 2017 Accepted: 4 December 2017

DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12291

ARTICLE

Taking on the boss: Informative contests in

prosecutor elections

Bryan C. McCannon Joylynn Pruitt

WestVirginia University

BryanC. McCannon, Department of Eco-

nomics,West Virginia University, PO Box

6025,Morgantown, WV 26506, USA

(bryan.c.mccannon@gmail.com).

JoylynnPruitt, Department of Economics, West

VirginiaUniversity, Morgantown, WV,USA

(jopruitt@mix.wvu.edu).

The United States is unique in that most states select their prose-

cutors using popular election. An interesting feature of prosecutor

elections is that the pool of potential challengers to an incumbent

comes primarily from subordinates within the office. We develop a

signaling model that analyzes whether entry into the political raceby

a subordinate provides voterswith useful information. We challenge

the commonly held presumption that the election mechanism is inef-

fective. Exploring the decision of an insider to challenge the boss, we

demonstrate that a challenger can strategically convey information

about the incumbent's quality by entering the race. Anticipating this,

poor incumbents exit. Thus, the model matches empirical observa-

tions of rare contested elections and rather modest vacancy rates.

Compared to the situation where outsiders challenge the incumbent,

the election mechanism is effective.

1INTRODUCTION

Local prosecutors handle the bulk of the crimes in the United States (approximately 95% of all felonies) (Simmons,

2004). Prosecutors are given an incredible amount of discretion in deciding how to handle these cases (Bibas, 2009a;

Kessler & Piehl, 1998). For example, they choose whether to file charges or dismiss a case, which charges to file, the

amount of investigationto expend, and whether to plea bargain (among others). Their choices not only affect the victim

and the accused, but also have a significant impact on the public's finances and on society through the deterrence of

crime. Local prosecutor decision making is a crucial component of U.S.democratic institutions.

Given the discretion endowed to prosecutors, it is appropriate to evaluate the quality of the accountability mecha-

nisms in place. Agency problems and public choice considerations can be expected to be issues of concern. Important

components of the prosecution process, such as governingthe admissibility of evidence and the sharing of exculpatory

evidence, are overseen by the judge involvedin the case. The judge's role in monitoring prosecutor behavior is limited

when guilty pleas are negotiated outside the courtroom. Given that plea bargaining arises in approximately 97% of

felony convictions (Bandyopadhyay& McCannon, 2014), judicial oversight is an insufficient check on prosecutors.

The popular (typically partisan) election is the primary mechanism to evaluate, motivate, select, and retain chief

local prosecutors in the United States. Residents of a county elect their chief prosecutor to serve a four-year term