Tackling the Iran-U.S. crisis: the need for a paradigm shift.

• Author: Zarif, Mohammad Javad
• Position: THE U.S.-IRAN RELATIONSHIP

Central Asia and the Persian Gulf region have been engulfed in turmoil and instability with global ramifications for the last several decades. The region has been the scene of super-power rivalry and competition as well as major-power understanding and cooperation. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan lead to one of the bloodiest Cold War confrontations, while during the same period, the Iran-Iraq war created a unique opportunity for both superpowers and most other powers to support the same side.

This region has also been the scene of the most amazing and drastic shifts in United States alliances. Before they turned against their benefactors, Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda began as major assets for--if not creations of--the United States in the war against communism and later in the campaign against Iran. (1)

The turmoil in this region has shown that major-power rivalry has not been the sole source of the region's miseries, because significant episodes of major-power cooperation did not bring about positive change. The source of trouble is not extremism either, as it has been a symptom and not the cause; not to mention the fact that today's extremists were once close allies of their current antagonists. The problem lies in the prevailing paradigm, founded on the need for an enemy--real, perceived, imaginary or artificially manufactured--as a convenient tool for governance and global interactions. The resulting double standards, short-sighted policies, political and military domination and imposition continue to nurture conflict, insecurity, arms races, dictatorship and extremism. (2)

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CONTEXT OF IRAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Iran has suffered tremendously from the enemy paradigm. In this context, it became the victim of a war, launched by Saddam Hussein on 22 September 1980, which was miserably dealt with by the international community. (3) The Iranian people experienced war and destruction on the battlefields and in their homes, thanks to Saddam's doctrine of total war. Massive diplomatic, financial and military support for the aggressor from every corner of the world added insult to injury, When Saddam invaded Iran and swiftly advanced to occupy 30,000 square kilometers of Iranian territory, it took seven days for the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution, presumably based on the widely held belief that the war would bring down the newly established revolutionary government within a week. (4) Even after seven days, the Security Council did not make the routine call for a cease-fire and withdrawal, nor consider Saddam's invasion of Iran a threat against international peace and security. (5) In the course of the war, the United States joined the Soviet Union and France in providing Iraq with military hardware and intelligence, and even the material for chemical and biological weapons along with German and other Western companies. (6) The Security Council was prevented for several years, and in spite of mounting evidence and UN reports, from dealing with the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iranian civilians and soldiers. (7)

Iran has also been directly affected by turmoil in the neighborhood. Iran welcomed the removal of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. However, the turmoil, insecurity and extremism present since the aftermath of invasion and foreign occupation have had a detrimental impact on Iran's security and development. Iran had warned the Security Council about these consequences before the invasion: "We all have an idea of the unparalleled disaster that a possible war could bring about. The humanitarian crisis in Iraq and in the neighboring countries might take catastrophic dimensions. The threat of disintegration of Iraq and instability in the region is significant. The fact that extremism stands to benefit the most from a war is undeniable." (8) An increasingly bloody sectarian clash, initiated by terrorists and fanned by politicians, is now threatening the entire region.

This turbulent experience--in addition to the more classic geopolitical determinants--has influenced Iran's national security doctrine. From a geopolitical perspective--unlike few other countries in the region that have felt suffocated and have historically espoused expansionist tendencies--Dan has been content with its geography and human and natural resources, and thus has not had to invade any other country in the past 250 years. As the most powerful country in its immediate neighborhood, Iran has always found it necessary to engage in confidence-building with its neighboring states to address their understandable concerns arising from power and size disparities, and also in order to offset extra-regional agitations.

For the same geo-strategic reasons, Iran has historically considered stability in the region to be vital to its own security and development. Recognition of this reality motivated Iran to play an instrumental role in efforts to stabilize Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Iran's role in the Bonn Conference and its contributions to the stability and development of Afghanistan--in spite of Iran's difficulties with the United States--has been widely recognized, including by senior U.S. officials. (9)

The same policy considerations have applied to Iraq. Despite its opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Tehran was the first capital in the region to recognize and support the Iraqi Governing Council--established after the fall of Saddam--and has maintained excellent relations with all post-Saddam governments, whose senior officials have consistently rejected U.S. allegations of Iranian interference. (10) According to the Los Angeles Times, "The Iraqi government is moving to solidify relations with Iran, even as the United States turns up the rhetorical heat and bolsters its military forces to confront Tehran's influence in Iraq." (11) The closest U.S. allies in Iraq have also strongly protested U.S. policies and behavior against Iran in Iraq. (12)

While Iran played a constructive role regarding various issues affecting the region, Iranian decisionmakers also recognized that advancing Iran's national security necessitates a more structural paradigm shift from regional rivalries and mistrust caused by exclusion and block-formations to regional cooperation and confidence through inclusion and participation.

In 1986 at the height of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran proposed the establishment of a security and cooperation arrangement in the Persian Gulf region to ensure stability and prevent the widening of the Iran-Iraq war. (13) This proposal was initially well received, even incorporated into UN Security Council Resolution 598, but never implemented.

In 1999, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Iran officially proposed to "change [the global] security paradigm," and "to replace military block security umbrellas with a new and innovative concept of Global Security Networking ... for an inclusive and participatory global security, which uses the existing mechanisms in a complimentary rather than competing schemes." (14)

Following the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iran proposed that "it is time to finally establish an indigenous and internationally guaranteed regional security arrangement under United Nations auspices. The momentum created by the removal of Saddam Hussein should be used to replace mistrust and the arms race with mutual security and transparency." (15)

Another important component of Iran's security doctrine--also partly shaped by its own experience--is the elimination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), strengthening and universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the establishment of a zone free from such weapons in the Middle East. This policy has important ideological and strategic underpinnings, but emotionally it is rooted in the fact that Iranian civilians and soldiers were victims of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq.

Based on Islamic jurisprudence, the development and use of weapons with indiscriminate impact on the population and the environment are prohibited. The leader of the Islamic Republic has issued a religious decree against WMDs and specifically against the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. (16) In practice, the UN found that Iran had not used chemical weapons, even in retaliation for Iraq's massive use of these weapons against Iranian soldiers and civilians. (17)

From a strategic point of view, Iranian leaders realize that nuclear weapons do not provide domestic stability or external security. (18) Nuclear might did not prevent the break up of the Soviet empire, nor has it been a factor in recent conflicts in the Middle East. (19) Iran's policy makers believe that development or possession of nuclear weapons undermine Iranian security. Even the perception that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons negatively impacts Iran's power by decreasing its regional influence and increasing its global vulnerabilities.

Iran does not need nuclear weapons to protect its regional interests in the immediate neighborhood. In fact, to augment Iranian influence in the region, it has been necessary for Iran to win the confidence of its neighbors; an effort that will inevitably suffer from such perceptions. Furthermore, with its current state of technological development and military capability, Iran cannot reasonably rely on nuclear deterrence against its adversaries in the international arena or in the wider region. Engaging in a spiraling arms race to establish and maintain nuclear deterrence would also be prohibitively expensive, draining the limited economic resources of the country.

Furthermore, Iran has been one of the more active participants in international efforts to eliminate WMDs and one of the most outspoken proponents of full implementation, strengthening and universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (20) For example, Iran reacted to nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in the...