The Syrian turn: Israeli-Syrian peace and the new moment in U.S. grand strategy.

AuthorBrookhyser, Jason D.

Editor's Note: Does the evolving situation in the Middle East offer the opportunity for constructive negotiations with Syria that could turn it away from support for terrorist organizations toward better relations with Israel and the West and also promote overall peace in the Middle East? This essay argues that a deal analogous to that which was achieved with Libya is possible if the United States renounces regime change as an objective. For a contrary view on negotiating with Syria, see an article by Barry Rubin that is reviewed in our Internet Article Reviews section.

Nancy Pelosi's recent trip to meet with the President of Syria in an effort to revive relations between the two countries certainly provoked a great deal of criticism and debate about the foreign policymaking powers of Congress and the political weakness of President Bush. The trip also highlighted an underlying desperation for change in U.S. foreign policy. Regardless of the potential efficacy of Pelosi's methods, her giant leap to Syria serves as another sign that the United States has come to a crossroads in its strategy in the Middle East. Furthermore, the undermining of President Bush's executive authority is the most recent example of a growing frustration over the dangers brought about by what many have come to call a reckless and arrogant U.S. grand strategy as the world's unipolar hegemonic leader.

The revelations of unofficial talks between Israeli and Syrian figures over the last two years, which was leaked to the press last January, present a tremendous, though temporary, window for the United States to press ahead with the Israeli-Syrian peace process. The chain reaction that would be brought about by a peace agreement and the subsequent normalization of relations between Israel and Syria would include the end of Syrian support for Hezbollah and Hamas, the opportunity for a permanent peace between Israel and Lebanon and the further international isolation of the regime in Iran, as well as all of the elements necessary to bring about the successful implementation of a mutually beneficial solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The United States has come to a new moment in its history in which it must show itself as a truly benevolent hegemon, with farsighted interests, and reasonable respect for the legitimate interests of others. When asked why he would not support the draft peace plan that was established by the unofficial Israeli-Syrian meetings, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert took cover in the claim that by opening a dialogue with Syria, Israel would anger the United States. (1) Regardless of the sincerity of his claim, the United States should have immediately responded with unequivocal support for Israeli engagement with Syria.

It is in the clear interests of the United States to use its power and resources to facilitate the Israeli-Syrian peace process; first, through direct U.S.-Syrian engagement, followed by the use of coercive pressure by the United States to bring the two states together. In order to understand the likelihood of such engagement, it is first necessary to look back at the history of the conflict between Syria and Israel, particularly since the Six Day War of 1967.

The Hostile Evolution of Israeli-Syrian Relations

The origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict can be traced back to Israel's inception in 1947, though the specific character of the current relations between these states began to take shape in the run-up to the Six Day War of 1967. Egyptian President Nasser began to form a new conception of the conflict that would bring together the powers of Arab nationalism against the perceived imperialist threat of Zionism. By turning the conflict into a pan-Arab confrontation with Israel, all for the sake of the Palestinian cause, Nasser was able to consolidate his power and influence within a unified Arab front. (2) It thus became necessary for Israel to respond in kind, and reframe the conflict in such a way that would reflect the deepening nature of the existential threat.

Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion faced this threat by developing a public perception of the great dangers that lie on the border. By utilizing the still recent memories of the Holocaust, Ben-Gurion was able to create an atmosphere in Israeli public opinion of anxious hostility toward the Arab states in the region, which were certain to attack at any moment.

The specific course of events that led to the outbreak of violence in June of 1967 revolves primarily around Egyptian troop movements into the Sinai Peninsula, thereby increasing Israeli certainty that an attack was imminent. At a different level, though, the build-up to violence was directed and fed by misperceptions and intemperate rhetoric, which effectively trapped the leaders of both sides into a continuously escalating drive to confrontation. Israel used the opportunity of the war to assert its superior military strength, advancing into enemy territory and establishing itself as an occupying power in the West Bank and Gaza as well as the Egyptian Sinai and the Golan Heights of Syria. The occupation would establish a continuous state of tension between the belligerents. While Egypt regained the Sinai after the Camp David Accords of 1978, Syria has still to accomplish the return of the Golan. This lack of sovereign legitimacy has added to a sense of frustration and anger on the Syrian side of the conflict. (3)

After the Six Day War, the Israeli strategy in the region was driven by what came to be known as "the capsule theory." It was argued that in order for the Israelis to achieve the most beneficial compromise to the Palestinian problem, they would first need to reach peace agreements with the surrounding Arab regimes. This would encapsulate the Palestinians and force them to negotiate directly with Israel, rather than through a hostile regional power. (4)

Syrian President Assad feared the encirclement of pro-Israeli regimes and, rather than enter talks that could lead to the return of the Golan Heights, chose to encourage the continuation of the conflict. This was especially true after Egyptian President Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem to address the Israeli Parliament, which led to the Camp David summit and the return of the Sinai to Egyptian control. Assad vehemently rejected Sadat's example, and worked to ensure that other states in the region would reject it as well. Furthermore, the Syrian leader insisted that Israel would have to consent to retreat from the Golan before Syria would sit for comprehensive peace talks. (5)

In order to ensure Syrian security, Assad also worked to assert his control over Lebanon. This became especially necessary after Israel's 1982 invasion of southern Lebanon to confront growing Palestinian militant factions in the area. Assad was keenly aware that Israeli access to Lebanon was essential to its regional influence, and that denial of such access would prove effective in containing its power. This added to Syria's interest in control over Lebanese foreign policy for the purposes of hedging against regional marginalization. (6)

Syria's uncompromising stance in the peace process continued until its economic and military stability was threatened by the demise of its patron, the Soviet Union, with the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, the Gulf War of 1991 established the United States as the unquestioned hegemon in the region. It is from this point that Assad began to offer overtures of accepting a bilateral peace with Israel, although, because of his perceived domestic constraints, he wanted an agreement that could be framed as a legitimate victory for Arab nationalism.

The Madrid...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT