Symposium foreword.

• Author: Litton, Paul
• Position: Bombshell or Babystep? The Ramifications of Miller v. Alabama for Sentencing Law and Juvenile Crime Policy

1. INTRODUCTION

   In June 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Miller v. Alabama, holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory sentences of life without parole (LWOP) for juveniles, regardless of the crime committed.* 1 Miller represents the fifth time since 2002 that the Supreme Court invoked the Eighth Amendment to bar a punishment for a class of offenders based on cither offender characteristics or the particular crime. (2) Three of those five decisions pertain to juveniles, prohibiting the death penalty, (3) LWOP for non-homicide offenders, (4) and mandatory LWOP. (5) The Miller opinion raises many important matters: practical issues for lower courts in the twenty-nine affected jurisdictions that had authorized mandatory LWOP for juveniles; challenges for attorneys representing juveniles charged with homicide; moral and policy questions for legislators who should reform their states' juvenile justice systems; and questions regarding the future of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.

   In March 2013, the Missouri Law Review brought together an outstanding group of scholars and attorneys to address sentencing law issues stemming from Miller. Our first panel explored constitutional questions, ranging from the desirability of the opinion itself to its potential implications for individualized adult sentencing. A common theme of these presentations was the Court's methodology in conducting Eighth Amendment proportionality analyses, with specific focus on the role of "objective indicia" of evolving standards. Presenters on our second panel, who are all involved in post-Miller litigation, focused on relevant practical issues facing state courts and legislatures, including here in Missouri: Are lower courts applying Miller retroactively? What challenges will defense attorneys face in trying to demonstrate that their clients are capable of reform? (6) What alternatives to juvenile LWOP are acceptable? Our third and final panel's charge was broader, discussing policy considerations for juvenile justice reform more generally.

   Part II of this Foreword briefly addresses one open constitutional question in the wake of Miller: in light of its rationale, is juvenile LWOP--whether mandatory or the result of an individualized sentencing process--constitutionally permissible? I argue that the Miller opinion itself is incoherent insofar as it permits juvenile LWOP as a constitutionally viable sentence. Part III provides a short synopsis of the controversy among Justices regarding the proper methodology for Eighth Amendment proportionality analyses. Then, with particular attention to the authors' different takes on Miller's implications for methodology, Part III provides a guide to the symposium contributions focusing on the Eighth Amendment. Parts IV and V will then briefly summarize our symposium contributions focusing on sentencing policy more generally and on Missouri's juvenile justice system.

2. THE PERPLEXING RATIONALE OF MILLER V. ALABAMA AND THE FUTURE OF JUVENILE LWOP

   The Supreme Court justified its holding by invoking two strands of precedent interpreting the Eighth Amendment's ban on excessive punishments. The first strand prohibits certain "sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty." (7) Two decisions specifically place limits on juvenile sentencing: Roper v. Simmons prohibits the death penalty for juveniles, (8) and Graham v. Florida forbids LWOP sentences for juvenile, non-homicide offenders. (9) Those opinions recognize that children are "constitutionally different from adults" because of their "diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform." (10)

   The Court summoned a second strand of precedent based on its view that juvenile LWOP is "akin to the death penalty." (11) By comparing juvenile LWOP to execution, the Court invoked its capital jurisprudence, which prohibits mandatory death sentences. (12) Woodson v. North Carolina held that a mandatory death penalty unconstitutionally prevents the sentencer from considering characteristics of the offender and circumstances of the offense that may speak in favor of a more lenient sentence. (13) An overarching purpose of Woodson and other Supreme Court cases is to shape capital sentencing schemes "so that the death penalty is reserved only for the most culpable defendants committing the most serious offenses." (14) Together, these two lines of cases led the Court to ban mandatory juvenile LWOP. (15) Miller permits juvenile LWOP, but a juvenile is entitled to an individualized sentencing hearing before a court decides whether to impose it. (16)

   One of the puzzling aspects of the Court's rationale is its invocation of Woodson from its capital jurisprudence. Of course, the dissent and critics of the decision decry the majority's razing of the "death is different" wall that had limited the Court's more active oversight of state capital sentencing schemes. (17) But even on the assumption that the Court justifiably invoked its capital jurisprudence, its reliance on Woodson is perplexing for the following reason: the Court's capital jurisprudence directly addresses whether juveniles may receive the death penalty. Roper held that they may not. (18) In the same way that Woodson permits the death penalty but disallows a mandatory scheme, Miller permits juvenile LWOP while prohibiting only its mandatory imposition. (19) But if juvenile LWOP is truly akin to the death penalty, warranting the Court's death penalty jurisprudence, then one should conclude that Roper applies, prohibiting juvenile LWOP in the same way it prohibits the death penalty for juveniles.

   Is there a principled reason that explains why Woodson, but not Roper, applies? Perhaps some unexposed reason exists for saying that juvenile LWOP is "like death" for Woodson purposes but not for Roper's. However, none is evident. Maybe Miller prohibits mandatory juvenile LWOP to minimize the risk that an undeserving juvenile will receive that sentence, but it ultimately permits juvenile LWOP because some juvenile murderers might, in fact, deserve it. The problem with that response, though, is that similar arguments were made to the Court in Roper and Graham and rejected. In forbidding a "case-by-case approach," which would have permitted juvenile LWOP for some juvenile non-homicide offenders, the Graham majority stated:

   For even if we were to assume that some juvenile nonhomicide offenders might have "sufficient psychological maturity, and at the same time demonstrat[e] sufficient depravity," to merit a life without parole sentence, it does not follow that courts taking a case-by-case proportionality approach could with sufficient accuracy distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for change. (20) The Court made a similar statement in rejecting a case-by-case approach to the death penalty for juveniles, in which one's youth and attendant characteristics would serve as mitigating factors rather than a categorical bar:

   An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender's objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack...