Symbolic Speech

AuthorJeffrey Lehman, Shirelle Phelps

Page 425

Nonverbal gestures and actions that are meant to communicate a message.

The term symbolic speech is applied to a wide range of nonverbal communication. Many political activities, including marching, wearing armbands, and displaying or mutilating the U.S. flag, are considered forms of symbolic expression. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that this form of communicative behavior is entitled to the protection of the FIRST AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution, but the scope and nature of that protection have varied.

The Supreme Court first gave symbolic speech First Amendment protection in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 1117 (1931). The Court overturned a California statute that prohibited the display of a red flag as a "sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government." But not until the VIETNAM WAR era did the Court articulate the rules to be followed in determining whether symbolic expression is entitled to the protection of the First Amendment.

In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S. Ct. 1673, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1968), the Court reviewed the conviction of David Paul O'Brien for violating a 1965 amendment to the Selective Service Act (50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 451 et seq.) that prohibited any draft registrant from knowingly destroying or mutilating his draft card. O'Brien had burned his Selective Service card on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse at a rally protesting the Vietnam War. He claimed that his act of burning his card was symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment. The government argued that it could prohibit this conduct because it had a legitimate interest in requiring registrants to have draft cards always in their possession as a means of ensuring the proper functioning of the military draft.

The Supreme Court sided with the government, with Chief Justice EARL WARREN rejecting "the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled speech whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express his idea." When "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a lesser burden will be placed on the government to justify its restrictions. Accordingly, the Court announced the appropriate constitutional standard:

[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Applying this test to the statute involved in O'Brien, the Court found the law constitutional.

A less defiant form of symbolic speech was extended constitutional protection during the Vietnam War. In TINKER V. DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969), high school officials in Des Moines, Iowa, had suspended students for wearing black armbands to school to protest U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Justice ABE FORTAS, in his majority opinion, rejected the idea that the school's response was "reasonable" because it was based on the fear that the wearing of the armbands would create a disturbance. Fortas ruled that the wearing of the armbands was "closely akin to 'pure speech' which ? is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment?" Public school officials could not ban expression out of the "mere...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT