Symbolic Conflict Resolution and Ingroup Favoritism

• Published date: 01 November 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231155323
• Author: Sergi Martínez,Vicente Valentim,Elias Dinas
• Date: 01 November 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Journal of Conf‌lict Resolution

2023, Vol. 67(10) 2028–2057

© The Author(s) 2023

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DOI: 10.1177/00220027231155323

journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr

Symbolic Conf‌lict Resolution

and Ingroup Favoritism

Sergi Mart´

ınez

1

, Vicente Valentim

2

, and Elias Dinas

3

Abstract

What are the domestic consequences of symbolic conf‌lict resolution? We isolate the

effect of symbolic conf‌lict by looking into a dispute with no material stakes (for one

side), but high symbolic ones: the Prespa Agreement, which ended the dispute on the

name of FYROM, thenceforth named North Macedonia. Greeks opposed this name

because the ancient Macedonian heritage is central to their national identity. Based on

social identity theory, we expect this threat to the group’s distinctiveness to increase

nationalist sentiment. Using an original dataset of f‌lags displayed in the façade of

buildings in Athens and Thessaloniki, which we compare to Lisbon, we f‌ind an increase

in national f‌lags in the Greek cities after the Agreement. The effect is stronger in

Thessaloniki, Greek Macedonia’s capital, where the identity threat was more pro-

nounced. We also f‌ind that the treaty shifted voters to the right, especially those

residing in the region of Macedonia.

Keywords

nationalism, radical right, social identity theory, f‌lags, Prespa agreement

Symbolic grievances are a common barrier to conf‌lict resolution. International and

intra-national competition for political resources often entails a dispute for the control

or monopoly over symbolic capital such as myths or symbols (Harrison 1995).

1

Princeton Politics, Bobst Center for Piece and Justice, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA

2

Nuff‌ield College, University of Oxford, UK

3

Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy

Corresponding Author:

Sergi Mart´

ınez, Princeton Politics, Bobst Center for Piece and Justice, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ

08540, USA.

Email: sergi.martinez@princeton.edu

Examples abound. Oftentimes, symbolic disputes are mostly low-scale and folkloric in

nature, like Austria and Germany’s competing claims about the birthplace of Mozart or

even Hitler; Greece and Turkey’s contested ownership over what is generally known as

Turkish coffee; or even the ongoing dispute between Serbia and Croatia over the

recognition Nicola Tesla’s birthplace. In other cases, these disputes become more

salient in the political debate, sometimes providing the justif‌ication for actual armed

conf‌lict. Examples include the contest between ethnic groups to design a f‌lag for post-

Apartheid South Africa; or even the conf‌lict over Kosovo, which is often justif‌ied on

symbolic grounds by the Serbs because the region was the playground of their historical

battle against the Ottomans. As Kaufman (2006) points out, the critical role of symbols

in def‌ining group identities can make this kind of dispute more diff‌icult to resolve than

conf‌licts over more tangible interests.

Given the ubiquity of symbolism in political conf‌lict, it is crucial that we understand

the domestic political consequences of symbolic conf‌lict resolution. Previous research,

however, has provided scant evidence on this matter due to the diff‌iculty in isolating the

symbolic nature of conf‌lict. In most conf‌licts, symbolic and material grievances are

intertwined, making it hard to empirically disentangle the type of strategies that are

most effective in dealing with each of them.

We draw upon the singular case of a conf‌lict that, for one of the countries involved,

had only symbolic interests at stake—the Macedonia naming dispute.

1

With a large

population of ethnic Greeks identifying as Macedonians, Greece objected to the ap-

propriation of the Macedonian label by a different country after the break up of

Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. This objection set the ground for a nearly 30-year long

dispute with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) over its off‌icial

name. The Prespa Agreement, signed between the two countries in 2018 and ratif‌ied by

their parliaments the following year, settled the dispute. According to its resolution,

FYROM would henceforth go by the off‌icial name of Republic of North Macedonia.

Our focus is on the Greek side of the Agreement, for which stakes were solely

symbolic. On the Macedonian side, these symbolic interests were intertwined with

material ones. For a new state like FYROM, branding can signif‌icantly affect its future

geopolitical placement. For example, resolving the naming dispute was a crucial step if

the country were to remain hopeful of joining the European Union in the future. For

Greece, however, such material interests were absent and made the origin of the dispute

purely based on symbolic grievances. What were the domestic political consequences

of symbolic conf‌lict resolution in this case?

We expect this treaty to have increased nationalist sentiment among Greek citizens.

Social identity theory postulates that group distinctiveness shapes ingroup perceptions

and qualif‌ies outgroup attitudes (for a review, see Hogg, Abrams and Brewer 2017).

Accordingly, individuals are likely to react by increasing their ingroup favoritism when

perceiving a threat to their group’s distinctiveness by a competing outgroup. In that

respect, the Prespa Agreement entailed the Greek government accepting that another

country would have a term central to Greek national identity (Macedonia) in its off‌icial

Mart´

ınez et al. 2029