Swann's Rebuttal to Diamond

• Pages: 163-165

163

7C

Swann’s Rebuttal to

Diamond

The differencesbetween the co-editors astosurveyformats fordilu-

tion areprimarilynuanced. Asan example, wewould bothrejectan

“aided”association question,“What[type of product/automobile]

comestomind when Isay(orwhen yousee) [allegedlydiluting brand/

TAMOTA]?,”asimproperlynarrowing amemory search. Iwould

favor,however,“Whatbrand orbrands,ifany,come tomind, when

Isay(orwhen yousee) [allegedlydiluting brand]?,”asframing the

inquiry in amarketplace context (and notdemanding an answer)–as

opposed toDr.Diamond’s whollyneutral question, “Whatwasthe

first thing thatcame tomind when hearing (orwhen seeing) [allegedly

diluting brand]?” (thatmaybe deemed byrespondents todemand an

answer). Thatisabout asnuanced asyoucan get.

Thereisone substantiveand majordifference legal between us.

Dr.Diamond essentiallyreadsthe phrase“association arising from

the similarity between amarkortrade name and afamous markthat

impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark”asfocusing on “asso-

ciation thatimpairs distinctiveness”; and from thatreading, she then

observes:(a) that“[i]twould be desirable tohaveasurveydesign that

could …test directlywhetheramarkislikelytocausedilution, that

is,whetheranyobtained association islikelytoimpairdistinctiveness

…”; and (b) thatabsentsuch asurvey,“courts …will havetocontinue

tostruggle, unaided bydirectsurveyevidence….”1Idisagree withthe

focus on and linkage between association and impaired distinctiveness;

and, consequently:(a) withanyneed forasurveytodoanything more

thatmeasureassociation;and (b) withthe suggestion thatcourts must

struggle anymorewithdilution-factoranalysesthan theyhave, for

decades,withconfusion-factoranalyses.

First,whynotread the definitional phraseasfocusing on “ similarity

…thatimpairs distinctiveness”? Atleast twoBoarddecisionshave

appropriatelyinferred association from similarity in finding (in

1. ShariSeidman Diamond, “Surveys in Dilution CasesII”at162.