Sustainable Development and the Legal Protection of the Environment in Europe
| Author | Luis A. Avilés |
| Position | Associate Dean, University of Puerto Rico Law School |
| Pages | 29-34 |
29SPRING 2012
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE LEGAL
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN EUROPE
by Luis A. Avilés*
Sustainable development has gained considerable
attention from environmental and supranational organi-
zations, including the United Nations and the European
Union (“EU”), since the concept was first discussed in the mid
1970s1 and then defined by the United Nations as “development
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”2 Environ-
mentalists hoped for a shift in policy and lawmaking that would
balance present and future needs by accounting for environmental
externalities resulting from economic development.3 They also
hoped that the concept of sustainable development would spawn
legal rules and principles that would resolve legal disputes without
sacrificing the interests of either the environment or development.4
This hope has yet to materialize and environmentalists now think
sustainable development has become a euphemism for naked
development.5 This article traces the adoption of sustainable
development principles by the United Nations in the 1992 Rio
Declaration and by the European Community and the European
Union. Specifically, the article analyzes the concept of sustain-
able development under the primary and secondary law along
with its treatment in the Court of Justice of the European Union
(“CJEU”). The review illustrates that sustainable development
has become a general principle in the European legal order,
incorporated into the field of environmental protection via a set
of sub-principles. The European legislature and the CJEU could
further strengthen these principles by striking a balance between
economic development and environmental protection, the dual
underpinnings of sustainable development.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
FROM STOCKHOLM 1972 TO RIO 1992
Sustainable development has eluded concrete definition
since its inception. Nonetheless, its importance is evident from
its inclusion by the United Nations in the Stockholm Declaration
on the Human Environment and in the establishment of the World
Commission on Environment and Development (“CED”).6 In
1987, the CED issued a report entitled Our Common Future
(also known as the “Brundtland Report”), recommending
“sustainable development” as a perspective for addressing the
relationship between economic development, the environment,
and the divide between rich and poor countries.7 Under this
definition,8 the report identified two key priorities in making
sustainable development decisions: assuring the needs of the
poor9 and protecting natural resources to ensure present and
future growth of civilization and technology.10
The United Nations 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development clarified the two priorities of sustainable
development. The Declaration proclaimed twenty-seven prin-
ciples in the hope of forming an “equitable global partnership”
among international stakeholders.11 The first four principles are
of particular importance in defining sustainable development:
Principle 1: Human beings are at the centre of concerns for
sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and
productive life in harmony with nature.12
Principle 2: States have, in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations and the principles of international law,
the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant
to their own environmental and developmental policies,
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environ-
ment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.13
Principle 3: The right to development must be fulfilled so as
to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs
of present and future generations.14
Principle 4: In order to achieve sustainable development,
environmental protection shall constitute an integral part
of the development process and cannot be considered in
isolation from it.15
In Principle 1, the word “entitled” could be understood as
part of the State’s duty or positive obligation to protect the human
right to health and life. Principle 2 articulates a “good neighbor
policy,” recognizing the State’s sovereign right to exploit its
natural resources, while also imposing a responsibility to ensure
that this exploitation does not damage other States. Principle 3
limits the State’s development right with an inter-generational
equitable duty to balance current needs with the needs of future
generations. Finally, Principle 4 integrates environmental
protection and development into a single process, insinuating
the necessity for environmental regulation at all steps — from
planning to execution — in the development process.
The Community of Nations’ announcement of these princi-
ples led to immense debate16 among policy makers considering
international cooperation, human rights, trade, economics,17 and
urban and strategic planning.18 As a result, policy makers have
been unsuccessful in adopting sustainable development prin-
ciples, even when balancing development and environmental
*Luis A. Avilés is the Associate Dean, University of Puerto Rico Law School.
Professor Avilés is the former Chairman of the Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority. He has a JD from the Harvard Law School and an LLM in European
Law from Université Pantheon-Assas Paris II.
30 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
concerns appears logical.19 Translating ideology into practice is
not an easy task.20
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: POLICY GOAL,
LEGAL PRINCIPLE, OR LEGAL RULE?
Any modern discussion about the difference between legal
rules and legal principles ought to consider the ideas of legal
philosopher Ronald Dworkin. According to Dworkin, rules
are “applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion”21 while principles
have “the dimension of weight or importance.”22 Furthermore,
a principle is “a standard to be observed, not because it will
advance or secure an economic, political, or social situation, but
because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other
dimension of morality.”23 Judges use legal principles to justify
their reasoning when deciding a case and these principles are
always weighed against other principles.24 Policy, on the other
hand is a “kind of standard that sets out the goals to be reached,
generally an improvement in some economic, political, or social
feature of the community.”25 While courts use legal principals to
weigh their decisions, the development of policies is the realm
of legislatures and government agencies. Unfortunately, legal
observers frequently intermingle principles and policies, result-
ing in confusion of the two terms.
Discussion about the “vagueness” of sustainable development
and its inability to produce tangible results has been attributed
to: 1) failure to strike a concrete balance among principles
and policies when applied to actual situations, and 2) the
difficulty of deriving legal norms or legal rules that create duties
or obligations subject to review by courts.26 Regarding the first
observation, author J.B. Ruhl rejects the either-or dichotomy
between developers (whom he calls “resourcists”) and envi-
ronmentalists arguing that a third variable, social equity must
be included in the sustainable development decision process.27
Social Equity, both in its geographic (local to global) and time
(intra-generational and inter-generational) dimensions This third
consideration is necessary to balance development with environ-
mental concerns.28 Hans Vedder, a frequent commentator on EU
environmental law, notes that while “[e]nvironmental protection
and sustainable development continue to occupy a prominent
place in the objectives of the European Union . . . , [a]n issue that
remains unresolved is the exact weight to be given to the various
objectives where they are at odds with each other.”29
Regarding the second observation, some scholars theorize
that the integration of sustainable development and the legal
system may result in three types of legal roles.30 These roles are:
1) a standard of behavior, 2) a guiding principle that decision-
makers must rely on when making decisions, and 3) a general
framework under which to interpret a given law.31 Most of the
legislation aimed at achieving sustainable development utilizes
the second and third roles. The main issue with making sus-
tainable development a legal standard of behavior involves the
difficulty of defining the parameters of legal behavior. As Ruhl
observed, sustainable development is a balance of economic,
environmental, and equity considerations.32 However, there
is no widely accepted scientific model that can formulate a
standardized equation from such a multiplicity of interconnected
variables whose informational quality varies considerably.33
Another author, John Gillroy, notes that, although sus-
tainable development is recognized as a general principle of
international law, it has little relevance in the resolution of
international disputes.34 To resolve a legal dispute, a legal
principal must be recognized and capable of generating rules.35
However, the legal principal of sustainable development is not
capable of generating rules because it remains a collection of
competing sub-principals.36 According to Gillroy, instead, the
legal principle of sustainable development is a meta-principle
of law comprised of four substantive and four procedural
sub-principles that are sometimes at odds with each other. The
four substantive principles are: 1) prevention, 2) precaution,
3) the right to equitable development, and 4) the right to use
internal resources so as not to harm other states.37 Gillroy’s
four procedural principles are: 1) integration of environment
and development, 2) concern for future generations and their
welfare, 3) a common but differentiated responsibility, and 4)
the polluter-pays.38 Gillroy argues that the frequent conflict
between and among the procedural and substantive principles
inhibits the meta-principal of sustainable development from
generating legal rules that courts may use to resolve legal
disputes.39 This is because the principles themselves are
fundamentally unclear as to which should bear greater weight
on a conceptual or legal scale. For instance, if precaution
against environmental harm and prevention of environmental
degradation are of critical importance, do these principles then
place legal limits on a State’s right to develop or use its internal
resources? Or, if preservation for future generations is seen as
the end goal of sustainable development, should there be any
limitation on the polluter-pays principle or the idea that devel-
opment and environmental interests can ever be integrated?
These questions simply highlight the ambiguity inherent in
the current state of sustainable development’s definitional and
legal evolution.
Given these ambiguous, and often conflicting, principles,
is it fair to draw the same conclusion when the legal prin-
ciple of sustainable development is applied to the resolution of
disputes in a supranational court such as the Court of Justice
of the European Union (“ECJ”)? The next section of the article
considers how the ECJ has articulated the elusive principle of
sustainable development when resolving disputes under various
EU treaties.
EUROPEAN UNION’S COMMITMENT
TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The tumultuous evolution of environmental protection
within the EU began in the 1970s with the European
Commission’s (“Commission”) “First Communication on
Environmental Policy.”40 In this policy report, the issue of
whether environmental problems should be addressed at the
State or community level was put forward with Member States
eventually agreeing to adopt community legislative measures.41
Just a year after the 1987 release of the Brundtland Report, the
31SPRING 2012
European Council began to shift its focus from environmental
protection alone by considering additional issues related to
sustainable development.42 However, almost a decade passed
before the European Community incorporated sustainable devel-
opment into law when the Treaty of Amsterdam promulgated
the concept as an objective43 by including the principle of a
“balanced and sustainable development.”44 However, the Treaty
of Amsterdam referred to sustainable development as a “general
principle” but did not provide a definition of the concept.45
Despite the lack of definition, a principle of environmental
protection emerged because of the Treaty’s focus on careful
usage of natural resources.46 The purpose was to balance the
economic and environmental interests of present and future
generations.47 Additionally, the European Community incorpo-
rated a “high level of protection and improvement of the quality
of the environment” as an objective of the Treaty.48
Pursuing the theme of sustainable development under the
1992 Rio Agenda, EU institutions commenced an aggressive
legislative program49 based on the Fifth Environmental Program
in 1998, which aimed to “review []the European Community
programme of policy and action in relation to the environment
and sustainable development ‘towards sustainability.’”50 Despite
high hopes for this program, the European Commission reported
that little progress had been achieved since 1992.51 However, the
review found that the EU did change its focus on development
from “environmental protection” to “environmental sustain-
ability” by shifting its attention from the negative environmental
impacts of using natural resources to long-range planning for
sustainable use of natural resources.52
Following this trend, the Commission unveiled its Sixth
Environmental Action Program (“6EAP”) a few months
before issuing the EU Rio+10 report, emphasizing the concept
of “environmental sustainability” rather than “sustainable devel-
opment.”53 The 6EAP encouraged the use of the “integration
principle” proposed in Article 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU)54 to incorporate the EU’s envi-
ronmental goals into the secondary legislation.55 The 6EAP
also emphasized transparency in its encouraging the public to
participate in decisions effecting the environment and promoting
access to environmental information.56 However, a recent report
from the European Institute for Environmental Policy draws less
than optimistic conclusions on the achievements and future of
the 6EAP, indicating that political forces at the Member State
level may be to blame for the lack of paradigmatic changes
to the legal protection of the environment since the Rio+10
report.57 Most problematic is the delay in implementation of the
“Thematic Strategies” that target environmental goals related to
air, marine life, waste management, urban development, natural
resources, pesticide usage, and soil.58
Currently, Article 3(3) of the Treaty on the European Union
(“TEU”)59 mandates the establishment of an internal market
based on the “sustainable development of Europe” based on three
objectives: 1) balanced economic growth and price stability, 2)
a highly competitive social market economy aimed at achiev-
ing full employment and social progress, and 3) “a high level
of protection and improvement of the quality of the environ-
ment.”60 Thus, the historical objective of the EU — the creation
of an internal market — must be accomplished incorporating
sustainable development’s principles of balancing economic
growth in a social market economy with a high level of envi-
ronmental protection. This goal marks a paradigm shift from the
ordoliberal principles underlying the original Treaty of Rome.61
Additionally, Article 3(3) defines sustainable development in the
EU context by outlining the three objectives described above.62
Article 3(3) echoes the Rio 1992 Declaration, emphasizing the
conviction that a pursuit of a sustainable development strategy
will work to eradicate world poverty and manage the world’s
natural resources.63
However, sustainable development is not only the paradigm
for the internal market. Article 3(5) of the TEU requires the
EU to contribute to “the sustainable development of the Earth”
through its international relationships.64 Additionally, Article
21(2) of the TEU mandates EU States to “foster the sustainable
economic, social, and environmental development of develop-
ing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty.”65
Furthermore, sustainable development must be ensured using
international cooperation to “preserve and improve the quality
of the environment and the sustainable management of global
natural resources.”66
Article 6(1) of the TEU incorporates into law a recognition
of “the rights, freedoms and principles of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union . . . which shall have
the same legal value as the Treaties.”67 Article 37 of the Charter
provides that “[a] high level of environmental protection and the
improvement of the quality of the environment must be inte-
grated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance
with the principle of sustainable development.”68 This principle,
now integrated into EU law, is similar to Gillroy’s sub-principle
mandating a high level of environmental protection.69
The integration clause of Article 11 of the TEU provides
a framework under which EU institutions may pursue compli-
ance with Gillroy’s procedural sub-principle of integration of
the environment and development.70 This clause requires the
integration of environmental protections into EU polices and
activities to promote sustainable development.71 The Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union provides specific
guidance on the environmental objectives of these policies and
activities.72 Article 191(1) of the TFEU identifies the following
objectives:
preserving, protecting and improving the quality of
the environment, protecting human health, prudent
and rational utilisation of natural resources, promoting
measures at international [sic] level to deal with
regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in
particular combating climate change.73
Article 192(2) TFEU establishes that “a high level of
[environmental] protection” will be achieved by “taking into
account the diversity of situations in the various regions of
the Union. It shall be based on the precautionary principle
and on the principles that preventive action should be taken,
32 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at
source and that the polluter should pay.”74 Thus the “high level
of protection and improvement of the quality of the environ-
ment” principle that defines the sustainable development of the
EU’s internal market in accordance with Article 3(3) TEU, must
incorporate the: precautionary principle,75 the source principle,
the polluter pays principle, the prevention principle, and the
safeguard clause. Any EU policy must integrate elements that
correspond to the high level protection envisioned by the pro-
tection principle as shaped by its corresponding sub-principles.
Otherwise, the policy and the secondary legislation that articu-
lates it, infringe the Treaties.
A host of secondary legislation issued as Directives
to Members States has also incorporated the objective of
sustainable development.76 One directive, the Water Framework
Directive (“WFD”), incorporates the “river basin approach” to
environmental water management and attempts to integrate a
multi-sided sustainable development approach in its structure.77
Commentators applaud such an approach to secondary legisla-
tion, while continuing to criticize the apparent lack of political
will from Member States to speedily embrace such legislation.78
The European Union’s sustainable development mandate
is not only limited to the European arena; it is also part of its
international agenda.79 In addition to the EU efforts, individual
Member States have attempted to incorporate sustainable devel-
opment into their domestic legal systems. The United Kingdom,
for example, has incorporated the concept into urban planning.80
Sustainable development continues to elude environmental
lawyers who operate in a command-and-control regulatory
system that already affords effective legal protection to the
victims of environmental harms.81 While sustainable development
is part of the EU primary and secondary law, legal tribunals must
still weigh the concept’s role when deciding disputes where the
EU objectives of economic development, social development,
and environmental protection clash. Thus, we must consider how
the ECJ has articulated the legal principle of sustainable devel-
opment in the resolution of these disputes under the Treaties.
THE ECJ AND THE PRINCIPLE
OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The ECJ has not shied from discussing sustainable develop-
ment principles in its decisions.82 Of all principles addressed in
the ECJ, the principle of assuring a high level of environmental
protection is the most integral to the implementation of sustain-
able development in the EU.83 The ECJ has even pronounced
this principle in cases where the relevant treaties were quiet on
the issue. In the Danish Bottles case,84 for example, the ECJ
declared that the Member States may limit the free movement of
goods under the Cassis de Dijon85 doctrine if it is necessary to
protect the environment.86
Two recent cases also demonstrate the ECJ’s approach
toward the interplay between the polluter pays principle, the
prevention principle, and the precautionary principle. In the
Grand Chamber decision of Raffinerie Meditarranee,87 the
Court interpreted the polluter pays principle under Directive
2004/35/EC, which outlined the environmental liability sur-
rounding the prevention and remedying of environmental dam-
age.88 There, the Italian court imposed penalties on the polluter
parties that required remedial action beyond that established
under the consultative process of the Directive.89 The remedial
action was implemented “without that authority having carried
out any assessment, before imposing those measures, of the
costs and advantages of the changes contemplated from an eco-
nomic, environmental or health point of view.”90 In addition, the
Court issued preventive orders to parties whose lands were not
polluted or had been decontaminated before the effective date
of the Directive.91 These measures afforded a higher level of
environmental protection than the one required by the Directive,
a stretch, but not prohibited by a literal reading of Article 193 of
the TFEU.92 The Court further held that the polluter pays prin-
ciple could be incorporated into even more protective national
measures:
Articles 7 and 11(4) of Directive 2004/35, in conjunction
with Annex II to the directive, must be interpreted as
permitting the competent authority to alter substantially
measures for remedying environmental damage which
were chosen at the conclusion of a procedure carried
out on a consultative basis with the operators concerned
and which have already been implemented or begun
to be put into effect. However, in order to adopt such
a decision, that authority:
– is required to give the operators on whom such
measures are imposed the opportunity to be heard,
except where the urgency of the environmental
situation requires immediate action on the part of the
competent authority;
– is also required to invite, inter alia, the persons
on whose land those measures are to be carried out
to submit their observations and to take them into
account; and
– must take account of the criteria set out in Section
1.3.1 of Annex II to Directive 2004/35 and state in
its decision the grounds on which its choice is based,
and, where appropriate, the grounds which justify the
fact that there was no need for a detailed examination
in the light of those criteria or that it was not possible
to carry out such an examination due, for example,
to the urgency of the environmental situation.93
Under this precedent, national authorities could impose
a higher level of protection than originally devised under the
Directive, provided they give the relevant parties the opportunity
to be heard, invite the participation and comments of adjacent
landowners, and the national measure is grounded in the need
for urgent preventative action. The orders against the landown-
ers whose lands were not polluted also validates the measures
33SPRING 2012
under the precautionary principle and the general principle of
proportionality:
Directive 2004/35 does not preclude national legislation
which permits the competent authority to make the
exercise by operators at whom environmental recovery
measures are directed of the right to use their land
subject to the condition that they carry out the works
required by the authority, even though that land is not
affected by those measures because it has already been
decontaminated or has never been polluted. However,
such a measure must be justified by the objective of pre-
venting a deterioration of the environmental situation in
the area in which those measures are implemented or,
pursuant to the precautionary principle, by the objective
of preventing the occurrence or resurgence of further
environmental damage on the land belonging to the
operators which is adjacent to the whole shoreline at
which those remedial measures are directed.”94
In a second case decided the same year, Afton Chemical
Limited,95 the ECJ affirmed the level of judicial review to be
applied to institutional actions relying on complex environmental
issues while further clarifying the role of the precautionary
principle under European legislation. Afton, a chemical com-
pany was seeking to invalidate the limits imposed by Directive
2009/30 to the additive MMT on grounds of the precautionary
principle, pending a full assessment of its health and environmen-
tal impacts.96 Regarding judicial review, the ECJ affirmed that:
[I]n an area of evolving and complex technology . . .
the European Union legislature has a broad discretion,
in particular as to the assessment of highly complex
scientific and technical facts in order to determine
the nature and scope of the measures which it adopts,
whereas review by the Community judicature has to be
limited to verifying whether the exercise of such powers
has been vitiated by a manifest error of appraisal or a
misuse of powers, or whether the legislature has mani-
festly exceeded the limits of its discretion. In such a
context, the Community judicature cannot substitute its
assessment of scientific and technical facts for that of
the legislature on which the Treaty has placed that task.
***
However, even though such judicial review is of limited
scope, it requires that the Community institutions [that]
have adopted the act in question must be able to show
before the Court that in adopting the act they actually
exercised their discretion, which presupposes the taking
into consideration of all the relevant factors and circum-
stances of the situation the act was intended to regulate.97
Regarding the precautionary principle, the Court in Afton
prescribed its application as follows:
A correct application of the precautionary principle
presupposes, first, identification of the potentially nega-
tive consequences for health of the proposed use of
[Methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl
(“MMT”)] and, secondly, a comprehensive assessment
of the risk to health based on the most reliable scientific
data available and the most recent results of international
research . . . [w]here it proves to be impossible to deter-
mine with certainty the existence or extent of the alleged
risk because of the insufficiency, inconclusiveness or
imprecision of the results of studies conducted, but the
likelihood of real harm to public health persists should
the risk materialise, the precautionary principle justifies
the adoption of restrictive measures, provided they are
non-discriminatory and objective (see Commission
v France, paragraph 93 and case-law there cited) In
those circumstances, it must be acknowledged that the
European Union legislature may, under the precautionary
principle, take protective measures without having to
wait for the reality and the seriousness of those risks to
be fully demonstrated.98
Ultimately, the Court held that the temporary restrictions
on MMT additives in combustion fuels, pending a full scientific
assessment, was objective and non-discriminatory and, there-
fore, a proper use of the precautionary principle.99
CONCLUSION
The acquis communitaire demonstrates that the principle
of sustainable development occupies a privileged position in
the European legal order. The principle is a foundation of the
EU Treaty, encompassing sub-principles — the precautionary
principle, the source principle, the polluter pays principle, and
the prevention principle — and promoting a balanced growth
imperative via the safeguard clause of Article 192 TFEU.100
European institutions have incorporated these principles in the
secondary legislation of the EU and the Court of Justice of the
European Union has commenced the long process of embroider-
ing these principles into the legal fabric of the EU.
Even though the Court of Justice has embraced adjudicat-
ing European law on the principles of environmental protection,
articulation of these principles as sub-tenants of sustainable
development remains absent. The European legislature ought
to “put flesh to the bones” of the general environmental protec-
tion principles by noting that integration of these principles in
a particular act or legislation satisfies the Treaties’ objective
sustainable development.101 The principle of sustainable devel-
opment should also see the Court of Justice continue to apply
environmental sub-principles. In doing so, the Court of Justice
needs to provide a coherent interpretation of these principles to
clearly establish the balancing between economic development
and environmental protection that sustainable development
34 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
calls for. This consistent application will ensure that sustain-
able development as a legal principle will continue playing a key
role in the development of European environmental law and will
perhaps inspire other legal systems to follow suit.102 As the legal
community takes up this trend, it will guide the evolution of the
European Union in its quest to create “an ever closer union among
the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as
possible and as closely as possible to the citizen.”103
Endnotes: Sustainable Development and the Legal Protection
of the Environment in Europe
1 See generally ROBERT L. STIVERS, THE SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY: ETHICS
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1976).
2 World Comm. on Env’t and Dev., Our Common Future: Report of the World
Commission on Environment and Development, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Aug.
4, 1987) [hereinafter Our Common Future].
3 See e.g., James L. Huffman, Markets, Regulation, and Environmental
Protection, 55 MONT. L. REV. 425, 430 (1994) (noting that environmentalists
hoped that command-and-control to limit private interests that are damaging the
environment). But see, David Barnhizer, Waking from Sustainability’s “Impossible
Dream”: The Decision Making Realities of Business and Government, 8 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 595, 588–89 (2006) (arguing that purely sustainable
development is impossible to achieve because human self interest will always
stand in opposition).
4 Cf. Barnhizer, supra note 3, at 613 (discussing how environmentalists want
to establish an equal balance between human needs and natural systems).
5 Cf. id. at 670–71 (arguing that corruption is a primary reason for the failure
of laws protecting the environment).
6 See United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration
on the Human Environment, ¶¶ 4–5 U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1 (June 16,
1972) (declaring that developed and developing countries must ensure that their
growth protects the interests of the environment).
7 Our Common Future, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 4–15 (describing sustainable
development as a means to growth in which both developed and developing
countries work together to responsibly use the earth’s resources so that they will
continue to be available in the future).
8 Id.
9 See id. at ¶ 42–47 (declaring that the basic needs of the poor must be
addressed including food, employment, energy, housing and sanitation).
10 See id. at ¶ 65–71 (addressing the need for continued growth of technology
that is harmonized with the needs of the developing world and also the
environment).
11 See generally Gen. Assembly, Report of the United Nation Conference on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (June 13, 1992).
12 Id. prin. 1.
13 Id. prin. 2.
14 Id. prin. 3.
15 Id. prin. 4.
16 See, Gregory A. Daneke, Sustainable Development as Systemic Choices,
29 POL’Y STUD. J. 514, 514–15 (2001) (arguing that the economic and environ-
mental balancing act that underlies sustainable development has led to continual
re-conceptualization which has, in turn, made the idea a “vague agenda rather
than a serious set of policy mechanisms”).
17 See Lawrence Wai-Chung Lai & Frank T. Lorne, The Coase Theorem and
Planning for Sustainable Development, 77 TOWN PLAN. REV. 41, 41 (2006)
(arguing that the Coase Theorem, used to model transactions costs when analyz-
ing market failures, should be used in sustainable development planning); see
also DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 24 (1990) (defining sustainable development as maximiz-
ing the benefits of economic development, including all elements of social welfare,
while maintaining the services and quality of natural resources in the future).
18 See generally Susan E. Batty, Planning for Sustainable Development in
Britain: a Pragmatic Approach, 77 TOWN PLAN. REV. 29, 31 (2006) (analyzing
how urban planners in the U.K. have adopted sustainable development principals
and looking specifically at failures of policy, institutions and politics).
19 See id. at 39 (arguing that strong public concern for the environment is
necessary before policy makers will make significant strides towards sustainable
development).
20 NICO SCHRIJVER & FRIEDL WEISS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 7 (2004).
21 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 24 (1978).
22 Id. at 26.
23 Id. at 22.
24 Id. at 65.
25 Id.
26 John Martin Gillroy, Adjudication Norms, Dispute Settlement Regimes
and International Tribunals: The Status of “Environmental Sustainability” in
International Jurisprudence, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (2006) (discussing how
the twenty-seven principles pronounced in the Rio Declaration negotiated by
various conflicting interests resulting in an incoherent notion of sustainable
development).
27 J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for
Environmental Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 36 (1999).
28 Id.
29 Hans Vedder, The Treaty of Lisbon and European Environmental Law and
Policy, J. ON ENVTL. L., 285, 287-288 (2010).
30 Bruce Pardy, Sustainable Development: In Search of a Legal Rule, 28 J.
BUS. ADMIN. AND POL’Y ANALYSIS 391 (2001).
31 Id.
32 Ruhl, supra note 27, 35-36.
33 See id. at 61 (noting that models use to design sustainable development are
poor because they rely on non-methodical judgments and expertise).
34 Gillroy, supra note 26, at 2 (recognizing that because sustainable development
remains only a principle of international jurisprudence, it plays a minimal role
in resolving international disputes).
35 Id.
36 See id. (arguing that the reason sustainable development has not resulted
in dispositive legal rules is that the concept itself is not sufficiently definitive
due to competing and contradictory principles and sub-principles that dilute
the clarity necessary to transform the principle into legal rules).
37 Id. at 12.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 2.
40 Noah Vardi & Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich, From Rome to Nice: A Historical
Profile of the Evolution of European Environmental Law, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L.
REV. 219, 221-22 (2004).
41 Id.
42 WILLIAM M. LAFFERTY & JAMES MEADOWCROFT, IMPLEMENTING SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES AND INITIATIVES IN HIGH CONSUMPTION SOCIETIES 307
(2000).
43 Treaty of Amsterdam, art. 2, Oct. 2 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, 37 I.L.M.
56.
44 Vardi & Zeno-Zencovich, supra note 40, at 223.
45 Id.
46 See id. (noting that the Treaty’s language has been interpreted to govern
economic and environmental interests because of its focus on careful use of
natural resources).
47 Id. at 236.
48 See id. at 236-37 (suggesting that such language precludes the adoption
of any regulatory measures by Member States that aim at only achieving a
“minimum common denominator of environmental protection” because
the Treaty suggests that the entire Community must attain a high level of
environmental protection).
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