Survival, adaptation and uncertainty: the case of Cuba.

• Author: Mujal-Leon, Eusebio
• Position: Inside the Authoritarian State - Report

The Cuban Revolution recently experienced a major transition of leadership as power shifted hands from Fidel Castro to his younger brother, Raul. Eschewing the role of caretaker, Raul embarked on an ambitious program aiming to streamline a cumbersome and inefficient state while reforming the economy in ways that will increase agricultural production, encourage self-employment and lead to sustainable economic growth. At the same time, Raul Castro refashioned the ruling coalition and proposed major changes to the ruling Communist Party, including term limits, leadership rotation and the separation of party and state functions. This article analyzes the emergence of a new Cuban political elite, explores how power is distributed between its military and party wings and examines the major challenges this coalition must overcome if it is to successfully manage the transition from the Castro era and stabilize Cuban autocracy.

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The Cuban Revolution is now in its sixth decade. Born in the crucible of the Cold War, it survived the effects of longstanding U.S. sanctions, the collapse of the communist bloc and Fidel Castro's quixotic efforts to create the "new man" through both socialism and communism. The collapse of the Soviet Union plunged the Cuban economy into a prolonged tailspin from which it has yet to emerge; twenty years later, most economic indicators are still at a fraction of their pre-1989 levels. (1) Christening this phase as the Periodo Especial en Tiempo de Paz (Special Period in Time of Peace), Fidel Castro vowed never to surrender. He did not capitulate and the regime endured. The profound economic crisis that engulfed the island spurred neither dangerous instability nor drastic political change.

Forty years after coming to power, Fidel Castro was still in charge; only a serious illness in July 2006 finally forced him to abdicate his posts. As the economy continued to stumble, he seamlessly turned power over to his brother Raul, who formally assumed the presidency of the Council of State in February 2008 and then the post of the first secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) at its Sixth Congress in April 2011.

The defining characteristics of the Cuban Revolution have been chronic economic difficulty and remarkable political durability. But how long can this endure?

There is little doubt that Raul Castro views the faltering economy as a challenge to the regime's long-term survival. His speeches are replete with calls for order, discipline and exigency in all spheres; his words exude a sense of urgency. In an address to the National Assembly, he declared that the country was on the verge of a "precipice." (2) During another, he noted: "We have to permanently erase the notion that Cuba is the only country in the world where people can live without working." (3) "Socialism," he affirmed on yet another occasion, "means social justice and equality.... Equality of rights [and] of opportunities, not of income. Equality does not mean egalitarianism [which is] another form of exploitation ... exploitation of the responsible worker ... by the slothful." (4)

Since taking over from his brother, the eighty-one-year-old leader has begun to implement wide-ranging changes designed to reform the Cuban economy and reduce the bloated state--which employs nearly 85 percent of the workforce--while putting in place a "successor generation" that will inherit a more stable Cuban Revolution. (5) Raul Castro does not describe his efforts as "reforms," preferring instead to describe them as an actualizacion (updating) of the model. (6) It is too soon to tell whether these initiatives, which are timid in comparison to those implemented in China and Vietnam over the past three decades, will spur sustainable economic growth, but they nevertheless represent a sharp break from the paternalistic vision of his brother.

Raul Castro seeks to change more than the face of the Cuban economy. He has fashioned a new ruling coalition and has begun to prepare the transfer of power to the next generation of party leaders. Many younger cadres who worked closely with Fidel are gone. The new coalition includes remnants of the revolutionary generation (most of whom are in their seventies or eighties), but beneath this gerontocracy, a "successor generation" of military elites and party provincial secretaries has emerged.

This article analyzes the rise of this new ruling elite. The first section explores how the economic crisis of the 1990s spawned the conditions for its emergence. The second section analyzes how Raul Castro and his supporters consolidated power. The conclusion discusses the challenges this new elite will face when it inherits power after the era of the Castro brothers ends.

THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Cuba was rocked by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, and in short order, the island nation became an international orphan. The effect was devastating. More than 85 percent of Cuban trade was with the Soviet Union--90 percent if one includes the entire Soviet bloc. (7) Year to year, trade and commerce collapsed, along with all subsidies, loans, grants and free military equipment Cuba had been receiving from the Soviet Union. Precise data are difficult to come by, but reliable estimates put the figures of economic aid at $39.5 billion from 1960 to 1990, loans at $60.5billion (most of which were written off or unpaid) and military parts and equipment at $13.4 billion. (8) The demise of the Soviet Union also had major political and ideological consequences for Cuba. Not only was the Castro regime cast adrift in an inhospitable world, but it also had to adjust to the demise of communism as an ideology. Because the Cuban Revolution had genuine nationalist roots, however, it was able to replace Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin with Jose Marti and Antonio Maceo with relatively little effort.

The economic consequences of the Soviet collapse were profound and long lasting. The Cuban economy went through a particularly rough period between 1990 and 1994, with widespread food shortages and electricity outages. In August 1994, a spontaneous riot involving several thousand people (known as the maleconazo) erupted in Havana. Shortly thereafter, thousands of balseros left the island on makeshift rafts and inner tubes. However, with the exception of the Havana riots, occasional protests elsewhere and the heroic defiance of dissident groups, there were few overt signs of dissent during the early years of the Periodo Especial--certainly none that placed the regime in jeopardy.

By 1996, the worst was over. Over the next fifteen years, the economy stabilized and even showed signs of growth. But the improvement concealed persistent structural problems in the economy, especially the inefficiency of the state sector and the low productivity of its workers. As soon as things started to improve, Fidel Castro slammed the brakes on the tepid reforms he had only grudgingly accepted. If Cuba could afford to postpone its economic day of reckoning, it was only because Hugo Chavez came to power in Venezuela in 1999 and began to provide Cuba with nearly $3.5 billion in subsidies annually. (9)

There were several reasons why the Cuban regime survived the economic and social cataclysms of the early 1990s. One was the efficacy of its mechanisms for social control. The Cuban state was omnipresent, employing a mix of strategies to control, direct and disarm society. (10) Opposition was also weak, and immigration served as a safety valve for nonconformists. The absence of viable alternatives helped the regime survive but this was only one side of the equation. Fidel Castro and many Cubans struck a grand bargain when the regime consolidated power in the early 1960s. This project involved a radical defense of national sovereignty, the promise of social equality and the delivery of universal health care, education and housing--the so-caned accomplishments of the revolution. In exchange, citizens could expect tight political restrictions and a constant struggle against domestic and foreign enemies, including a permanent conflict with the United States. This confrontation (which was fueled on both sides of the Florida Straits) helped consolidate and sustain the regime.

The consensus forged in the early 1960s between the Cuban state and its citizens lost adherents over time. Many people who originally supported the project became disenchanted, retreating into a form of internal exile that did not require confrontation with the status quo. Resolver (to get by) was the new normal; stealing from the state and trading on the black market became part of everyday life. Support declined steadily once the Periodo Especial arrived. (11) The decline in fervor was most evident among Cuban young people who grew tired of the incessant calls for struggle and sacrifice that never improved the lives of ordinary citizens. (12) Finding that their education did not guarantee employment in the brave new Cuba of the 1990s, university graduates left their professions and took jobs in tourism and other lucrative sectors of the service economy. Many young people left the country or just strolled along the malecon, a long seaside walkway in Havana, and dreamed of doing so. More than 500,000 people left Cuba between 1994 and 2009--a statistic that does not include those who departed illegally. (13) Both critics and supporters of the regime took note of the deep social malaise.

In May 1999, Archbishop Pedro Meurice spoke of the "anthropological lesions" suffered by Cuban society during the preceding forty years. (14) More recently, Alfredo Guevara, a cultural icon and close friend of the Castro brothers, commented on the "material and spiritual crisis" that had enveloped Cuba since the start of the Periodo Especial. (15) Even if such dissatisfaction did not find political expression, it was increasingly evident that the national project--which had...