Suppression by Mobilization: How Information Control Strategies Contain Political Criticism in Autocracies

• Published date: 01 September 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241242040
• Author: Li Shao,Dongshu Liu,Fangfei Wang
• Date: 01 September 2024
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Political Research Quarterly

2024, Vol. 77(3) 729–742

© The Author(s) 2024

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DOI: 10.1177/10659129241242040

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Suppression by Mobilization: How

Information Control Strategies Contain

Political Criticism in Autocracies

Li Shao

1

, Dongshu Liu

2,3

, and Fangfei Wang

4



Abstract

Autocrats selectively tolerate political criticism, which may erode regime support. The literature suggests that regimes

contain criticism by encouraging more supportive voices, but the mechanisms remain unclear. We theorize two

mechanisms: winning more supporters (persuasion) or mobilizing existing supporters to speak out (mobilization). These

mechanisms can be created by censoring evidence that supports criticism and adopting propaganda to arouse nationalism

or promise material gains. We conducted two survey experiments in China with a novel measurement of supporter

mobilization: respondents’written defenses against criticism. We f‌ind evidence of a mobilization mechanism but not

persuasion. Censoring facts strongly encourages supportive comments. Ideological propaganda’s effects are moderate,

whereas propaganda on material benef‌its has no effect.

Keywords

evidence censorship, propaganda, authoritarian regimes, China, political criticism, mobilization

Introduction

Contemporary autocrats often face unexpected political

criticism that spreads domestically and internationally.

Criticism can signal regime incompetence to the public

(Guriev and Treisman, 2020) or facilitate collective ac-

tions (Egorov, Guriev,and Sonin, 2009), thus endangering

regime stability. However, completely suppressing criti-

cism is costly. Because of the information problem, au-

tocrats often cannot detect the potential crisis in advance

and suppress all criticism. For example, Chinese off‌icials

were unprepared for the spread of COVID-19 during the

f‌irst few weeks of the pandemic, thus attracting both

domestic and foreign criticism.

1

These types of criticisms

spread quickly with little cost (Chen and Xu, 2017, 793),

and the regime can only suppress it after it has already

widely reached the public.

2

In other cases, these unex-

pected criticisms can serve as an alarm to remind the

regime of potential crises. Political criticism can resolve

information dilemmas for autocrats and enhance their

governance capabilities (Stromseth, Malesky, and

Gueorguiev, 2017). Regimes may strategically tolerate

political criticism (King, Pan, and Roberts, 2013;

Lorentzen, 2014;Shao, 2018) because it is helpful for the

regime to understand its true governance standing.

This study proposes an information control strategy,

that is, censorship and propaganda, by which autocrats

can create, solicit, and spread supportive voices to counter

criticism without completely suppressing it. Mobilizing a

supportive voice creates an appearance of a split opinion,

which can discourage potential opponents and thus

minimize the negative impacts of criticism (Chen and Xu,

2017;Little, 2016). In China, from the paid online

commentator (the f‌ifty-cent army) (King, Pan, and

Roberts, 2017) to the voluntary regime defender (Han,

2015), supporting voices are widely solicited by the

government to contain the negative consequences of

1

Department of Political Science, School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang

University, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China

2

Department of Public and International Affairs, City University of Hong

Kong, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong

3

Centre for Public Affairs and Law, City University of Hong Kong, Hong

Kong

4

Faculty of Humanities, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, China

Corresponding Author:

Dongshu Liu, Department of Public and International Affairs, City

University of Hong Kong, LI-5543, Li Dak Sum Yip Yio Chin Building, Tat

Chee Ave, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong.

Email: dongshu.liu@cityu.edu.hk