Support for Division-Level Innovation Cells During Continuous Transformation

• Pages: 347-388
• Date: 01 November 2025
• Published date: 01 November 2025
• Author: Major J. Erin Malapit

Support for Division-Level Innovation Cells During

Continuous Transformation

Major J. Erin Malapit*

We are an Army in transition that must win in the current environment and

build for the future. All of us, regardless of rank, are empowered to solve prob-

lems and identify opportunities to improve how we f‌ight and how we take care

of our Soldiers, Civilians, and Families. We will foster and sustain the right

culture and processes while capturing our initiative in programs of record that

will outlast each of us.

1

I. INTRODUCTION

For the past three years, Ukraine has defended against a conventionally supe-

rior adversary when “virtually all” expected Russian success.

2

Steven Pifer, Russia-Ukraine after three years of large-scale war, STANFORD CENTER FOR INT’L

SEC. AND COOP. (Feb. 19, 2025), https://perma.cc/XH29-XV9U.

When The Russian

Federation (Russia) invaded Ukraine in February of 2022, Russia boasted the

“preponderance of power” with a defense budget that was ten times larger, an

economy nearly eight times larger, nearly f‌ive times as many military personnel,

and signif‌icantly superior military capabilities compared to its opponent.

3

Seth G. Jones et al., Ukrainian Innovation in a War of Attrition, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L

STUD. (Feb. 27, 2023), https://perma.cc/HNV4-83RG.

Despite

* Judge Advocate, United States Army. Presently assigned as the Chief of Justice, 7th Infantry

Division, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. LL.M, 2024, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal

Center and School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia; J.D., 2020, Vanderbilt University

Law School; M.S., 2016, Missouri University of Science and Technology; B.A., 2012, University of

Virginia. Previous assignments include Military Justice Advisor, Military District of Washington,

Washington, D.C., 2022-2023; Administrative Law Attorney, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault),

Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 2021–2022; Battalion Engineer, 83rd Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Bragg,

North Carolina, 2016–2017; Aide de Camp, 21st Theater Sustainment Command, Kaiserslautern,

Germany, 2014–2015; Platoon Leader, 500th Horizontal Engineer Company, 15th Engineer Battalion,

Grafenwoehr, Germany, 2013–2014; Assistant Operations Off‌icer, 15th Engineer Battalion,

Grafenwoehr, Germany, 2012–2013. Member of the Bars of Pennsylvania, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Armed Forces, and the Supreme Court of the United States. In 2024, this paper was

submitted in partial completion of the Master of Laws requirements of the 72nd Judge Advocate Off‌icer

Graduate Course (Boo Hoos!) © 2025, Major J. Erin Malapit. Thank you to my faculty advisor, LTC

Hannah Purkey, for believing in me; my husband, MAJ Mark Thomas, for his steady supply of love,

humor and patience; our au pair, “Lu Lu” Aguiar, for her support and encouragement; my parents, Jeff

and Gigi Malapit, for giving me the gift of Faith and forming the foundation of our domestic church; my

sister, Julia Yard, for inspiring me; our eldest children, Juanito and Shanley, for giving my life meaning;

and last, but not least, our baby Aurora, whose joyfully awaited birth was the force behind this article.

1. XVIII Airborne Corps, XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS INNOVATION PROCESS: GUIDE FOR INNOVATION

PROJECTS 1 (Dec. 2022) [hereinafter XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS INNOVATION GUIDE] (quoting then-

Lieutenant General Christopher T. Donahue, who had been serving as the Commanding General of

XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Liberty at the time of the statement).

2.

3.

347

these enormous quantitative and qualitative advantages, Russia failed to achieve its

goal of seizing the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv, which the Kremlin assumed it would

control within days of invading.

4

See generally Soph Warnes and Lou Robinson, Visualizing how Ukraine has changed in the

3 years since Russia’s full-scale invasion, CNN (Mar. 3, 2025), https://perma.cc/8YNF-SASQ.

Even after expending staggering amounts of per-

sonnel and equipment on this unexpectedly protracted war, Russia continues to fall

short of its goal of occupying the Eastern one-half to two-thirds of Ukraine.

5

See Pifer, supra note 2; see generally Grace Mappes, Russia Has Failed to Break Ukraine,

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR (Feb. 24, 2025), https://perma.cc/E649-RPWZ.

While

many factors have contributed to Ukraine’s astonishing ability to overcome the

odds, its use of bottom-up military innovation is undoubtedly a critical factor.

6

The importance of innovation for national security has not gone unnoticed by

the rest of the world. While the United States was bogged down by counterinsur-

gency conf‌licts with non-peer forces, its Great Power competitors focused their

efforts on quickly approaching technological parity with the United States.

7

See Colonel George M. Dougherty, Accelerating Military Innovation: Lessons from China and

Israel, JOINT FORCE Q. 98 (Sep. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/KQT5-UREV.

The

People’s Republic of China (China), the United States’ “pacing threat”, has

focused heavily on modernization, going so far as to reorganize the country’s sci-

ence and technology sectors to ensure that potentially disruptive technologies

advance Chinese military capabilities.

8

See Nicholas R. Licata, China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy: A Blueprint for Technological

Superiority, FOREIGN POL’Y RSCH. INST. (Dec. 19, 2023), https://perma.cc/7WAW-7YA7. China’s

designation as a “pacing threat” means that “China is the only country that can pose a systemic

challenge to the United States in the sense of challenging us, economically, technologically, politically

and militarily.” Jim Garamone, Off‌icial Talks DOD Policy Role in Chinese Pacing Threat, Integrated

Deterrence, DEP’TM DEF. NEWS (Jun. 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/RC54-YDHE (quoting then-

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl).

The United States has taken notice and

responded with strategic-level changes in the hopes of accelerating innovation.

9

However, not all innovation is created equal. While China’s authoritarian gov-

ernment has enabled it to effectively translate technological innovations into mili-

tary capabilities, this top-down structure has failed to produce its own disruptive

innovations.

10

In contrast to China, Ukraine has effectively leveraged disruptive

technologies, tactics, techniques, and procedures as generated from end-user

innovators rather than the traditional military-industrial complexes.

11

See generally VIDEO: Robot War: Inside Ukraine’s Battlefront of Steel and Circuits, SMALL

WARS J. (Mar. 6, 2025), https://perma.cc/8Z36-B65H.

While not

suff‌icient in itself, embracing bottom-up innovation has become increasingly nec-

essary to winning contemporary wars. The democratization of technology means

that conventional military advantages will no longer be the sole determinant of

victory.

12

4.

5.

6. See Jones et al., supra note 3.

7.

8.

9. See Doughtery, supra note 7 (explaining that one such change was the creation of U.S. Army

Futures Command (AFC)).

10. See Doughtery, supra note 7.

11.

12. See generally Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan with Mason Clark et al, UKRAINE AND

THE PROBLEM OF RESTORING MANEUVER IN CONTEMPORARY WAR 16 (Aug. 2024).

348 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 15:347

While the U.S. Army has taken steps to encourage Soldier-led innovation, cur-

rent f‌iscal policies and a lack of dedicated organizational support are dampening

these efforts. This paper examines the current state of bottom-up innovation in

the Army and argues that its optimization requires that Division Commanders

are provided f‌lexible funding and the support of a Soldier Innovation Cross

Functional Team, as organized under the U.S. Army Futures Command (AFC).

To most effectively deliver innovation with speed at scale, the Department of

Defense (DoD) must look inside the force as much as outside of it. This has been

demonstrated throughout history, such as during the U.S. wars in Vietnam and in

Iraq.

A. Gun Trucks, Two Ways

In 1966, the 54th Transportation Battalion of the 8th Transportation Group

went into Vietnam with a plan that, like all good plans, did not survive f‌irst con-

tact.

13

See Nina A. Kollars, War’s Horizon: Soldier-Led Adaptation in Iraq and Vietnam, J. OF

STRATEGIC STUD. 529-553, 540 (Jan. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Kollars, War’s Horizon], https://perma.cc/

SPD4-5DG8.

Having saved their f‌irepower for combat units, the U.S. Army sent logisti-

cal units, such as the 54th, to run supply lines without many organic combat

capabilities.

14

Relying on the insuff‌icient availability of military police or air sup-

port for defense, the convoys were ripe for ambush.

15

The North Vietnamese

quickly took advantage of the capability gap by interdicting supply lines in an

effort to deny combat units logistical support.

16

With no immediate solution from

higher in the chain of command, the unit took to its own ingenuity to solve the

problem.

17

Using local resources and the skills of individual soldiers, Soldiers

“hardened” their convoys by welding armor and weapons to selected trucks that

were then designated for offensive duty.

18

“Every crew was proud of their truck,”

recalls one member of the 8th.

19

Matt Fratus, The Gun Trucks of Vietnam: How US Soldiers Transformed Cargo Vehicles into

Fighting Machines, COFFEE OR DIE (Oct. 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/7VSV-B85C.

The Vietnam-era “gun truck” made it across the

theater with no formal direction or promotion, and by 1969, it was a f‌ixture for

convoys across the country.

20

However, without a centralized process to capture

this knowledge, each unit spent their own time and resources developing internal

13.

14. Id.

15. See Kollars, War’s Horizon, supra note 13, at 540.

16. Id.

17. Id.

18. Id. at 541. Early gun truck modif‌ications varied based on local supply and individual solider

capabilities (e.g. welding). Some used sheet metal, lumber, or sandbags to fortify their vehicles. Others

pulled hulls from deadlined armored personnel carriers (APCs), welding them to their deuce-and-a-half

for protection. Id. Almost all borrowed f‌irepower was sourced externally, beyond their Table of

Organization and Equipment (TOE). They acquired their M134 Mini-guns—high-powered machine

guns capable of f‌iring 10,000 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition—from aviation or M2s (.50 caliber

machine guns) from f‌ield artillery. Id. at 542.

19.

20. Id.

2025] SUPPORT FOR DIVISION-LEVEL INNOVATION CELLS 349