Supervision/Enforcement of Charitable Trusts

AuthorBrowne C. Lewis
Pages237-253
237
Chapter 8 -
Supervision/Enforcement of
Charitable Trusts
The charitable trust is considered to be a public trust. Instead of the beneficiary of
the trust being a specific ascertainable person, the trust must be meant to benefit a particular
organization or class of persons. Since a charitable trust is a public trust, unlike the case
involving a private trust, the beneficiary of the charitable trust does not have standing to
force the trustee to live up to his fiduciary duties. The state attorney general or another
government official has the authority to enforce the provisions of a charitable trust. Unless
the trust provides otherwise, the donor does not have authority to enforce the charitable
trust.
8.1 Donor Standing
Russell v. Yale University
, 737 A.2d 941
LAVERY, J.
The plaintiffs, an heir of the settlor of a charitable trust, alumni donors and students
of the named defendant, Yale University (Yale), appeal from the judgment of dismissal
rendered by the trial court in granting the Yale's motion to dismiss, which asserted that the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing.
On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly granted Yale's motion to
dismiss because, where the attorney general elects not to participate in a proceeding
involving a charitable trust, a person with a “special interest” may appear on behalf of the
trust to protect the interests of the beneficiaries and that the plaintiff heir, alumni donors
and students have the special interest necessary to confer standing on them. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are necessary for our resolution of this appeal. Yale is a
nonprofit corporation organized pursuant to a 1745 charter, which was reconfirmed in
article eighth, § 3, of the constitution of Connecticut in 1965. The settlor, John W. Sterling,
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died in 1918. At that time, he left, in trust, money for the erection of a building or buildings
that would constitute a fitting memorial reflecting his gratitude and affection for his alma
mater, Yale. The trustees were given broad discretion in the disposition of these funds and
directed, if their discretion made it advisable, to consult with Sterling's sisters with regard to
the use of the funds. The will directed that the money not be used for the purchase of land
or as part of Yale's general fund. In 1930, the Sterling trustees voted to contribute money for
the erection and maintenance of the divinity school quadrangle that bears Sterling's name.
No other restrictions existed in the will and no property rights were reserved for Sterling's
heirs by the will.
The divinity school is one of Yale's graduate professional schools, which educates
men and women for the Christian ministry and provides theological education for persons
engaged in other professions. Prior to the commencement of this action, the president of
Yale appointed a committee to undertake a comprehensive study of the divinity school and
its future. In late 1996, the Fellows of the Yale Corporation approved certain
recommendations, as made to them by the president and dean of the divinity school, calling
for the reorganization of the divinity school, including the demolition of large portions of
the Sterling Divinity Quadrangle.
The plaintiffs took exception to the reorganization and instituted this action seeking
a temporary and permanent injunction enjoining Yale from carrying out the reorganization, a
declaratory judgment that Yale's reorganization plan constitutes an abuse of discretion as a
trustee of a public charitable trust, and an accounting of all gifts and donations Yale received
for the benefit of the divinity school and of charges against the divinity school's endowment.
Yale moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring
suit. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs appealed. Additional
facts will be addressed as necessary.
“It is a basic principle of our law ... that the plaintiffs must have standing in order for
a court to have jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment.... A party pursuing declaratory
relief must ... demonstrate, as in ordinary actions, a justiciable right in the controversy sought
to be resolved, that is, contract, property or personal rights ... as such will be affected by the
[court's] decision.... When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose
standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue and not

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