SEATTLE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Volume 38, No. 4, SUMMER 2015
Public School Funding and McCleary v. State of Washington-A Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine or a Legitimate Exercise of Judicial Autonomy?
Jessica R. Burns(fn*)
I. INTRODUCTION
Public school funding has been contentiously litigated throughout the United States, and the Washington Supreme Court has addressed the inadequacy of public school funding in two pivotal cases: Seattle School District No. 1 v. State(fn1) and McCleary v. State.(fn2) In both decisions, the Washington Supreme Court held that the State failed to provide an adequate basic education for its public school students;(fn3) however, in its attempt to remedy the situation, the court took drastically different approaches.
In McCleary v. State, the focus of this Comment, the Washington Supreme Court held that the State had not met its constitutional obligation to adequately fund K-12 education, and the court ordered the legislature to fully fund the State's basic education program by 2018.(fn4) Interestingly, the court also retained jurisdiction over the case, and ordered the legislature to report annually to the court so that it could evaluate whether the legislature was making meaningful progress towards the court's mandate.(fn5) This jurisdictional retention initially caused some strife among the justices, with several denouncing the judiciary's oversight of the legislature as a violation of the separation of powers.(fn6) This Comment argues that this alleged infringement by the court is not a violation of the separation of powers doctrine-at least not in Washington State. This Comment further delineates what steps the Washington Supreme Court may take before blatantly overstepping its constitutionally delineated bounds.
Part II of this Comment provides a detailed summary of two key Washington cases pertaining to public school funding: Seattle School District No. 1 v. State and McCleary v. State. Following the decision in McCleary, the Washington Supreme Court issued five orders related to the legislature's compliance, or lack thereof, with the State's constitutional mandate.(fn7) These orders, and the subsequent judicial-legislative tug-of-war, are important not just because of their holdings, but also because of the long-standing debate between the court and the legislature as to the proper role of the judiciary in the educational finance arena.
Part III analyzes the separation of powers debate generated by the McCleary court's decision to retain jurisdiction over the case. It ultimately concludes that the court's direct oversight of the legislature is not a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, but is in line with the court's jurisprudence. The court's actions are well within its judicial authority because Washington employs a functional separation of powers doctrine that permits greater flexibility and communication between the branches of government.(fn8) For sociopolitical issues of great importance-such as public school funding adequacy-public policy justifies the use of this flexible approach.
Part IV discusses the court's response to the legislature's noncompliance. Although the McCleary holding does not run afoul of the separation of powers, the court's enforcement of its mandate could potentially violate the separation of powers doctrine. Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
The Washington State Constitution asserts that "[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education(fn9) of all children residing within its borders."(fn10) Therefore, the State has a judicially enforceable and affirmative duty to provide for the education of all K-12 public school students.(fn11) Because the constitution asserts that this duty is "paramount,"(fn12) the obligation to adequately provide for Washington schoolchildren is accorded an elevated status.(fn13) Examination of the Washington State Constitution reveals that the framers specified only one state function as a paramount duty within the entire document-the State's duty to provide for the education of its resident children.(fn14) Evidently, the Washington Constitutional Convention placed great emphasis on the education of children residing within the state's borders.(fn15) The following cases illustrate how the court has interpreted this paramount duty.
A. Seattle School District No. 1 v. State
In Seattle School District No. 1 v. State, the Washington Supreme Court held that the legislature failed to meet its constitutional obligation to adequately fund public schools.(fn16) Prior to the decision, public schools in Seattle were forced to rely on special levy elections to supplement school funding because the legislature did not appropriate sufficient revenue to fund annual educational programs.(fn17) This reliance on special levy elections created a precarious financial situation for public schools. Although school districts could receive additional funding through levy elections, "voters [were] not required to approve the request."(fn18) Additionally, special excess levy elections could only be brought twice annually; upon failure of the second election, the school district was forced to operate with the inadequate funds provided by the legislature.(fn19) In 1975, after two failed special excess levy proposals, parents of children enrolled in the Seattle School District brought a civil suit alleging that the State had failed to uphold its constitutional obligation to provide for the education of its resident schoolchildren.(fn20)
The court found that during the 1975-1976 academic year, 40% of students in Washington attended "levy loss districts."(fn21) The lack of funding forced levy loss districts to reduce teaching staff, subject offerings, and security personnel.(fn22) Additionally, these districts had to cut the budget for fundamental teaching supplies-including textbooks.(fn23) This financial uncertainty created a gradual decline in public school efficacy; as one scholar noted, a "pattern of boom and bust economic swings creates havoc with educational opportunity."(fn24)
Furthermore, the court found evidence that suggested this levy system was patently prejudicial to children in low socioeconomic communities because special excess levies depend on the assessed property valuations within a particular district.(fn25) Presumably, urban communities with higher property valuation were more likely to raise sufficient funds through special excess levies than rural communities with lower property valuation.(fn26) The court thus held that the State's duty to make ample provision for the education of resident children was not constitutionally satisfied by the authorization of special excess levy requests.(fn27) The legislature must make sufficient provision for basic education through appropriation or "dependable and regular tax source[s]."(fn28) The court held that special excess levy funds were neither.
Next, the court determined that it was the judiciary's duty "to construe and interpret the word 'education' by providing broad constitutional guidelines"; however, it was the legislature's duty "to give specific substantive content to the word [education] and to the program it deems necessary to provide that 'education' within the broad guidelines."(fn29) Therefore, the court mandated that the legislature define "basic education"(fn30) and fund Washington's basic education program-without the use of special excess levies(fn31)-no later than July 1, 1981.(fn32) The court, however, did not direct the legislature as to how it should accomplish these directives, stating, "While the Legislature must act pursuant to the constitutional mandate to discharge its duty, the general authority to select the means of discharging that duty should be left to the Legislature."(fn33)
Finally, the Washington Supreme Court overturned the trial court's decision to retain jurisdiction, finding it "inconsistent with the assumption that the Legislature will comply with the judgment and its constitutional duties."(fn34) The court stated that it had "every confidence [that] the Legislature will comply fully with the duty mandated by [the constitution]."(fn35) Despite the court's confidence in the legislature's efforts, thirty years after Seattle School District No. 1, the Washington Supreme Court once again held that the State had failed to adequately fund basic education.(fn36) After a second failure, however, the court was unwilling to place its blind faith in the legislature once again.
B. McCleary v. State
In McCleary v. State, parents of schoolchildren in the Seattle School District again challenged the adequacy of public school funding.(fn37) The Washington Supreme Court found that after Seattle School District No. 1 was decided, the legislature had defined basic education as mandated.(fn38) However, the funding allocated by the legislature did not correlate with the actual cost of providing students with the "education" advanced by the legislature.(fn39) Consequently, during the thirty-some years following Seattle School District No. 1, Washington school districts increasingly relied on levies to supplement state funding(fn40)-an eerily reminiscent cycle.
In McCleary, the State argued that the basic education program was fully funded according to the Basic Education Act, which stated that "education shall be considered to be fully funded by those amounts of...
