After Thirty Years, Is it Time to Change the Vehicle Inventory Search Doctrine?

Publication year2007

SEATTLE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEWVolume 30, No. 4SUMMER 2007

COMMENTS

After Thirty Years, Is it Time to Change the Vehicle Inventory Search Doctrine?

Nicholas B. Stampfli (fn*)

I. Introduction

It was a cold winter night.(fn1) Bobby Smoltz was returning after a long day of skiing. He was tired and had hurt his leg on the slopes. He had also drunk beer and smoked several joints while skiing. As Smoltz was on his way home, something about the way he was driving caught the eye of Officer Bret Maddux. Maddux pulled his squad car behind Smoltz's 1985 Toyota 4-Runner and followed him for several miles. Eventually, Smoltz's truck crossed over the centerline while turning a corner. At that point, Maddux initiated a traffic stop because he suspected that Smoltz was driving under the influence of intoxicants.(fn2)

As Maddux approached the truck, he smelled an overwhelming odor of marijuana emanating from the driver's window. Upon looking in, Maddux believed that Smoltz was stoned. He asked Smoltz for his driver's license, and after observing Smoltz fumble around, Maddux asked Smoltz to get out of his car for some standard field sobriety tests. Subsequently, Maddux turned on his patrol car's video camera. The video of the stop showed that Smoltz performed comparatively well on the standard field sobriety tests, although he frequently complained about his hurt leg. Still, something did not feel right to Maddux and he decided to probe further. Maddux asked Smoltz if he had consumed any alcohol or taken any other drugs earlier that day. Smoltz admitted that he had drunk some beer and had smoked some marijuana with his friends while he was up on the mountain. Based on this admission and Maddux's training and experience, Maddux placed Smoltz under arrest for driving under the influence of intoxicants. This is where the story really becomes interesting.

After Smoltz was cuffed and placed in the back of the patrol car, Maddux asked for permission to search the vehicle. Smoltz, perhaps realizing the consequences of his earlier admissions, smartly declined. When Maddux asked, "Why not?," Smoltz responded, "Because I do not want you to!"

Nonetheless, Maddux pressed on. He said, "I still have to perform an inventory search of the vehicle. Is there anything I am going to find during that inventory search that you want to tell me about?" Smoltz capitulated: "Well, I do have about four or five ounces of pot in my duffel bag."(fn3)

Sure enough, when Maddux performed his "inventory search" of the truck, he found eight Ziploc bags containing one-half pound of marijuana each.(fn4) He also found $667.00 in cash. The truck was towed, and Maddux took Smoltz to jail on charges of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, manufacturing a controlled substance, and driving under the influence of a controlled substance.

Inventory searches are warrantless searches that are not investigatory in scope and are not intended to be searches for evidence.(fn5) Thus, this story raises an interesting problem: whether Officer Maddux abused the inventory search procedure by going beyond the scope permitted by law.

Inventory searches usually occur whenever a car is impounded.(fn6 ) Generally, when performing an inventory search, police are looking to find either valuables or dangerous items before the vehicle is towed.(fn7) The purpose of an inventory search is to protect the vehicle owner's property while it is in police custody and control, protect the police from dishonest claims of theft, and protect officers and the community from potentially dangerous situations.(fn8) These three reasons make inventory searches a useful procedure that the police should continue to use.(fn9)

However, just as inventory searches are useful, helpful procedures, the inventory search doctrine itself is immersed in problems.(fn10) Some of these problems stem from the fact that the public has little or no knowledge of the procedure or its intended use.(fn11) This is easily demonstrated by Smoltz, who initially refused a general evidentiary search and then made incriminating statements because he did not understand the limitations on the inventory search or what it entailed. If the public is generally ignorant regarding inventory searches, it is also possible that there is a lack of knowledge about the procedure among police, lawyers, and even judges.(fn12) This Comment will demonstrate that even for those who understand inventory searches, the rules are hopelessly inconsistent and difficult to apply in practice.(fn13) Such ambiguity leads to an even greater problem: police have the ability to use the procedure to manipulate suspects. Consequently, inventory searches run the risk of not serving their benevolent policy concerns, but instead acting as a "safety net" in cases where an evidentiary search is impossible.(fn14)

Thus, to ensure that inventory searches continue to serve their useful, intended purpose, courts should abandon their reliance on "reasonable police procedure," and instead adopt clear, bright line rules that define a broad scope for inventory searches, yet require police to obtain consent and to honor a refusal of an inventory search. Part II of this Comment will describe the inventory search as it has developed in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in order to provide background and understanding of the procedure as it stands today. Part III will address the difficulties in applying the Supreme Court's approach by comparing the differences in police department policies. Part IV will then closely examine Washington's somewhat laudable approach to inventory searches, the limits the state has placed on the scope of inventory searches, and the steps the state has taken to impose a consent requirement. Last, Part V will suggest much needed reforms for Washington and the rest of the nation to ensure that the rights of individuals are protected while inventory searches continue to serve their purpose.

II. The Supreme Court's Development of the Inventory Search Doctrine

The inventory search doctrine that has been followed or adapted by many states(fn15) was developed by the Supreme Court in four major cases.(fn16) This Part will begin with a general discussion of standard inventory search rules. Then, in order to provide a greater understanding of inventory search procedure, how the doctrine developed, and its policy implications, this Part will discuss the four major cases: South Dakota v. Opperman,(fn17) Illinois v.Lafayette, (fn18) Colorado v. Bertine,(fn19)and Florida v.Wells.(fn20) While examining those cases, this Part will also analyze their implications, strengths, and shortcomings.

Any discussion of search and seizure procedure begins with the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It provides as follows: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause ... ."(fn21) This Amendment requires that a warrant be issued before a search takes place, and consequently, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable and unconstitutional.(fn22) The point of the warrant requirement is that the decision to search should be made "by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."(fn23)

Although warrantless searches are considered per se unreasonable, where there is a danger to law enforcement officers or when evidence could be lost or destroyed, the Court has allowed for "a few 'jealously and carefully drawn' exceptions" to the warrant requirement.(fn24) Other exceptions to the warrant requirement include cases where police are not searching for evidence, but are merely performing a "community care-taking function."(fn25) It follows that the inventory search doctrine is an exception because police are not searching for evidence but are performing this "community caretaking function" and protecting themselves from dishonest claims of theft.(fn26) If police do find contraband during the course of a lawfully performed and seemingly benevolent inventory search, then that evidence will be admissible at trial.(fn27) Additionally, although inventory searches take place without a warrant, they are in fact "searches" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and are considered reasonable.(fn28)

Vehicle inventory searches can occur in a variety of situations and they almost always occur after a vehicle is impounded by the police.(fn29) For example, an inventory search usually happens when a vehicle is impounded where the driver is arrested for driving while intoxicated or driving with a suspended license.(fn30) In cases where a traffic stop is involved, for the inventory search to be valid, the stop itself must be valid.(fn31) Many times, inventory searches also occur when there is no stop, no suspect is present, and police are merely impounding an illegally parked or abandoned vehicle.(fn32) Here again, in order for the search to be valid, the impound of the car must also be valid.(fn33) Thus, to understand how these rules developed and their current problems, it is helpful to examine the cases that have created them.

A. South Dakota v. Opperman(fn34) Describes the Modern Inventory Search Standard and Creates Modern Problems

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