Summaries of Published Opinions, 0421 COBJ, Vol. 50, No. 4 Pg. 96
| Position | Vol. 50, 4 [Page 96] |
COLORADO SUPREME COURT
February 1, 2021
2021 CO 7. No. 19SC548. People v. Garcia.
Confrontation Clause—Sixth Amendment— Testimonial Hearsay.
In this opinion, the Supreme Court reviewed the district court's finding that a return of service document was inadmissible testimonial hearsay under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Applying the "primary purpose" test provided by the Supreme Court for determining whether a statement is testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes, the Court concluded that a court must examine the statement's primary purpose when it is made, not its primary purpose when it is introduced at trial. And, at the time of its making, the primary purpose of the return of service document in this case was administrative, not prosecutorial. Therefore, the district court's judgment was reversed.
2021 CO 8. No. 20SA321. In re Raven v. Polis. Civil Procedure—Parties—Executive Officials— Proper Defendants.
The Supreme Court exercised its original jurisdiction to consider whether Governor Polis was a proper named defendant in a class action challenging the treatment of transgender women in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections. The Court held that its decision in Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, 178 P.3d 524 (Colo. 2008), did not alter the longstanding rule that a suit seeking to enjoin or mandate an executive agency's enforcement of a statute may include the governor, in his or her official capacity, as a named defendant. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the trial court correctly declined to dismiss Governor Polis from the action. The rule to show cause was discharged.
2021 CO 9. No. 19SC573. People v. Ross. CRS § 18-7-402(l)(a) and (b)—For the Purpose of Prostitution of or by a Child—CRS § 18-7-407.
The Supreme Court determined that it need not resolve the parties' dispute as to whether "with intent" or "knowingly" is the applicable culpable mental state for the crime of soliciting for child prostitution under CRS § 18-7-402(1) (a) and (b) (subsections (a) and (b)). Instead, the Court concluded that the requisite culpable mental state—whether with intent or knowingly—applies to all the elements (and every part of each element) in subsections (a) and (b), including that the purpose of the defendant's conduct was the prostitution of or by a child. Thus, simply proving that the defendant's purpose was prostitution in general, not child prostitution specifically, cannot suffice—even if there is eventually prostitution of or by a child.
Contrary to the People's contention...
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