Summaries of Published Opinions, 0519 COBJ, Vol. 48, No. 5 Pg. 94

PositionVol. 48, 5 [Page 94]

48 Colo.Law. 94

Summaries of Published Opinions

Vol. 48, No. 5 [Page 94]

Colorado Lawyer

May, 2019


March 4, 2019

2019 CO 15. No. 16SC584. People v. Travis. Sixth Amendment—Counsel of Choice—Motion to Continue—Abuse of Discretion.

The People challenged the decision of a division of the Court of Appeals that concluded that Travis's request to "look for and pay for a lawyer" was an invocation of her Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel of her choice. The Supreme Court held that Travis's request did not implicate her Sixth Amendment right to counsel of her choice and that die trial court's decision to deny Travis's request to continue her trial to "look for and pay for a lawyer" was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the Court reversed the division's decision and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

March 11, 2019

2019 CO 16. No. 18SA83. In the Matter of Booras.

Judicial Discipline—Sanctions.

In this judicial disciplinary proceeding, the Supreme Court considered the exceptions of a now-former Colorado Court of Appeals judge to the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline's (Commission's) recommendation that the judge be removed from office and ordered to pay the costs the Commission incurred in this matter.

The Commission's recommendation was based on factual findings and conclusions of law determining that the judge had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.2, Canon 3, Rule 3.1, and Canon 3, Rule 3.5 of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct by (1) disclosing confidential information belonging to the Court of Appeals (namely, the vote of a Court of Appeals division on a case prior to the issuance of the decision in that case) to an intimate, non-spousal partner, and (2) using inappropriate racial epithets in communications with that intimate partner, including a racially derogatory reference to a Court of Appeals colleague.

The Supreme Court concluded that the Commission properly found that the judge's communications with the judge's then-intimate partner were not protected by the First Amendment. The Court further concluded that, given the judge's resignation, which the judge tendered and which became effective after the Commission made its recommendation, the Court need not decide whether the judge's removal from office was an appropriate sanction. Rather, die Court concluded that die appropriate sanction in this case...

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